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Self-control can be defined as the ability to exercise control over one’s action, 
thoughts and emotions (Casey & Caudle, 2013). Self-control abilities are crucial for 
successful functioning in all aspects of human life (e.g. social situations, educational 
and work environments). The development of self-control is an important aspect of 
cognitive development through childhood and adolescence (Diamond, 2013), and has 
far-reaching implications during this important developmental period. That is, self-
control is important for learning (e.g. self-control helps concentrating on the task at 
hand and not getting distracted by the environment), for making optimal decisions 
(e.g., healthy food-related or financial decisions), for keeping friendships (e.g. self-
control helps in not reacting impulsively and hitting someone, when being teased), and 
for social skill development (e.g. self-control helps to inhibit the impulse to cut in line) 
(Diamond, 2013). 
At the core of self-control lies the ability to intentionally inhibit one’s actions. 
Intentional inhibition has been defined as a late ‘veto’ mechanism (Filevich, Kühn, & 
Haggard, 2012; Haggard, 2008). By means of this late ‘veto’ mechanism, one can 
cancel action execution of an already initiated action at the last possible moment, as 
given in by an internal thought process (Filevich, et al., 2012; Haggard, 2008). Thus, 
intentional inhibition differs from stimulus- or externally driven inhibition1 in that it is 
driven by an internally generated process, rather than an external stimulus which tells 
you to stop your behavior. To date self-control development has been primarily 
studied from the perspective of externally driven inhibition (for a review, see 
Diamond, 2013), yet, intentional inhibition is clearly present in many aspects of 
children’s life, such as when inhibiting the tendency to get up of your chair and walk 
around in the classroom based on internally set goals, or when trying to finish a 
tedious task without supervision. In addition, given that intentional inhibition lies at 
the core of self-control, that is to say, most of our action control is driven by internal 
motives, problems in intentional inhibition have wide-ranging implications, such as for 
childhood psychological and psychiatric disorders, such as Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (Moffitt et al., 2011) or conduct disorder (Fergusson, 
Boden, & Horwood, 2013).  
Therefore, the main goal of this thesis is to gain insight in the development of 
intentional inhibition. In this chapter, a theoretical background for the empirical 
studies on intentional inhibition presented in this thesis will be given. First, the 
existing behavioral and neuroscientific literature on the development of self-control, 
with a focus on what is currently known about externally guided inhibition will be 
reviewed. Next, a framework for studying the development of intentional inhibition 
will be given. Finally, the literature discussing self-control in emotionally and/or 
motivationally relevant contexts will be described. Together, this overview leads to a 
set of studies on intentional inhibition presented in this thesis. 
                                                        
1 The terms stimulus-driven and externally driven inhibition both refer to inhibition that is 
driven by and external stimulus. Therefore, the terms stimulus-driven and externally driven 
inhibition will be used interchangeably in this thesis.  
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1.2 Externally guided inhibition 
 
One of the most studied components of self-control development involves the ability 
to control one’s actions and stop actions when the environment requires one to do so, 
also referred to as inhibition (Diamond, 2013; Zelazo et al., 2003). There are marked 
improvements in inhibition in infancy (Diamond, 2013), early childhood (Zelazo, et 
al., 2003) and school-aged children (van der Molen, 2000), which has been interpreted 
as protracted development of executive control functions. Executive control is often 
used as an umbrella term to refer to our ability to control our thoughts and actions in 
order to attain future goals, and inhibition is a key component of executive control 
(Diamond, 2013). As such, inhibition is thought to lie at the core of cognitive 
development (Diamond, 2013).  
Most research on the development of inhibition has focused on the 
development of stimulus-driven inhibition. In these experiments, inhibition is typically 
preceded by an external stimulus or cue, which signals that one has to stop an already 
initiated or prepotent action. Research with two experimental paradigms has 
contributed significantly to our knowledge of the mechanisms underlying stimulus-
driven inhibition, namely the stop-signal paradigm and the go/nogo paradigm. In the 
stop-signal paradigm participants are presented with a simple stimulus (e.g. a left or 
right pointing arrow) to which they have to respond as quickly as possible. On a 
limited number of trials (i.e. about 25 % of all trials) a stop signal (e.g. a loud noise or 
a color-change of the stimulus) is presented after the stimulus has come online. By 
varying the delay between presentation of the stimulus and presentation of the stop-
signal, it is possible to calculate the Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT), that is the time 
one needs to inhibit an already initiated response (Band, van der Molen, & Logan, 
2003; Logan & Cowan, 1984). The go/nogo paradigm also examines the inhibition of 
prepotent responses (Casey et al., 1997). In this paradigm participants are presented 
with a stream of stimuli (e.g. different letters) to which they have to respond by means 
of a button press. However, one stimulus (e.g. the X) is instructed to be a nogo-
stimulus. This nogo-stimulus is presented on a limited numbers of trials (i.e. around 
20 % of all trials), and when this nogo-stimulus is presented participants have to 
inhibit a prepotent response to the presentation of a new stimulus (Casey, et al., 1997). 
In contrast to the stop-signal paradigm, the go/nogo paradigm does not allow for a 
calculation of the SSRT. Instead, the dependent variable in the go/nogo paradigm is 
the number of false alarms (i.e. the number of times a participant does not inhibit 
when a nogo-stimulus is presented). 
Cross-sectional developmental comparison studies using these paradigms 
have shown that stimulus-driven inhibition has a protracted development (Casey, et 
al., 1997; Cohen et al., 2010; Durston et al., 2002; Rubia, Smith, Taylor, & Brammer, 
2007). Studies using the stop-signal paradigm have found that even though children 
are already able to inhibit, the SSRT continues to become faster across development 
(between 6-30 years of age) (Cohen, et al., 2010; Ridderinkhof, Band, & Logan, 1999; 
Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999). Furthermore, studies using 
the go/nogo paradigm have shown that even though 6 to 10 year-old children are 
already able to inhibit, they are more susceptible to the effects of prepotency of 
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responding (Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 2002). That is to say, when a nogo-trial 
was preceded by a larger number of go-trials, thereby increasing the prepotency of 
responding, children experienced more difficulty inhibiting responding to that nogo-
stimulus (Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 2002). Taken together, young children are 
already able to inhibit, but not to the same level as adults and not in a stable level 
across the full duration of a paradigm (Diamond, 2013; Luna, Padmanabhan, & 
O'Hearn, 2010). This ability continues to improve across childhood and adolescence, 
with mature performance levels being reached in early (11 years of age) (Huizinga, 
Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006) to late adolescence (18 years of age) (Luna, et al., 
2010).  
In terms of neural correlates, studies in adults have shown that a specific 
network of brain regions is active when participants perform a stop-signal task. This 
network involves the dorsal and ventral prefrontal cortex (specifically right inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG)), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)/pre-supplementary motor 
area (SMA) and parts of the basal ganglia, including the subthalamic nucleus (STN) 
(see Figure 1) (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Ridderinkhof, Forstmann, Wylie, Burle, & van 
den Wildenberg, 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Individual differences analyses 
have shown that activity in rIFG and STN correlates with SSRT, suggesting that these 
are core regions for successful response inhibition (Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank, & 
Poldrack, 2007; Aron & Poldrack, 2006). In addition, functional and structural 
network analyses have found that increased connectivity between rIFG and STN is 
related to successful response inhibition performance (Aron, et al., 2007; Forstmann 




Figure 1. Brain regions associated with externally guided inhibition (in blue) and internally 
guided inhibition (in purple). 
Note. rIFG = right inferior frontal gyrus, ACC/preSMA = anterior cingulate 




Compared to adults, children show different activity during externally driven 
response inhibition. Specifically, some studies have shown that 8 to 12 year-old 
children use left lateralized PFC regions whereas adults use right lateralized regions 
(Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002), some studies reported 
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more activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in 8 to 12 year-old children compared to 
adults (Velanova, Wheeler, & Luna, 2008), and others reported more activity in 
ventrolateral PFC in adults than in 6 to 10 year-old children (Durston, Thomas, Yang, 
et al., 2002). Together, these changes can be characterized as a shift from diffuse to 
focal activity (Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 2002). In other words, in childhood, 
widespread inhibition related activation was observed across lateral prefrontal cortex 
(Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 2002; Luna, et al., 2010), whereas with increasing age 
this activation became more focalized to the rIFG (Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 
2002; Luna, et al., 2010). These findings are consistent with structural neuroimaging 
studies showing that regions in the lateral prefrontal cortex are the last to mature in 
terms of loss of grey matter volume, which is an index of neuronal maturation (Giedd, 
2004; Shaw et al., 2008; Sowell et al., 2004), and slowly developing white matter 
maturation in the prefrontal cortex and its connections (Paus, 2010; Paus et al., 2001).  
These findings fit well with studies focusing on other components of 
executive control which also rely on lateral prefrontal cortex, such as working memory 
(e.g. Crone, Wendelken, Donohue, van Leijenhorst, & Bunge, 2006; Finn, Sheridan, 
Kam, Hinshaw, & D'Esposito, 2010; Jolles, Kleibeuker, Rombouts, & Crone, 2011), 
task switching (e.g. Christakou et al., 2009; Crone, Donohue, Honomichl, Wendelken, 
& Bunge, 2006), and attention (Smith, Halari, Giampetro, Brammer, & Rubia, 2011). 
These studies also reported that prefrontal cortex activity is developing protractedly in 
childhood and adolescence, which has been interpreted in terms of increased 
interactive specialization of brain regions important for higher order cognitive 
processes (Johnson, 2011). In sum, there is substantial evidence that response 
inhibition, measured by the inhibition of behavior based on external signals, lies at the 
core of cognitive development (Diamond, 2013), matures slowly across development 
(Diamond, 2013; Luna, et al., 2010), and is associated with immature activity in the 
prefrontal cortex (Luna, et al., 2010).  
 
 
1.3 Intentionally guided inhibition 
 
Many of our daily activities involve stopping actions based on internally generated 
(i.e., intentional) stop signals, rather than explicit external stimuli telling us to stop our 
actions. Despite the clear importance of the intentional component of inhibition, 
intentional inhibition has remained largely unstudied within developmental psychology 
and developmental cognitive neuroscience. Since intentional inhibition is not preceded 
by an external stimulus or cue, and does not result in any behavioral output, there are 
obvious difficulties in studying intentional inhibition. In daily life, however, the need 
to inhibit is not constantly signaled by external cues, and therefore, understanding the 
mechanisms of intentional inhibition is of clear importance.  
 
A framework for studying intentional inhibition 
A useful framework for studying intentional inhibition is the factorial organization of 
action control (Filevich, et al., 2012). According to this framework both the 
motivation for action and the motivation for inhibition can be externally or internally 
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guided (see Table 1). Importantly, in daily life, action and inhibition decisions are 
often based on a combination of external and internal motivations. For instance in our 
previous example of children having to intentionally inhibit the tendency to get up of 
your chair and walk around in the classroom, external factors such as teacher 
expectations also play a role. Within experimental research, internal and external 
motivations for action and inhibition are separated by the presence or absence of an 
external cue signaling action or inhibition (Filevich, et al., 2012). 
 
 











Stop walking when a green 




Stop teasing a classmate 





Resisting the impulse to 
take another biscuit from 
the biscuit box standing in 
front of you. 
 
 
Resisting the impulse to 
scratch your itchy skin 




Stimulus-driven inhibition involves the externally guided inhibition of both externally 
and internally guided action. However, as outlined above, traditionally most research 
has focused on externally guided inhibition of externally guided action. Intentional 
inhibition on the other hand involves the internally guided inhibition of both 
externally and internally guided action. When studying intentional inhibition there are 
three main difficulties (Filevich, et al., 2012). First, intentional inhibition does not 
result in any behavioral output. Thus, on the behavioral level one can only examine 
whether someone has intentionally inhibited or not. However, concluding that 
intentional inhibition has happened on the basis of no behavioral output is 
problematic (see the third point). Therefore, psychophysiological and neuroimaging 
measures are particularly useful in the study of intentional inhibition, since they can 
help identify the covert processes associated with inhibition. A second difficulty in the 
study of intentional inhibition is that intentional inhibition is an internal process, 
which is not triggered by an external stimulus or cue. This means that intentional 
inhibition cannot be easily manipulated in an experimental task. Third, according to 
our definition of intentional inhibition, intentional inhibition involves the inhibition of 
an action. However, on the behavioral level we cannot distinguish between an action 
that was inhibited at the last possible moment and an action that was never prepared. 
In the latter case, we would speak of early decision not to prepare an action. This 
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process is linked more to action selection than to inhibition (Haggard, 2008). Early 
decisions not to prepare an action are more likely in paradigms where there is no 
strong motivation for acting (Filevich, et al., 2012). Therefore, paradigms designed to 
measure intentional inhibition should include a strong motivation or prepotency for 
acting.   
The marble paradigm is a valuable paradigm to study intentional inhibition, 
which was first developed by Kühn and colleagues (2009). In this paradigm, a white 
marble is rolling down a ramp. As soon as the marble starts rolling, the marble 
changes color to green. Participants are instructed to respond to the rolling marble as 
quickly as possible, to prevent the marble from dropping from the ramp and crashing. 
This green marble condition creates a prepotency for responding. On a number of 
trials (around 35 %, this differs slightly between experiments), the rolling marble does 
not change color and remains white. In this case, participants are free to choose to 
either respond or inhibit. However, since responding is prepotent, inhibiting taxes the 
late ‘veto’ mechanism.  
In the first four empirical chapters of this thesis (chapters 2 to 5) the marble 
task is combined with heart rate and neuroimaging techniques to gain insight in the 
processes involved in intentional inhibition. 
 
Heart rate 
A useful measure for studying the covert processes underlying intentional inhibition is 
the study of phasic heart rate changes. Beat-to-beat heart rate changes are controlled 
by both the sympathetic and the parasympathetic autonomic nervous system 
(Berntson, Quigley, & Lozano, 2007). The sympathetic and parasympathetic systems 
differ in the latency by which they influence beat-to-beat changes. The sympathetic 
system has a relatively long-term effect on beat-to-beat changes, that is, it takes the 
sympathetic system several seconds to increase the heart rate. The parasympathetic 
system on the other hand, has a more direct influence on the heart and can decrease 
the heart rate quickly. This short-latency parasympathetic heart rate deceleration has 
been interpreted as indicative of an orienting reflex (Bradley, 2009). 
Parasympathetic-driven phasic heart rate changes are shown to be a sensitive 
index of cognitive control processes in general (Crone, Somsen, Van Beek, & Van Der 
Molen, 2004; Crone et al., 2003; Jennings, Van der Molen, & Debski, 2003), and 
response activation and inhibition processes specifically (Jennings & van der Molen, 
2002; van der Molen, 2000; Van der Veen, Van der Molen, & Jennings, 2000). During 
preparation and/or anticipation of a speeded response (a go-stimulus in a go/nogo or 
stop-signal paradigm), a pattern of heart rate deceleration is typically observed 
(Jennings & van der Molen, 2002, 2005; Jennings, van der Molen, Somsen, & Terezis, 
1990). This pattern of anticipatory heart rate deceleration is interpreted as indicative of 
the central inhibition of action representations (Jennings & van der Molen, 2002, 
2005). This anticipatory heart rate deceleration is followed by acceleratory recovery 
when a response is made (Jennings & van der Molen, 2005; Jennings, et al., 1990). 
However, during inhibition, the shift from anticipatory heart rate deceleration to 
acceleratory recovery is delayed, and heart rate continues to decelerate (Börger & van 
der Meere, 2000; Jennings & van der Molen, 2005; Jennings, van der Molen, Pelham, 
1. Introduction 
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Debski, & Hoza, 1997; van der Molen, 2000; Van der Veen, et al., 2000). This 
continued deceleration is implicated to be indicative of midbrain inhibition of action 
(Jennings, van der Molen, & Stenger, 2008; Van der Veen, et al., 2000). 
In this thesis phasic heart rate changes are examined as an index of the 
development of intentional inhibition (chapter 2). Also, to gain further insight in the 
role of the central autonomic network in intentional action control, in chapter 4 
phasic heart rate changes are examined in combination with changes in neural 
activation as measured by fMRI. 
 
fMRI 
A second method, which is useful for unraveling the covert processes involved in 
intentional inhibition, is neuroimaging. Concretely, fMRI studies can generate more 
specific hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms involved in externally driven 
and intentional inhibition. With fMRI it is possible to examine which brain regions are 
activated during task performance, by taking advantage of the BOLD (Blood 
Oxygenation Level Dependent) signal.  
The first fMRI study specifically designed to measure intentional inhibition 
made use of a free choice paradigm involving the internally generated inhibition of 
internally generated action (Brass & Haggard, 2007). In this paradigm, participants 
were asked to always prepare and perform a simple action (i.e. a key press) at the time 
of their choice. Importantly, participants were instructed to withhold this action at the 
last possible moment on some freely chosen trials. On every trial, also when their 
action was inhibited, participants reported the time at which they felt they were about 
to perform their action. This reported time, also in the absence of action, formed the 
event modeled in the fMRI analysis. This analysis showed specific activation during 
intentional inhibition in the dorsal fronto-median cortex (dFMC), a brain region not 
implicated in stimulus-driven inhibition (see Figure 1) (Brass & Haggard, 2007). 
However, the free choice paradigm differs in two aspects from traditional stimulus-
driven inhibition experiments, which focus on externally guided inhibition of 
externally guided action. That is to say, in this free choice paradigm both the decision 
to act and the decision to inhibit was internally guided.   
Kühn and colleagues introduced the marble paradigm, which only differs in 
the internal initiation of inhibition from the traditional stimulus-driven inhibition 
paradigms, in an fMRI study in adults (2009). The critical contrast focused on brain 
regions that were more active during intentional decisions to inhibit compared to 
intentional decisions to act. This study also showed specific activation in the dFMC 
during intentional inhibition (Kühn, et al., 2009), comparable in location to the study 
by Brass & Haggard (2007). 
In this thesis, fMRI is used in chapters 3 to 5. In chapter 3 fMRI is used to 
examine whether intentional and externally guided inhibition can be dissociated on the 
neural level. In chapter 4 fMRI is combined with the study of phasic heart rate 
changes to examine the role of the central autonomic network in intentional action 
control. Finally, in chapter 5 fMRI is used to examine the neural bases of the 
development of intentional inhibition. 
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1.4 Self-control in context 
 
The studies described so far have all examined self-control in a relatively neutral 
context. In daily life however, we often experience strong motivations for action and 
inhibition, and inhibition rarely happens in an affectively neutral context. For instance, 
previous research has shown that externally guided inhibition performance improves 
when participants are motivated by external rewards, such as money (Leotti & Wager, 
2010). Externally guided inhibition has also been shown to be influenced by affective 
context (Tottenham, Hare, & Casey, 2011). In this study, participants were instructed 
to respond to face stimuli expressing a certain emotion and inhibit responding to faces 
expressing a different emotion. Four different emotional expressions were included, 
three negative emotions (fear, anger and sadness), and one positive emotion 
(happiness), and in each block a different emotional face was coupled with neutral 
faces. In a developmental sample (5 to 28 year-olds) it was found that response 
inhibition performance was most negatively influenced by emotions for which 
emotion recognition was worst, namely for anger and sadness (Tottenham, et al., 
2011). Another study has shown that also irrelevant emotional background stimuli, 
appeared to influence response inhibition performance (Cohen-Gilbert & Thomas, 
2013).  
 In this thesis it is examined whether intentional inhibition performance is also 




1.5 Outline of this thesis 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to gain insight in the development of intentional 
inhibition. In the majority of the empirical chapters (chapter 2 to 5) the marble task is 
combined with heart rate and neuroimaging techniques to gain insight in the processes 
involved in intentional inhibition. This approach allowed examining the covert 
process, which are not visible with only performance measures, involved in the 
development of intentional inhibition.  
 In chapter 2, the development of intentional inhibition was examined in a 
cross-sectional study with 3 age groups (8-10, 11-12, and 18-26). In this study phasic 
heart rate changes were examined as a measure of the covert processes underlying 
intentional inhibition.  
 The study presented in chapter 3 examined the differences and similarities in 
underlying neural correlates between intentionally and externally guided inhibition in a 
sample of young adults (18-26). For this means participants performed both the 
marble task, as a measure of intentional inhibition, and the stop-signal task, as a 
measure of externally guided inhibition, while inside the MRI scanner. In chapter 4, 
the role of the central autonomic network involved in intentional action control was 
further examined in a combined fMRI and heart rate study. For this study heart rate 




 The development of intentional inhibition was further examined in the study 
presented in chapter 5. This study examined the neural correlates of intentional 
inhibition in a group of children (10-12) and a group of young adults (18-26). In this 
study individual differences in self-reported impulsivity were also related to intentional 
inhibition performance and the underlying correlates. 
 In the final empirical chapter (chapter 6) the development of inhibition within 
an affective context was examined in a large developmental sample (6-26). In this 
chapter two tasks are presented, one examining externally guided inhibition in an 
affective context and one examining externally guided and intentional inhibition in an 
affective context.  
 Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the results of all the empirical studies presented 
in this thesis. Implications of the results are discussed and suggestions for future 
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Abstract 
The ability to inhibit is a major developmental dimension. Previous studies examined 
developmental change in instructed inhibition. The current study, however, focused on 
intentional inhibition. We examined heart rate responses to intentional action and inhibition, 
with a focus on developmental differences. Three age groups (8-10, 11-12, and 18-26 year-
olds) performed a child-friendly marble paradigm in which they had to choose between 
intentionally acting on, or inhibiting a prepotent response. As instructed, all age groups chose 
to intentionally inhibit on approximately 50 percent of the intentional trials. A pronounced 
heart rate deceleration was observed during both intentional action and intentional inhibition, 
but this deceleration was most pronounced for intentional inhibition. Heart rate responses did 
not differentiate between age groups, suggesting that intentional action and inhibition reach 
mature levels early in childhood.  




The ability to control our actions is of critical importance for optimal functioning in 
daily life. Control over our actions can be both externally driven, such as when a 
traffic light turns red, and internally driven, such as when deciding not to scratch an 
itchy mosquito bite. Externally driven action control has been extensively studied 
using several different paradigms, such as stop-signal tasks (Logan & Cowan, 1984) 
go/nogo tasks (Casey, et al., 1997), and task-switching tasks (Monsell, Sumner, & 
Waters, 2003). In these paradigms a stimulus indicates whether participants should 
inhibit a prepared or prepotent response. Successful performance on these tasks 
appears to rely on a lateral prefrontal-parietal network in the brain (Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack, 2004; Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002), specifically the 
right inferior frontal gyrus which seems to be prominently involved in the inhibition 
of motoric actions (Aron, 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). 
Internally driven action control, on the other hand, has been less extensively 
studied, most likely because of the obvious difficulty in observing internal triggers for 
action. The limited number of studies in this area examined the ‘what ‘ and ‘when‘ 
components of intentional action selection (Brass & Haggard, 2008; Haggard, 2008). 
Tasks examining the what-component of intentional action focused on voluntary 
action selection (e.g. participants are instructed to voluntarily select between two 
response options), whereas tasks examining the when-component focused on 
voluntary action planning (e.g. participants are instructed to decide when they want to 
execute an instructed response). In contrast to externally driven action control, 
voluntary action selection and action planning are thought to rely on a different 
network in the brain, specifically involving the medial frontal cortex (Lau, Rogers, 
Haggard, & Passingham, 2004; Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006).  
Recently, research into internally driven action control focused on a third 
component of intentional action selection, namely the ‘whether’ component (Brass & 
Haggard, 2008; Haggard, 2008). The ‘whether’ component captures the process of 
deciding between intentionally performing or intentionally inhibiting a prepared action 
(Brass & Haggard, 2007, 2008; Filevich, et al., 2012). Intentional inhibition has been 
conceptualized as a late veto process; a final check before action execution (Brass & 
Haggard, 2007; Filevich, et al., 2012; Kühn, et al., 2009). Since there is no external 
stimulus and no overt behavior in intentional inhibition, the process of intentional 
inhibition proved to be quite difficult to investigate. Recently, however, two studies 
examined the neural correlates of intentional inhibition using paradigms in which 
participants were instructed to always prepare an action, but to choose to inhibit 
executing this prepared action on a number of trials. These studies indicate that 
intentional inhibition is supported by a specific brain area in medial frontal cortex, 
which can be dissociated from the areas involved in intentional action selection and 
planning, namely the dorsal fronto-median cortex (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Kühn, et 
al., 2009).  
 In the present study, we examined intentional action and inhibition by taking 
advantage of phasic heart rate changes, based on prior research showing that phasic 
heart rate is a sensitive measure of response activation and inhibition processes 
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(Crone, et al., 2004; Crone, et al., 2003; Jennings, Brock, van der Molen, & Somsen, 
1992; Jennings & van der Molen, 2005; Jennings, et al., 1997). A score of studies 
showed that during the anticipation and preparation of a speeded response (e.g. a go-
response in a go/nogo task) heart rate decelerates (Jennings & van der Molen, 2002; 
Van der Veen, et al., 2000). This anticipatory heart rate deceleration is proposed to 
support the central inhibition of action representations (Jennings & van der Molen, 
2002, 2005). When a response is made, anticipatory heart rate deceleration is followed 
by an acceleratory recovery (Jennings & van der Molen, 2002; Van der Veen, et al., 
2000). The shift from anticipatory deceleration to acceleratory recovery is dependent 
on reaction time vis-à-vis the R-wave of the ECG, with shifts occurring earlier when 
the interval between the R-wave to the behavioral response is short (i.e., within 350 
ms) while later shifts occur with longer R-wave to response intervals (Jennings & 
Wood, 1977; Somsen, Jennings, & van der Molen, 2002). The pattern of anticipatory 
deceleration followed by acceleratory recovery is delayed when a response is inhibited; 
during response inhibition continued heart rate deceleration is observed (Börger & 
van der Meere, 2000; Jennings, et al., 1992; Van der Veen, et al., 2000). The continued 
heart rate deceleration during action inhibition is interpreted to reflect midbrain 
inhibition of action (Jennings, et al., 1992; Jennings, et al., 2008; Van der Veen, et al., 
2000). Until now, the existing heart rate literature only focused on the processes of 
external action control and inhibition, not on the processes of intentional action and 
inhibition. Therefore, the present study was set out to examine heart rate response 
patterns associated with intentional action and inhibition.  
We chose to examine heart rate responses to intentional inhibition by 
focusing on developmental differences. It is well established that externally driven 
action control has a protracted developmental trajectory (Bunge, Dudukovic, et al., 
2002; Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 2002). The ability to inhibit is present in early 
childhood (Ridderinkhof, et al., 1999; Williams, et al., 1999), but this ability continues 
to improve through adolescence (Luna, et al., 2010; van de Laar, van den Wildenberg, 
van Boxtel, & van der Molen, 2011; van den Wildenberg & van der Molen, 2004). 
Inhibition-related heart rate deceleration has already been observed in children aged 5 
to 12 (Jennings, et al., 1997; van der Molen, 2000). However, inhibition-related heart 
deceleration was delayed in the youngest children, suggesting that with age children 
become more efficient in recruiting inhibitory mechanisms (van der Molen, 2000). 
Currently the development of intentional action and inhibition has not been 
examined, most likely because of a lack of valid child-friendly paradigms.  
Here, we adopted the recently developed marble task (Kühn, et al., 2009), in 
which participants have to decide between intentionally responding or intentionally 
inhibiting responding to a rolling marble, to examine the developmental pattern of 
intentional action and inhibition. During the task, heart rate was measured 
continuously so as to allow for an examination of the temporal dynamics of internal 
action control. We expected to observe anticipatory heart rate deceleration associated 
with the central inhibition of action representations (Jennings & van der Molen, 2002, 
2005) during both intentional action and intentional inhibition to allow for an 
intentional decision to be made. During intentional action trials we expected to 
observe a shift from anticipatory deceleration towards acceleratory recovery associated 
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with response activation and execution (Jennings & van der Molen, 2002). In contrast, 
during intentional inhibition trials we expected to observe continued heart rate 
deceleration associated with response inhibition until task completion (Börger & van 
der Meere, 2000; Jennings, et al., 1992; Jennings, et al., 1997; Van der Veen, et al., 
2000). Furthermore, with regard to the developmental pattern we expected to observe 
an early development of intentional action and inhibition abilities (Ridderinkhof, et al., 
1999; Williams, et al., 1999), but a possible delay in reaching the maximum inhibition 






Sixty healthy participants across three age groups participated in the experiment. 
Three participants were excluded from the study, one because of technical difficulties, 
one because of misunderstanding of the experimental task, and one because of deviant 
heart rate responses. The final sample consisted of twenty-four children between 8-10 
years of age (14 females, M = 9.42, SD = .63), fifteen early adolescents between 11-12 
years of age (6 females, M = 12.22, SD = .44), and eighteen adults between 18-26 
years of age (10 females, M = 21.91, SD = 2.55). A chi-square test revealed no 
significant differences in gender distributions between age groups (p = .51). Children 
were recruited from a primary school in the Netherlands and informed consent was 
obtained from a primary caregiver. Adult participants were recruited from Leiden 
University and signed informed consent before participation in the experiment. All 
participants completed the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven SPM) to 
obtain an estimate of their cognitive functioning (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). Age 
groups did not differ in estimated IQ scores, F (2, 56) = 1.97, p = .15, ηp2 = .07.  
 
Task 
The marble task was adapted from Kühn et al. (2009), and optimized for heart rate 
recording. Each trial (see Figure 1) started with the presentation of a fixation screen 
(white cross against a black background) with duration jittered between 1400 and 2000 
ms. The fixation screen was followed by a screen showing a white ramp with a white 
marble on top presented against black background. After a variable duration of 1400 
to 2000 ms the marble started rolling down the ramp and participants could stop the 
marble from crashing by pressing a button. Finally, a feedback screen, showing trial 
outcome, was presented for 1000 milliseconds. There were two task conditions: a 
green marble and a white marble condition. 
 In the green marble condition, the white marble changed to green as soon as 
it started rolling. The task was programmed in such a way that participants viewed 16 
rapidly presented static pictures showing the marble at successive locations on the 
ramp, which was experienced as a rolling movement. Participants were instructed to 
stop the marble from crashing by pressing a response button with their right index 
finger. When participants were successful at stopping the marble, they were presented 
with a feedback screen showing the location where they had stopped the marble. 
2. A heart rate analysis of intentional inhibition 
 24 
When participants were not successful at stopping the marble, they were presented 
with a feedback screen showing a shattered marble beneath the ramp. The speed of 
the marble was adjusted by a staircase procedure. At the start of the experiment, the 
static pictures were presented for 30 milliseconds each. When participants were 
successful at stopping the marble the duration was decreased with 10 milliseconds, 
making the task more difficult. When participants were not successful at stopping the 
marble in time the duration was increased with 10 milliseconds, making the task easier. 
The staircase procedure was allowed to fluctuate between 20 and 80 milliseconds, 
allowing a response window between 320 and 1280 milliseconds.  
 
 
Figure 1: Trial structure. Stimuli were presented at a black background. At the beginning of 
each trial a white marble on top of a ramp was presented. After a variable delay (jittered 
between 1400 and 2000 ms) the marble started to roll down the ramp, and could change color 
to green.  
 
 In the white marble condition, the marble did not change color and 
participants were instructed to choose between responding and inhibiting. When 
participants responded, they were presented with a feedback screen showing the 
location were they had stopped the marble. When participants inhibited, they were 
shown a feedback screen showing the white marble at the bottom of the ramp. In 
order to motivate participants to balance the frequency of responding and inhibiting, 
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they were told that the stopped and non-stopped marbles would fall in different 
baskets. Participants were instructed to collect an approximately equal amount of 
marbles in each basket, but were not allowed to count or use a sequencing strategy. At 
the end of each block participants were shown how many marbles they had collected 
in each basket.  
In order to give participants sufficient time to decide between responding and 
inhibiting the speed of the white marble rolling down the ramp was set considerably 
slower. The speed of the sequentially presented static white marble pictures was set to 
the speed currently reached in the green marble condition plus 30 milliseconds. 
Consequently the duration of the sequentially presented static white marble pictures 
was allowed to fluctuate between 50 and 110 milliseconds, allowing a response 
window between 800 and 1760 milliseconds.  
The experiment consisted of two blocks of 80 trials (160 trials in total). Each 
block consisted of 48 green and 32 white marble trials. The larger proportion of green 
trials was included to create a prepotent action tendency, so that intentional inhibition 
would involve a late veto on an already prepared action. Trials were presented in a 
pseudo-randomized order so that each white marble trial was preceded by 0, 1, 2, or 3 
green marble trials. The pseudo-randomized interleaving of green (instructed) and 
white (intentional) trials discouraged participants from strategically adopting a pattern 
of intentional action and inhibition, such as act-inhibit-act-inhibit etc. 
 
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually in a laboratory or an empty classroom. Before 
testing participants were instructed on the marble task. It was stressed that 
participants were not supposed to use a specific strategy to decide when to stop the 
white marble. Care was taken that all participants understood the instructions and 
were able to perform the task. All participants completed a practice block of 10 trials. 
Hereafter, participants completed the two test-blocks. Including instructions, the task 
took approximately 20 minutes to complete. After completion of the task participants 
were asked whether they had used a specific strategy in the task. Finally, participants 
completed the Raven SPM. 
 
Data Recording and Analysis 
During the task, the electrocardiogram (ECG) was measured continuously using the 
Biopac System at a sample frequency of 400 Hz. The ECG was recorded from three 
AgAg/Cl electrodes, attached via the modified lead-2 placement (one electrode 
directly under the right collar bone, one electrode between the two lower left ribs, and 
the ground electrode directly right of the navel). Inter Beat Intervals were defined as 
the length between consecutive R-peaks. The R-peaks were detected with the program 
Physiospec (developed by Technical Support Group UvA Psychology). The recorded 
Inter Beat Intervals (IBIs) were screened for physiologically impossible readings and 
artifacts (i.e. R-peaks not detected or other peaks seen as R-peaks). These were 
corrected by adjusting specific parameters in the program that extracted the IBIs from 
the digitized ECGs. Five consecutive IBIs were selected around the onset of marble 
motion; the IBI concurrent with the onset of marble motion (IBI 0), two IBIs 
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preceding the onset of marble motion (IBI -2 and IBI -1), and two IBIs following the 
onset of marble motion (IBI 1 and IBI 2). In order to obtain an index of phasic heart 
rate change (IBI difference) IBIs were referenced to IBI-2. Preliminary analysis of 
IBI-2 revealed no significant differences in IBI length between the different test 
conditions, confirming that there were no a priori differences between these 
conditions reflected in heart rate. Statistical analyses were performed using repeated 
measures ANOVA. Huynh-Feldt corrections for violations of the assumption of 






An Age group (3) ANOVA for the number of go-responses on the green trials 
showed that with increasing age participants became more successful at responding to 
the green marble in time, F (2, 56) = 20.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. Post-hoc Tukey tests 
showed that adults were more successful at responding fast to the green marble 
compared to both children (p < .001) and early adolescents (p < .01) (see Figure 2). 
Children and early adolescents did not differ significantly in their ability to respond to 
the green marble in time (p = .078). 
On average participants decided to inhibit responding to the white marble on 
43.64 percent of the trials. Age groups did not differ in this regard, F (2, 56) = .826, p 
= .44, ηp2 = .03 (children: M = 42.58 (SD = 15.99), early adolescents: M = 41.35 (SD 
= 15.69), adults: M = 46.96 (SD = 6.00)) (see Figure 2). This finding indicates that all 
age groups performed the intentional inhibition task as instructed.  
The use of strategies was evaluated by computing the Random Number 
Generation 2 (RNG2) index using Towse and Neil’s (1998) RgCalc program. The 
RNG2 index is an adaptation of the Random Number Generation (RNG) index 
(Evans, 1978) optimized for two-choice response sequences, which considers the 
randomness of the sequence (Neuringer, 1986). A mean RNG2 index of .784 (SD = 
.025) was observed. Age groups did not differ in RNG2 index, F (2, 56) = 2.55, p = 
.088, ηp2 = .09 (children: M = .789 (SD = .021), early adolescents: M = .790 (SD = 
.038), adults: M = .774 (SD = .007)). To examine the randomness the participants’ 
RNG2 index was compared with a RNG2 index computed over a set of randomly 
generated sequences of go and nogo-responses. For the randomly generated set of go- 
and nogo-response sequences a mean RNG2 index of .770 (SD = .001) was observed. 
Adults’ RNG2 index did not differ form the RNG2 index for the randomly generated 
set of go- and nogo- responses (p = .10), indicating that their choice behavior was not 
guided by unwanted rules (e.g., alternating between go vs nogo). RNG2 indexes of 
both children and early adolescents differed significantly from the RNG2 index for 
the randomly generated set of go- and nogo- responses (all p’s < .05), indicating that 
children’s and early adolescents’ choice behavior deviated from pure randomness.  
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Figure 2: Percentage of go-responses in the green and white marble conditions. 
 
 Reaction times were shorter for the green marble trials (M = 283.92, SE = 
6.85) than for the white marble trials (M = 358.77, SE = 11.78), F (1, 54) = 97.39, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .64. Overall, reaction times decreased with age, F (2, 54) = 3.47, p < .05, 
ηp2 = .11. Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that children were slower compared to adults 
(p < .05). Reaction times did not differ between children and early adolescents (p = 
.41) and between early adolescents and adults (p = .50). However, no interaction with 
condition was observed (p = .68). Together, these results indicate that all age groups 
performed the task accurately, but that adults were more efficient in doing so, as 
indicated by faster responses to green trials and more random choice behavior on the 




IBIs were computed separately for the stimulus-driven green-go condition, omissions 
on the stimulus-driven green trials, and the intentional white-go and white-nogo 
conditions. To test for differences in heart rate responses between the stimulus-driven 
and intentional conditions, an Age group (3) x Condition (2: green and white) x 
Response (2: go and nogo) x IBI (4) repeated measures ANOVA was performed. This 
analysis resulted in a main effect of IBI, F (3, 162) = 58.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .52, ε = 
.67. As can be seen in Figure 3, heart rate decelerated (i.e., slowed) in anticipation of 
stimulus presentation, followed by an acceleratory recovery. A Condition x IBI 
interaction, F (3, 162) = 17.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, ε = .83, indicated that heart rate 
deceleration was more pronounced for the intentional compared to the stimulus-
driven conditions. A Response x IBI interaction, F (3, 162) = 28.00, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.34, ε = .86, indicated that the shift from anticipatory deceleration to acceleratory 
recovery occurred earlier for go compared to nogo responses. Furthermore, a 
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Condition x Response x IBI interaction, F (3, 162) = 7.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .12, ε = .93, 
was observed, indicating that heart rate patterns associated with go vs. nogo responses 
differed depending on the condition (green/white) in which they were made. No 
interactions with Age group were found (all 2-, 3- and 4-way interactions, p’s > .1), 




Figure 3: Stimulus-locked heart rate changes associated with stimulus-driven action, omissions 
on stimulus-driven action trials, intentional action and intentional inhibition. IBI 0 refers to the 
IBI during which the marble started to roll down the ramp. An increase in IBI difference 
scores indicates heart rate deceleration, and a decrease in IBI difference scores indicates heart 
rate acceleration.  
 
Follow-up ANOVAs for the green stimulus-driven and white intentional 
conditions separately, showed that within the stimulus-driven condition the shift from 
anticipatory deceleration to acceleratory recovery occurred earlier for go compared to 
nogo responses, F (3, 168) = 31.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, ε = .88. For nogo responses 
heart rate continued to decelerate during IBI 1, indicative of a lapse of attention. In 
the intentional condition heart rate deceleration was more pronounced for intentional 
inhibition compared to intentional action, F (3, 168) = 5.93, p < .002, ηp2 = .10, ε = 
.90. Follow-up ANOVAs for the go and nogo responses separately, showed that for 
the nogo responses heart deceleration was more pronounced in the white intentional 
compared to the green stimulus-driven condition, F (3, 168) = 9.11, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.14, ε = .90. Furthermore, heart rate deceleration was also more pronounced and 
continued during IBI 1 for the intentional white-go compared to the stimulus-driven 
green-go responses, F (3, 168) = 21.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, ε = .84. Together, these 
results show that heart rate deceleration was more pronounced for the intentional 
conditions and that this heart rate deceleration was strongest in the intentional 
inhibition condition.  
However, one alternative explanation for the continued heart rate 
deceleration in the intentional action condition is the possibility of a longer R-wave to 
response interval for the white-go compared to the green-go condition (Jennings & 
Wood, 1977; Somsen, et al., 2002). Since reaction times in the white-go condition 
were slower compared to the green-go condition, it might be that responses in the 
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white-go condition occurred later in the interbeat interval, resulting in a longer R-wave 
to response interval. To control for this alternative explanation, we performed a 
response-locked analysis (Jennings, et al., 1990). For this analysis five IBIs were 
selected around the moment of responding, IBI -2 to IBI 2, the moment of 
responding occurred during IBI 0. IBIs were referenced to IBI -2 to create IBI 
difference scores. Preliminary analysis of raw IBI -2 values revealed no significant 
difference in IBI -2 length between the white-go and the green-go conditions, 
confirming that there were no a priori differences between those conditions reflected 
in heart rate.  
To test for differences in heart rate responses between the white-go and the 
green-go conditions, an Age group (3) x Condition (2) x IBI (4) repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed. Importantly, this analysis showed again a more pronounced 
heart rate deceleration for the white-go compared to the green-go condition, F (3, 
162) = 9.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, ε = .88 (see Figure 4), indicating that indeed heart rate 
deceleration is most pronounced for the intentional conditions. Again, no interaction 
with Age group was found (3-way interaction, p = .26), demonstrating that this pattern 
was similar across age groups. 
 
 
Figure 4: Response-locked heart rate changes associated with stimulus-driven action and 
intentional action. IBI 0 refers to the IBI during which the participant responded. An increase 
in IBI difference scores indicates heart rate deceleration, and a decrease in IBI difference 





In the present study, we examined the cardiac concomitants of intentional action and 
inhibition. Participants, divided in three age groups, performed a marble paradigm, in 
which they had to decide between intentionally inhibiting responding and intentionally 
responding to a rolling marble in the context of prepotent go responses, while their 
heart rate was measured continuously.  
 The behavioral results showed that all age groups followed task instructions; 
on average, age groups intentionally inhibited on 43.46% of the trials, which is close to 
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criterion (50%). The observation that in our study even the 8-to-10-year-olds were 
able to intentionally inhibit a prepotent response concurs with previous studies 
showing an early development of the ability to inhibit (Ridderinkhof, et al., 1999; 
Williams, et al., 1999). Importantly, analysis of the RNG2 index (Evans, 1978; 
Neuringer, 1986) indicated that participants did not use a simple alternation strategy to 
decide whether or not to inhibit responding to the white marble. Adults’ choice 
behavior did not differ from a randomly generated response sequence whereas the 
choice behavior of children and early adolescents did, which is consistent with 
previous research showing a protracted development of random sequence generation 
(Towse & Mclachlan, 1999).  
 Consistent with the results of Kühn and colleagues (2009) we observed longer 
reaction times for the intentional go-responses compared to the stimulus-driven go-
responses, indicating that the intentional decision process takes more time. Children 
and early adolescents responded slower compared to adults on both the stimulus-
driven and the intentional trials, indicating that children and early adolescents were 
less efficient in performing the go-task. Even though a tracking system was used to 
adapt speed of responding to average reaction times on the stimulus-driven trials, 
children and adolescents were still less able to respond to this deadline on all trials, 
suggesting that there was more variability in their response times (Tamnes, Fjell, 
Westlye, Ostby, & Walhovd, 2012). Importantly, for the reaction times no interaction 
between condition (stimulus-driven, intentional) and age group was found, indicating 
that intentional go-responses were not disproportionally more difficult than stimulus-
driven go-responses for children and early adolescents compared to adults.  
 The observed pattern of anticipatory heart rate deceleration and acceleratory  
recovery in our task is consistent with the standard pattern found in the stimulus-
driven action control literature (Jennings, et al., 1992; Jennings & van der Molen, 
2002, 2005; van Boxtel, van der Molen, Jennings, & Brunia, 2001; Van der Veen, et al., 
2000). In addition, during intentional inhibition a pronounced continued heart rate 
deceleration was observed. This is in line with previous heart rate studies focusing on 
stimulus-driven inhibition (van Boxtel, et al., 2001; Van der Veen, et al., 2000), in 
which also heart rate deceleration following action inhibition was observed. 
Interestingly, we also observed a continued heart rate deceleration during intentional 
action, although less pronounced as for intentional inhibition, suggesting that heart 
rate is also sensitive to volitional decisions. The observed heart rate deceleration 
during intentional action remained significant when a response-locked analysis was 
performed to control for possible differences in R-wave to response intervals between 
the stimulus-driven and the intentional conditions.  
The findings suggest that heart rate deceleration in the context of the current 
intentional action and inhibition paradigm is an index of a supervisory attention 
system for the central regulation of voluntary behavior (Jennings & van der Molen, 
2002; Norman & Shallice, 1986). The observation of heart rate deceleration in the 
context of intentional action is consistent with earlier results showing heart rate 
deceleration when delaying action (Jennings, et al., 2003). In the intentional action 
condition participants are also delaying their action until they have made a final 
decision whether or not to act. The same is true for the intentional inhibition 
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condition; in this case participants are also delaying their action until they have made a 
final decision whether or not to act, but here the final decision is an inhibition instead 
of an overt action.  
 We did not observe developmental differences in intentional action and 
inhibition, indicating that the mechanics for intentional action and inhibition are 
already in place in middle childhood. Notably, the pattern of heart rate responses 
suggested that there were also no developmental differences across the age groups 
examined in the efficiency of recruiting the inhibitory mechanism. One possible 
explanation for this observation could be the mediating role of internal motivation. 
When one intentionally decides to inhibit, internal motivation to inhibit will be higher 
compared to when an external stimulus signals that one has to inhibit. Previous 
research has shown that motivation indeed plays an important role in inhibition 
(Groom et al., 2010; Leotti & Wager, 2010; Sinopoli, Schachar, & Dennis, 2011). For 
example, inhibitory performance improves when monetary incentives are used (Leotti 
& Wager, 2010; Sinopoli, et al., 2011). Motivation also has a positive effect on 
electrophysiological markers of response inhibition (Groom, et al., 2010). This finding 
is consistent with our observation that children and early adolescents showed adult-
like heart rate response patterns for the internally motivated intentional conditions.  
One limitation to the present study is the relatively restricted age range.  
Future studies should include younger age groups for a full assessment of 
developmental change in intentional inhibition. Most likely, this will require some 
further adaptations of the marble task making it even more child-friendly than the 
current version.  
 Taken together, the present study was the first to examine heart rate 
responses to intentional action and inhibition. Both intentional action and intentional 
inhibition resulted in heart rate deceleration, although the deceleration was larger for 
intentional inhibition than for intentional action. Thus, both volitional processes and 
inhibition may drive heart rate deceleration. This extends the existing heart rate 
literature, by showing that not only externally driven effortful processing, but also 
internally driven volitional processing, affects heart rate responses. The finding that 
heart rate responses to intentional action and inhibition are in place in middle 
childhood may indicate that internally driven choices may form a basic part of the 










Neural correlates of intentional and stimulus-driven 


































This chapter is published as: 
Schel, M.A., Kühn, S., Brass, M., Haggard, P., Ridderinkhof, K.R., & Crone, E.A. 
(2014). Neural correlates of intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition: A comparison. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 27. 
3. Intentional versus externally driven inhibition 
 34 
Abstract 
People can inhibit an action because of an instruction by an external stimulus, or because of 
their own internal decision. The similarities and differences between these two forms of 
inhibition are not well understood. Therefore, in the present study the neural correlates of 
intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition were tested in the same subjects. Participants 
performed two inhibition tasks while lying in the scanner: the marble task in which they had to 
choose for themselves between intentionally acting on, or inhibiting a prepotent response to 
measure intentional inhibition, and the classical stop signal task in which an external signal 
triggered the inhibition process. Results showed that intentional inhibition decision processes 
rely on a neural network that has been documented extensively for stimulus-driven inhibition, 
including bilateral parietal and lateral prefrontal cortex and pre-supplementary motor area. We 
also found activation in dorsal frontomedian cortex and left inferior frontal gyrus during 
intentional inhibition that depended on the history of previous choices. Together, these results 
indicate that intentional inhibition and stimulus-driven inhibition engage a common inhibition 
network, but intentional inhibition is also characterized by additional context-dependent neural 
activation in medial prefrontal cortex.  
 
 




In daily life, most people experience and exercise a degree of voluntary control over 
their actions. The concept of intentional action is well recognized in the neuroscience 
literature. Several studies have focused on the voluntary choice between alternative 
actions (the so-called “what-component” of intentional action generation), and the 
voluntary choice of when to initiate action (the “when–component”) (Brass & 
Haggard, 2008). Neuroimaging research has shown that the processes of intentional 
action selection and planning are supported by a medial prefrontal network, including 
the rostral cingulate zone and pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) (Lau, et al., 
2004; Lau, et al., 2006).  
A recent novel line of research has suggested that the inhibition of actions, 
like the generation of actions, can also be either intentionally driven or stimulus-
driven.  Intentional inhibition has been conceptualized as a late “veto-process”, a final 
check-and-brake function before action execution (Filevich, et al., 2012; Kühn, et al., 
2009). It has been proposed as a third component in models of intentional action 
generation, the so-called “whether–component” (Brass & Haggard, 2008). In contrast 
to the “what” and “when” components of the model of intentional action generation, 
the “whether” component is difficult to examine, especially on a behavioral level, 
since intentional inhibition (i.e. internally driven inhibition) involves no external 
imperative stimulus, and does not result in any overt behavior. Two recent studies 
aimed to investigate intentional inhibition by asking participants to prepare actions, 
but then to occasionally cancel them at the last possible moment prior to action. 
These studies revealed a distinct neural network that was more activated in intentional 
inhibition than in intentional action, including the dorsal frontomedian cortex (dFMC) 
(Brass & Haggard, 2007; Kühn, et al., 2009). 
In contrast to the scarce literature on intentional inhibition, most studies of 
action inhibition have focused on stimulus-driven inhibition (i.e. externally driven 
inhibition). Within neuroscience research stimulus-driven inhibition has been 
extensively studied using different paradigms, such as go/nogo tasks (Casey, et al., 
1997) and stop-signal tasks (Logan & Cowan, 1984). In these paradigms an external 
stimulus signals that participants have to inhibit a prepotent or already prepared 
response. Successful performance on these stimulus-driven inhibition paradigms 
appears to rely on a fronto-striatal network (Aron, 2011; Aron & Poldrack, 2006; 
Ridderinkhof, et al., 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Within this network, 
specifically, the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) and preSMA have been implicated 
as crucial for the inhibition of motoric responses (Aron, et al., 2004; Chikazoe, 2010; 
Jahfari et al., 2012; Jahfari, et al., 2011). Importantly, stimulus-driven inhibition is 
influenced by preceding contexts, such that participants are more likely to make errors 
in inhibiting when an inhibition trial is preceded by a larger number of go-trials 
(Durston, Thomas, Worden, Yang, & Casey, 2002; Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 
2002). Also activation in key regions, such as the rIFG becomes stronger during 
inhibition following a larger number of go-trials (Durston, Thomas, Worden, et al., 
2002; Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 2002). Stimulus-driven inhibition benefits from a 
number of distinct methodological advantages, including a well-circumscribed 
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experimental task, and its mechanisms and dynamics are detailed by well-developed 
computational models (Aron & Poldrack, 2006).  However, one recent review has 
noted that stimulus-driven inhibition may not capture the crucial operations of 
cognitive inhibitory control in everyday life, and particularly in social contexts.  
Explicit stop-signals are relatively rare in real life, and society (including legislation) 
assumes that healthy adults have the capacity to decide for themselves when to refrain 
from an action (Aron, 2011). 
Despite the large literature on stimulus-driven inhibition, to date no study 
directly compared stimulus-driven inhibition and intentional inhibition. Nevertheless, 
understanding whether self-generated decisions to inhibit action are different from 
stimulus-driven decisions, remains an important question, both for the scientific 
understanding of inhibitory control, and for potential therapies for conditions such as 
impulsivity, harmful behavior, or shyness. In particular, is the neural network 
supporting stimulus-driven inhibition (lateral prefrontal cortex/ preSMA) also 
involved in intentional inhibition, or is a different neural network involved in 
intentional inhibition (including dFMC)? Additionally, is intentional inhibition 
dependent on preceding context, as has been previously observed for stimulus-driven 
inhibition (Durston, Thomas, Worden, et al., 2002; Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 
2002)? 
The present study is the first to test the neural correlates of intentional and 
stimulus-driven inhibition within the same subjects. To this end, participants 
performed two inhibition tasks while lying in the scanner; the marble task to measure 
intentional inhibition (Kühn, et al., 2009) and the stop-signal task to measure stimulus-
driven inhibition (Logan & Cowan, 1984). In the marble task, participants have to 
intentionally inhibit an externally triggered prepotent response. A marble begins to roll 
down a slope. If the marble turns green as it begins to roll, they must rapidly press a 
button to stop it from rolling down. If the marble remains white, they may choose 
whether to press and stop it, or inhibit pressing and let it roll down. The contrast of 
crucial interest for the marble task was the contrast between the two possible 
outcomes of intentional decisions: i.e., inhibition vs action.  We hypothesized that this 
contrast would show additional neural activity in dFMC as was previously shown by 
Kühn et al. (2009).  Interestingly, this activation is not normally reported in the 
equivalent contrast for stimulus-driven inhibition. Secondly, in the current study, the 
marble task was used to identify the neural network supporting the intentional 
inhibition decision process, by contrasting trials in which participants intentionally 
decide to inhibit with trials in which participants are instructed to respond (green 
marble trials). These neural regions were compared with the contrast of successful 
stopping versus executing an action in the stop signal task by means of a conjunction 
analysis. We hypothesized that the fronto-striatal inhibition network (Aron & 
Poldrack, 2006; Ridderinkhof, et al., 2011) would be involved in both the intentional 










Twenty-four healthy right-handed adults between 18-26 years of age (13 females, M = 
21.49, SD = 2.36) participated in the experiment. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and no neurological or psychiatric impairments according 
to self-report. Before participating in the experiment, all participants signed informed 
consent. In accordance with guidelines of the Leiden University Medical Center, all 
anatomical scans were reviewed by a radiologist. No anomalous findings were 
reported. To obtain an estimate of cognitive functioning participants completed two 
subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) (Wechsler, 1981a); 
similarities and block design. Estimated IQ scores were within the normal range (M = 
111.33, SD = 6.93). 
 
Experimental Tasks  
Participants performed two response inhibition tasks while lying in the MRI scanner. 
The tasks were presented in a fixed order. Participants first performed the marble task 
as a measure of intentional inhibition, followed by the stop-signal task as a measure of 
stimulus-driven inhibition. 
 
Marble task. The marble task was adapted from Kühn et al. (2009). Each trial 
(see Figure 1) started with the presentation of a fixation screen (white cross against a 
black background) with duration jittered between 1400 and 2000 ms. The fixation 
screen was followed by a screen showing a white ramp with a white marble on top 
presented against black background. After a variable duration of 1400 to 2000 ms the 
marble started rolling down the ramp and participants could stop the marble from 
crashing by pressing a button. Finally, a feedback screen, showing trial outcome, was 
presented for 1000 milliseconds. There were two task conditions: a green marble and a 
white marble condition. 
In the green marble condition, the white marble changed to green as soon as 
it started rolling. The task was programmed in such a way that participants viewed 16 
rapidly presented static pictures showing the marble at successive locations on the 
ramp, which was experienced as a rolling movement. Participants were instructed to 
stop the marble from crashing by pressing a response button with their right index 
finger. When participants were successful at stopping the marble, they were presented 
with a feedback screen showing the location where they had stopped the marble. 
When participants were not successful at stopping the marble, they were presented 
with a feedback screen showing a shattered marble beneath the ramp. The speed of 
the marble was adjusted by a staircase-tracking procedure. At the start of the 
experiment, the static pictures were presented for 30 milliseconds each. When 
participants were successful at stopping the marble the duration was decreased with 10 
milliseconds, making the task more difficult. When participants were not successful at 
stopping the marble in time the duration was increased with 10 milliseconds, making 
the task easier. The staircase procedure was allowed to fluctuate between 20 and 80 
milliseconds, allowing a response window between 320 and 1280 milliseconds.  




Figure 1: Trial structure of the marble task. Stimuli were presented on a black background. At 
the beginning of each trial a white marble on top of a ramp was presented. After a variable 
delay (jittered between 1400 and 2000 ms) the marble started to roll down the ramp, and could 
change color to green.  
 
   
 In the white marble condition, the marble did not change color and 
participants were instructed to choose between responding and inhibiting. When 
participants responded, they were presented with a feedback screen showing the 
location where they had stopped the marble. When participants inhibited, they were 
shown a feedback screen showing the white marble at the bottom of the ramp. In 
order to motivate participants to balance the frequency of responding and inhibiting, 
they were told that the stopped and non-stopped marbles would fall in different 
baskets. Participants were instructed to collect an equal amount of marbles in each 
basket, but were not allowed to count or use a sequencing strategy; therefore 
participants were instructed to make an independent decision every time the marble 
stayed white. At the end of each block participants were shown how many marbles 
they had collected in each basket. As will be described in the results section, the 
participants were successful in following the instruction to stop the marble on 
approximately 50% of the trials.  
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In order to give participants sufficient time to decide between responding and 
inhibiting the speed of the white marble rolling down the ramp was set considerably 
slower. The speed of the sequentially presented static white marble pictures was set to 
the speed currently reached in the green marble condition plus 30 milliseconds. 
Consequently the duration of the sequentially presented static white marble pictures 
was allowed to fluctuate between 50 and 110 milliseconds, allowing a response 
window between 800 and 1760 milliseconds.  
The experiment consisted of three blocks of 80 trials, each block consisting 
of 48 green and 32 white marble trials. Trials were presented in a pseudo-randomized 
order so that each white marble trial was preceded by 0, 1, 2, or 3 green marble trials. 
The large proportion of fast-paced green trials served two functions. First, the fast-
paced green trials lead to a prepotent tendency for action. This was desirable, so that 
intentional inhibition of action would involve a late brake on an already-prepared 
action, rather than an early decision not to initiate action preparation. Second, the 
randomized interleaving of intentional (white) and instructed (green) trials discouraged 
participants from strategically pre-deciding a pattern of intentional action, such as act-
inhibit-act-inhibit etc. 
 
Stop-Signal Task. The stop-signal task (Logan & Cowan, 1984) was presented 
in a visual form. Each trial started with the presentation of a green left- or rightwards 
pointing arrow. Participants were instructed to make a speeded response to the 
direction of the arrow, for the leftwards pointing arrow participants had to press a 
button with their left index finger and for the rightwards pointing arrow participants 
had to press a button with their right index finger. The arrow disappeared when 
participants responded or after 1500 milliseconds had passed. Following the 
presentation of the arrow a fixation cross was presented with a duration jittered 
between 2000 and 4000 milliseconds. When participants responded to the arrow, the 
duration of the fixation cross was extended by 1500 milliseconds minus the reaction 
time, in order to keep the duration of the task stable between participants.  
On a limited number of stop-trials (25 %) a stop-signal was presented. In this 
case the arrow suddenly changed color to red. This color change indicated that 
participants had to inhibit responding to the direction of the arrow. Stop-signal delay 
(SSD) was adjusted using a staircase-tracking procedure to guarantee a 50 % inhibition 
rate (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966). At the beginning of the task SSD was set at 250 
milliseconds. When participants successfully inhibited SSD was increased by 50 
milliseconds to make the task more difficult, when participants were not able to 
inhibit responding SSD was decreased by 50 milliseconds to make the task easier.  
The experiment consisted of two blocks of 128 trials, each block consisting of 
96 go-trials and 32 stop-trials. Trials were presented in a pseudo-randomized order so 
that each stop-trial was preceded by 1, 2, 4, or 5 go-trials. 
 
Data Acquisition 
Scanning was performed with a standard whole-head coil on a 3.0 Tesla Philips 
scanner at the Leiden University Medical Center. The marble task consisted of 3 
event-related runs, each lasting approximately 6 minutes, and the stop-signal task 
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consisted of 2 event-related runs, both lasting approximately 5 minutes. Functional 
data were acquired using T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI). The first 2 
volumes of each run were discarded in order to allow for equilibration of T1 
saturation effects (TR = 2.2 sec, TE = 30 msec, sequential acquisition, 38 slices of 
2.75 mm, field of view 220 mm, 80 x 80 matrix, in-plane resolution 2.75 mm). After 
the functional runs a high-resolution 3D T1-FFE scan for anatomical reference was 
obtained (TR = 9.760 ms; TE = 4.59 ms, flip angle = 8 degrees, 140 slices, 0.875 × 
0.875 × 1.2 mm3 voxels, field of view = 224 × 168 × 177 mm3). Head motion was 
restricted by using foam inserts between the head and the head coil. Visual stimuli 
were projected onto a screen in the magnet bore that could be viewed through a 
mirror attached to the head coil. 
 
Behavioral Data Analysis 
For the marble task, repeated measures analyses of variance were performed to 
examine the effect of preceding context on intentional inhibition. Planned 
comparisons were performed between the different numbers of preceding green trials, 
to examine which conditions differed from each other.  
The use of response selection strategies on the marble task was evaluated by 
computing the Random Number Generation 2 (RNG2) index using the program 
RgCalc (Towse & Neil, 1998). The RNG2 index is an adaptation of the RNG index 
(Evans, 1978) optimized for two-choice response sequences, which considers the 
randomness of the sequence (Neuringer, 1986). RNG2 scores can range from 0 (null 
predictability) to 1 (complete predictability). 
For the stop-signal task, the Stop signal reaction time (SSRT) was calculated 
according to the horse-race model of stopping (Logan & Cowan, 1984) following the 
procedures described in Band et al. (2003). In short, first all reaction times (RTs) for 
the correct go-trials were rank-ordered. Next, the percentage of failed inhibition was 
determined. Then, the go-RT corresponding to that percentage was determined. 
Finally, SSRT was computed as the difference between the go-RT corresponding to 
the percentage of failed inhibition and the mean SSD. 
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
Data were preprocessed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
London). Images were corrected for rigid-body motion. Structural and functional 
volumes were spatially normalized to T1 templates. The normalization algorithm used 
a 12-parameter affine nonlinear transformation involving cosine basis functions, and 
then resampled the volumes to 3-mm cubic voxels. Translational movement 
parameters never exceeded 1 voxel (< 3mm) in any direction for any subject or scan. 
Templates were based on the MNI305 stereotaxic space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan, 
& Evans, 1997), an approximation of Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). 
Functional volumes were spatially smoothed with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-
maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. Statistical analyses were performed on individual 
participants’ data using the general linear model in SPM8. The fMRI time series data 
were modeled by a series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF) and the temporal derivatives. For the marble task, the onset 
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of marble motion of each trial was modeled as an event of interest. Separate 
regressors were defined for white nogo (intentional inhibibition), white go (intentional 
action), green go (stimulus-driven action), and green omissions (omission on the green 
marble trials). For the stop signal task, the presentation of the arrow of each trial was 
modeled as an event of interest. Separate regressors were defined for stop-successful, 
stop-unsuccessful, go-successful, and go-unsuccessful trials. The trial functions were 
used as covariates in a general linear model, along with a basic set of cosine functions 
to high-pass filter (120 Hz) the data. The least-squares parameter estimates of the 
height of the best-fitting canonical HRF for the different conditions were used in pair-
wise contrasts. All reported effects consisted of at least 10 contiguous voxels that 
exceeded a false-discovery-rate (FDR) corrected threshold of p < .05, unless otherwise 
specified.  
To examine similarities across contrasts, conjunction analyses were computed 
using the minimum statistic approach (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 
2005). These analyses identified clusters that were significantly engaged at our 
threshold in both contrasts that we examined. 
Region of interest (ROI) analyses were performed to further characterize the 
involvement of brain regions in intentional inhibition. ROI analyses were performed 







 Marble task. Participants successfully responded to the green marble on 
63.22% of the trials. Participants intentionally inhibited responding to the white 
marble on 53.17% of the trials. Participants more often decided to inhibit responding 
to the white marble when there were fewer preceding green trials, F (3, 69) = 18.09, p 
< .001 (see Figure 2A). That is, intentional inhibition decreased as the previous history 
of instructed go-responses increased.  Planned comparisons showed that participants 
more often inhibited when there were 0 compared to 1, 2, or 3 preceding green trials 
(all p’s < .001) and when there was 1 compared to 3 preceding green trials (p < .05). 
The level of inhibition was comparable for the conditions where there were 1 or 2, 
and 2 or 3 preceding green trials (respectively p = .14, p = .24). 
To examine the randomness of response selection the RNG2 index was 
computed. A mean RNG2 index of .807 (SD = .012) was observed. To examine the 
randomness the participants’ RNG2 index was compared with a RNG2 index 
computed over a set of randomly generated sequences of go- and nogo-responses. For 
the randomly generated set of go- and nogo-response sequences a mean RNG2 index 
of .801 (SD = .002) was observed. Although the RNG2 index for the randomly 
generated sequences was marginally but significantly smaller compared to the 
participants’ RNG2 index, F (1, 47) = 5.71, p < .05, these results indicate that the 
participants’ behavior was close to being random and not driven by simple alternation 
strategies.  




Figure 2: Preceding context effects in the marble task. A. Participants inhibited more 
frequently with less preceding green trials. B. Reaction times on the white marble trials were 
faster with more preceding green trials.  
 
 Reaction times were shorter for the green marble trials (M = 301, SD = 39) 
compared to the white marble trials (M = 372, SD = 89), F (1, 23) = 32.55, p < .001, 
indicating that the decision process in the white marble trials took more time. 
However, longer reaction times on the white marble trials might also be partially 
related to the slower marble speed on those trials. Reaction times on the white marble 
trials were faster when there were more preceding green trials, F (3, 69) = 5.52, p < 
.01 (see Figure 2B). Planned comparisons showed that reaction times were faster 
when there were 3 compared to 0 or 1 preceding green trials (respectively p < .01, p < 
.001). Reaction times did not differ between the other conditions of preceding green 
trials (all p’s > .05).  
 Stop-Signal task. Participants successfully responded to the direction of the 
arrow on 96.46 % of the go-trials. The average reaction time on the successful go-
trials was 519 ms (SD = 133). Participants successfully inhibited responding to the 
direction of the arrow on 46.03 % of the stop-trials. SSRT was 281 ms (SD = 45).  
 
 Correlation between intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition. To examine the 
interrelations between the inhibition tasks, a correlation analysis was performed. 
Intentional inhibition as measured by the marble task (% intentional inhibition) was 
not correlated with stimulus-driven inhibition as measured by the stop-signal task 
(SSRT), r = .181, p = .40.  
 
fMRI results 
 Marble task. First, to identify the brain regions underlying the intentional 
inhibition decision process the contrast intentional inhibition > stimulus-driven action 
(White NoGo > Green Go) was computed. This analysis revealed activation in a 
widespread neural network (see Figure 3A and Table 1) consisting of bilateral IFG, 
bilateral middle frontal gyrus (MFG), bilateral superior frontal gyrus (SFG), 
preSMA/anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), bilateral inferior parietal lobule (IPL), right 
superior temporal gyrus (STG), and occipital lobe. Second, the brain regions 
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underlying the intentional action decision process were identified by computing the 
contrast intentional action > stimulus-driven action (White Go > Green Go). This 
analysis revealed a similar activation pattern as the previous analysis, namely bilateral 
IFG, bilateral MFG, bilateral SFG, preSMA/ACC, and bilateral IPL (see Figure 3B 
and Table 1). To formally compare activation patterns related to the intentional 
inhibition decision process and the intentional action decision process a conjunction 
analysis was performed. This analysis confirmed the considerable overlap in brain 
regions underlying both intentional decision processes by revealing significant 
overlapping activation in bilateral IFG, bilateral MFG, bilateral SFG, preSMA/ACC, 
and bilateral IPL (see Figure 3C and Table 1). 
 
 
Figure 3: A. Whole brain contrasts showing activation related to intentional inhibition 
decision process (White NoGo > Green Go) (FDR-corrected p < .05, at least 10 contiguous 
voxels). B. Whole brain contrasts showing activation related to intentional action decision 
process (White Go > Green Go) (FDR-corrected p < .05, at least 10 contiguous voxels). C. 
Conjunction analysis showing overlapping activation in intentional inhibition decision 
processes (White NoGo > Green Go) and intentional action decision processes (White Go > 
Green Go) (FDR-corrected p < .05, at least 10 contiguous voxels). 
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Table 1. Brain regions revealed by whole brain contrast, focused on decision processes (all 
FDR corrected, p < .05, > 10 voxels). 
 
Anatomical region L/R K Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
White NoGo > Green Go       
Middle Frontal Gyrus L/R 4637 5.76 36 45 18 
Occipital Lobe L/R 5484 5.60 12 -69 0 
Cerebellum L 28 3.36 -30 -63 -33 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 28 3.30 -21 6 69 
Middle Cingulate Cortex L/R 53 3.20 -3 -24 33 
Thalamus L/R 17 2.89 -6 -9 -3 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus / Insula R 11 2.86 36 -12 18 
       
White Go > Green Go       
Middle Frontal Gyrus L/R 3445 6.25 30 24 0 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus / Insula L 282 5.69 -27 27 0 
Inferior Parietal Lobe R 554 5.69 54 -48 54 
Inferior Parietal Lobe L 184 4.26 -54 -42 51 
Precuneus L/R 124 3.76 6 -66 42 
Thalamus L 35 3.54 -9 -15 0 
Middle Cingulate Cortex L/R 49 3.51 0 -24 33 
Cerebellum L 35 3.41 -33 -60 -33 
       
Conjunction Intentional Action and Inhibition     
Middle Frontal Gyrus L/R 2625 6.15 9 24 42 
Inferior Parietal Lobe R 521 5.45 51 -45 45 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 493 5.44 -30 51 12 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus / Insula L 226 5.12 -30 27 0 
Inferior Parietal Lobe L 149 4.28 -54 -42 51 
Precuneus L/R 156 4.23 6 -66 42 
Middle Cingulate Cortex L/R 30 3.34 -3 -24 33 
Superior Temporal Gyrus R 15 2.92 54 -30 -6 
  
 
 The next set of analyses focused on the intentional decision outcome. First, 
the brain regions underlying the intentional inhibition decision outcome were 
identified by computing the contrast intentional inhibition > intentional action (White 
NoGo > White Go). This analysis revealed activation in bilateral IPL, left IFG, left 
MFG, right medial temporal gyrus (MTG), and occipital lobe (see Figure 4A and 
Table 2). Next the reversed contrast (White Go > White NoGo) was computed to 
identify the brain regions underlying the intentional action decision outcome. This 
analysis did not result in significant activations at a FDR corrected threshold of p < 
.05. However, at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001 this analysis revealed activation 
in cingulate cortex and left postcentral gyrus, consistent with a role for left motor 
cortex in right-hand responding (see Figure 4B and Table 2).  
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Figure 4: A. Whole brain contrast showing activation related to intentional inhibition decision 
outcome (White NoGo > White Go) (FDR-corrected p < .05, at least 10 contiguous voxels). 
B. Whole brain contrast showing activation related to intentional action decision outcome 
(White Go > White NoGo) (uncorrected p < .001, at least 10 contiguous voxels). 
 
Table 2. Brain regions revealed by whole brain contrast, focused on decision outcomes (FDR 
corrected, p < .05, > 10 voxels, except for White Go > White NoGo which was thresholded p 
< .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels). 
 
Anatomical region L/R K Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
White NoGo > White Go       
Occipital Lobe L/R 5961 5.48 -15 -84 36 
Superior Temporal Gyrus R 51 3.88 60 -9 -9 
Insula L 34 3.59 -33 3 -12 
Subgenual Anterior Cingulate Cortex / 
Caudate R 113 3.49 6 30 3 
Middle Cingulate Cortex L 22 3.47 -15 -24 39 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 42 3.32 -48 42 6 
Superior Frontal Gyrus R 33 3.27 24 -12 72 
Orbital Anterior Prefrontal Cortex R 20 3.24 21 36 -6 
Middle Cingulate R 34 3.16 15 -21 42 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus L 14 3.13 -42 -36 -12 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 33 3.08 -30 36 -9 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 11 2.87 -60 -36 21 
       
White Go > White NoGo       
Anterior Cingulate Cortex / 
Presupplementary Motor Area L/R 129 4.00 -6 15 39 
Postcentral Gyrus L 72 3.90 -51 -21 54 
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 In order to examine the effect of the number of preceding green trials on 
intentional inhibition decision outcomes, a parametric analysis of the number of 
preceding green trials was performed on the contrast intentional inhibition > 
intentional action (White NoGo > White Go). This analysis revealed stronger 
activation in dFMC, left IFG pars orbitalis, left IFG pars triangularis, and right SFG 
when there were fewer preceding green trials (p < .001 unc.) (see Figure 5 and Table 
3). ROI analysis of dFMC, left IFG pars orbitalis, and left IFG pars triangularis 
showed increased activation for the contrast intentional inhibition > intentional action 
when there were 0 or 1 preceding green trials and deactivation when there were 2 or 3 
preceding green trials (see Figure 5 and Table 3). For dFMC contrast values were 
significantly different from zero when there were 0 or 3 preceding green trials (all p’s 
< .05). For left IFG pars orbitalis and pars triangularis contrast values were 
significantly different from zero when there were 0 preceding green trials (all p’s < 
.05).   
 
 
Figure 5: Brain regions showing more intentional inhibition decision outcome related 
activation when there are less preceding green trials (uncorrected p < .001, at least 10 
contiguous voxels): dFMC (3, 45, 18), left IFG pars orbitalis (-42, 39, -12), and left IFG pars 
triangularis (-48, 30, 0). 
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Table 3. Brain regions revealed by the parametric whole brain analysis on the contrast White 
NoGo > White Go (thresholded p < .001 uncorrected, > 10 voxels). 
 
Anatomical region L/R K Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
Dorsal Frontomedian Cortex L/R 79 4.28 3 45 18 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 34 3.90 -42 39 -12 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 17 3.67 -48 30 0 
Superior Frontal Gyrus R 10 3.51 21 33 54 
  
 
 Stop-Signal task. To identify the brain regions underlying the stimulus-driven 
inhibition decision process the contrast stop successful > go successful was 
computed. This analysis revealed activation in a widespread neural network (see 
Figure 6) consisting of bilateral IFG, bilateral MFG, bilateral SFG, bilateral STG, 
bilateral IPL, preSMA/ACC, and occipital lobe (see Figure 6A and Table 4).  
 
 
Figure 6: A. Whole brain contrast showing activation related to stimulus-driven inhibition 
process (Stop Successful > Go Successful) (FDR-corrected p < .05, at least 10 contiguous 
voxels). B. Conjunction analysis showing overlapping activation in intentional inhibition 
process (White NoGo > Green Go) and stimulus driven inhibition process (Stop Successful > 
Go Successful) (FDR-corrected p < .05, at least 10 contiguous voxels).  
 
 Comparison between intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition. Visual inspection of 
the intentional inhibition decision process contrast (Figure 3A) and the stimulus-
driven inhibition decision process contrast (Figure 6A) suggested that there is 
considerable overlap in the neural networks underlying both inhibition decision 
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processes, although the activation in the stimulus-driven inhibition contrast appears to 
be more extensive. In order to formally compare the neural networks underlying the 
intention inhibition decision process and the stimulus-driven inhibition decision 
process a conjunction analysis was performed. This analysis confirmed the 
considerable overlap in brain regions underlying both inhibition decision processes by 
revealing significant overlapping activation in bilateral IFG, bilateral MFG, left SFG, 
right STG, bilateral IPL, preSMA/ACC, and occipital lobe (see Figure 6B and Table 
4). 
 
Table 4. Brain regions revealed by whole brain contrasts taking together intentional and 
stimulus-driven inhibition (all FDR corrected, p < .05, > 10 voxels). 
 
Anatomical region L/R K Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
Stop Successful > Go Successful      
Lingual Gyrus L 18667 6.44 -21 -57 -6 
Occipital Lobe R  6.28 27 -72 -12 
Insula R  5.72 30 18 -12 
Cuneus R  5.70 15 -96 15 
Occipital Lobe L  5.67 -30 -66 -9 
Insula R  5.51 42 12 -9 
Lingual Gyrus R  5.42 27 -60 -6 
Calcarine Gyrus L  5.40 -6 -96 3 
Inferior Parietal Lobe R  5.25 48 -42 39 
Middle Frontal Gyrus R  5.17 36 45 21 
Superior Temporal Gyrus R  5.15 54 -24 -3 
Caudate R 22 3.07 12 -3 15 
Caudate L 14 2.55 -12 0 15 
       
Conjunction Intentional and Stimulus-Driven Inhibition    
Occipital Lobe L/R 4778 5.86 -45 -81 3 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L/R 2519 5.82 36 45 21 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 311 4.66 -30 60 18 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus / Insula L 221 4.15 -36 18 -9 
Middle Cingulate Cortex L/R 51 3.19 -3 -21 33 
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 19 2.96 -51 18 39 






The present study tested the neural correlates of intentional and stimulus-driven 
inhibition, using the marble task and the stop signal task. The analyses resulted in four 
main effects: (1) both intentional action and intentional inhibition decisions resulted in 
a large network of activation including the lateral prefrontal cortex, parietal cortex and 
preSMA, regions previously referred to as the intentionality network (Lau, et al., 2004; 
van Eimeren et al., 2006). (2) A parametric analysis of preceding context effects 
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showed activation in dFMC and left IFG during intentional inhibition to decrease as 
the number of preceding green (Go) trials increased. (3) Conjunction analysis 
confirmed that the intentionality network showed large overlap with the stimulus-
driven inhibition network. (4) Although the side-by-side comparison shows that 
intentional inhibition and stimulus-driven inhibition show overlap in networks of 
activation, intentional inhibition and stimulus-driven inhibition are not directly 
comparable as shown by behavioral correlation analysis. Participants, who perform 
well on the intentional inhibition task, do not necessarily perform well on the 
stimulus-driven inhibition task. Thus, despite the overlap in networks of activation, 
behavioral performance on the intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition tasks is not 
predictive of each other. Below, we discuss these findings in relation to our 
hypotheses.  
First, we aimed to replicate prior studies demonstrating that intentional action 
decisions are associated with increased activation in lateral and medial (ACC/preSMA) 
prefrontal cortex. Indeed, the contrast intentional action versus stimulus-driven action 
(white versus green marble Go responses) confirmed that this network was largely 
engaged, consistent with prior studies in the literature on intention action (Lau, et al., 
2004; van Eimeren, et al., 2006). The same network was engaged in intentional 
inhibition decisions where we compared intention inhibition with stimulus-driven 
actions, further confirming the notion that this network is important for intentionality, 
and not for motor planning per se (Lau, et al., 2004). This is in line with previous 
literature showing overlapping neural regions for inhibition and action, both when 
inhibition and action are internally driven (Karch et al., 2009) and when inhibition and 
action are externally driven (Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008). 
Secondly, we tested whether there were brain regions uniquely related to the 
intentional inhibition decision outcome by contrasting intentional inhibition with 
intentional action. A network of brain regions was active for intentional inhibition 
compared to intentional action including bilateral IPL and left IFG, suggesting that 
the inhibition process cannot be reduced to intentionality per se (Karch, et al., 2009; 
Kühn & Brass, 2009). We also observed widespread activation in the occipital lobe 
during intentional inhibition. This is most likely due to differences between conditions 
with respect to the continued marble movement in the intentional inhibition versus 
the intentional action trials.  
Contrary to prior findings by Kühn et al. (2009), we observed no dFMC 
activation in this general contrast. We then explored effects of preceding context using 
parametric analyses. We showed that dFMC activation during intentional inhibition 
depended strongly on the number of preceding green trials (note that these results are 
based on an uncorrected threshold of .001, > 10 contiguous voxels). At the behavioral 
level we also observed an effect of preceding context, such that participants were less 
likely to intentionally inhibit when there were more preceding green trials. 
Furthermore, we showed that when participants intentionally decided to act, reaction 
times were fastest when there were more preceding green trials. Together, these 
behavioral results are indicative of the formation of a disposition to act rather than 
inhibit, possibly reflecting an automatic associative mechanism in action generation 
(Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006). A run of preceding actions during 
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green trials may progressively contribute to a predisposition to decide to act, as 
opposed to inhibit, on intentional white trials. This appears to reflect a positive 
reinforcement association for the decision to act rather than inhibit (Perruchet, et al., 
2006). At the neural level we showed that dFMC does show activation related to 
intentional inhibition, but only when following a short run of preceding instructed 
actions (green trials), and not following longer runs of instructed actions. Thus, veto-
related activation appears to be stronger when participants are less established in a 
mode of prepotent responding, or set to act, to external instructive stimuli. This 
notion is further supported by the observation of not only increased dFMC, but also 
increased left IFG activation during intentional inhibition following shorter but not 
longer runs of preceding instructed action trials (green trials). Left IFG, like its right-
hemisphere counterpart, may be critically involved in response inhibition (Leung & 
Cai, 2007; Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2008).  
The results of the parametric analysis shed important light on the role of 
dFMC in intentional inhibition, and on the significance of intentional inhibition more 
generally. Briefly, we found dFMC activation was reduced when previous trials had 
created a prepotent urge to act. Our design differs from the original free-choice 
whether decision of Brass and Haggard (2007), by including a large proportion of 
randomly-interleaved instructed action trials. These were included with the express 
intention of inducing a prepotent urge to act. When the prepotent urge to act is 
present, we reasoned that intentional inhibition should operate as a late brake on 
action preparation, rather than simply an early pre-decision not to initiate any action 
preparation at all. Interestingly, our results suggest that prepotent action also makes 
intentional inhibition less likely, and reduces the activation in brain areas associated 
with intentional inhibition. Taken together, these findings suggest that motor drive 
and intentional inhibition are reciprocal and antagonistic influences, analogous to the 
competitive interaction thought to occur between alternative response options (Cisek, 
2007). 
This reciprocal antagonism corresponds to the common intuition that 
inhibition of action is harder when the drive to act is strong – for example in cases 
such as craving and addiction. Interestingly, these are exactly the circumstances when 
intentional inhibition may also be most necessary. It may also explain why we did not 
find dFMC activation in our main contrast, while previous studies that did not use 
instructed action trials to enforce a prepotent urge to act did (Brass & Haggard, 2007).  
Third, a side-by-side comparison between the intentional and the stimulus 
driven tasks was made. Stimulus driven inhibition resulted in the expected network of 
activation, including the right IFG and pre-SMA (Aron, 2011; Aron, et al., 2004; 
Chikazoe, 2010; Forstmann, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2008; Jahfari, et al., 
2011). This network was highly comparable to the network involved in intentional 
inhibition, confirming that the two types of inhibition share commonalities. Both 
intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition require one to refrain from responding, 
therefore it is likely that the right IFG/pre-SMA network is important for the motoric 
aspect of inhibition (Chikazoe, 2010). Despite the similarities in underlying neural 
networks, behavioral performance on the marble and stop-signal tasks was not 
correlated. However, it is not uncommon that different inhibition tasks correlate 
3. Intentional versus externally driven inhibition 
 51 
poorly (Huizinga, et al., 2006), but exactly how and when intentional and stimulus-
driven inhibition are dissociable on the individual level remains an important avenue 
for future research.  
Some limitations of the present study deserve mention. First, the fact that two 
different tasks were used to measure intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition pre-
empted the possibility to compute a direct contrast between intentional and stimulus-
driven inhibition. Future research might benefit from using one single task to measure 
both forms of inhibition, to allow for such a direct contrast. Second, for the marble 
task we cannot completely rule out the possibility that participants have pre-decided 
not to initiate an action on the intentional inhibition trials, instead of deciding in the 
instant to inhibit an already initiated action. The observed pattern of results showing 
that intentional inhibition was less likely following a run of instructed action trials, 
suggests that this was not the case. However, future research could shed more light on 
this issue, for instance by including electromyography measures to ascertain that the 
initial action initiation is also present in intentional inhibition trials. 
Taken together, this study was the first to test the neural correlates of 
intentional and stimulus-driven inhibition within the same subjects. The results 
confirmed the hypothesis that these two types of inhibition rely on the same neural 
network including lateral PFC and preSMA, regions previously associated with 
intentionality (Lau, et al., 2004; van Eimeren, et al., 2006). The results also 
demonstrated additional activation for intentional inhibition compared to intentional 
action in bilateral IPL and preSMA, suggesting that the inhibition process cannot be 
reduced the intentionality per se (Karch, et al., 2009; Kühn & Brass, 2009). Finally, the 
results showed that activation in dFMC, previously observed in other intentional 
inhibition studies, is dependent on specific task demands, such as prepotency of 
responding. Several open questions remain for how intentional inhibition relates to 
individual differences in self-control and self-regulation. For example, Casey et al. 
(2011) recently showed that individuals who can intentionally inhibit impulses to 
respond to immediate reward have better response inhibition associated with more 
lateral prefrontal cortex activation 40 years later. One of the key questions for future 
research is how motivational tendencies may influence internal drives to veto one’s 
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Abstract 
Externally and internally guided action control processes are associated with changes in both 
central (neural) and autonomic (heart rate) responses, but commonalities between these 
systems are not well understood. The present study aimed to integrate the study of heart rate 
and neural changes in one experiment in order to examine the role of a central autonomic 
network in intentional and externally guided action control. The results showed that heart rate 
deceleration during externally guided action control was associated with lateral PFC activation, 
whereas heart rate deceleration during intentional action control was associated with medial 
frontal cortex activation. The latter was observed for both intentional action and intentional 
inhibition events. Together, the results indicate that heart rate deceleration during action 
control is an integral part of the central autonomic network, which shows a medial/lateral 
distinction for intentional versus externally guided action control. 




The ability to exercise control over our actions is an important part of successful 
functioning in daily life. Action control can be guided both externally, such as when a 
traffic light turns red, and internally, such as when controlling the urge to scratch an 
itchy mosquito bite. The latter process is referred to as intentional inhibition, which 
can be defined as a late veto opportunity (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Filevich, et al., 
2012). A host of literature has indicated that externally guided inhibition is associated 
with heart rate deceleration (e.g. Börger & van der Meere, 2000; van Boxtel, et al., 
2001; Van der Veen, et al., 2000). Recently, heart rate deceleration has been shown to 
also be a sensitive index for intentional inhibition (Schel, Windhorst, van der Molen, 
& Crone, 2013). Together, these studies suggest the involvement of a central 
autonomic network in external and intentional action control, but how central and 
autonomic responses are related in externally and internally guided control is not well 
understood.  
To date, most research on the neural correlates of externally versus internally 
guided action control has focused on intentional action selection (for a review, see 
Brass & Haggard, 2008). Within this domain, previous research has suggested a 
medial-lateral distinction for internally vs. externally guided action control, with 
internally guided action selection being associated with activation in medial frontal 
cortex and externally guided action selection being associated with activation in lateral 
prefrontal cortex (Brass & Haggard, 2008; Goldberg, 1985; Krieghoff, Waszak, Prinz, 
& Brass, 2011). The evidence for intentional inhibition is less clear. Some studies have 
found activation in dorsal medial frontal cortex for intentional inhibition (Brass & 
Haggard, 2007; Kühn, et al., 2009). However, others reported activation during 
intentional inhibition in lateral prefrontal cortex, in regions similar to those involved 
in externally guided inhibition (Schel et al., 2014). 
 The present study aimed to examine the involvement of a central autonomic 
network in intentional and externally guided action control. For this means, 
participants performed an action control task in the MRI scanner, while their heart 
rate was measured continuously. Externally guided action trials were presented 
intermixed with intentional action control trials, where participants could choose 
between acting and inhibiting. We expected to observe heart rate deceleration during 
intentional compared to externally guided action control (Schel, et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, for intentional action control we expected to find a relation between 
heart rate responsiveness and activation in medial frontal cortex, and for externally 
guided action control between heart rate responsiveness and activation in lateral 






Twenty-four healthy right-handed adults between 18-26 years of age participated in 
the experiment. Eight participants were excluded from all data analysis because of 
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poor quality heart rate data, caused by scanner artifacts. For these participants, it was 
not possible to distinguish R-waves from noise. However, when analyzing the fMRI 
data for the complete sample (N = 24) and for the final sample (N = 16), there were 
no differences in activation patterns, suggesting that the noisy heart rate measures 
were not associated with differences in neural activation. The final sample consisted of 
sixteen adults between 18-26 years of age (8 females, M = 21.82, SD = 2.43). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no neurological or 
psychiatric impairments according to self-report. Before participating in the 
experiment, all participants signed informed consent. All anatomical scans were 
reviewed by a radiologist. No anomalous findings were reported.  
To obtain an estimate of cognitive functioning participants completed two 
subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) (Wechsler, 1981a); 
similarities and block design. Estimated IQ scores were within the normal range (M = 
112, SD = 7.03).  
The behavioral and fMRI results of the complete sample (N = 24) have been 
published separately in a study comparing intentional and externally guided inhibition 
(Schel et al., 2014). 
 
Task 
The marble task was adapted from Kühn et al. (2009), and optimized for heart rate 
recording (Schel, et al., 2013). Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation-
screen, jittered between 1400 and 2000 ms. Hereafter, a white marble on top of a 
ramp was shown, which started to roll down and changed color to green after a 
variable duration of 1400 to 2000 ms. Participants were instructed to respond to the 
rolling green marble to prevent it from crashing (externally guided action). Intermixed 
with the green marble trials, trials in which the marble remained white were presented 
during which participants were free to choose between responding (intentional action) 
and inhibiting responding (intentional inhibition) to the rolling marble. The 
experiment consisted of three blocks of 80 (48 green, 32 white) trials each (see Schel, 
et al., 2014 for further task details (chapter 3)). 
 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
Scanning was performed with a standard whole-head coil on a 3.0 Tesla Philips 
scanner at the Leiden University Medical Center. Functional data were acquired using 
T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI). The first 2 volumes of each run were 
discarded in order to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects (TR = 2.2 sec, TE 
= 30 msec, sequential acquisition, 38 slices of 2.75 mm, field of view 220 mm, 80 x 80 
matrix, in-plane resolution 2.75 mm). After the functional runs a high-resolution 3D 
T1-FFE scan for anatomical reference was obtained (TR = 9.760 ms; TE = 4.59 ms, 
flip angle = 8 degrees, 140 slices, 0.875 × 0.875 × 1.2 mm3 voxels, field of view = 224 
× 168 × 177 mm3). Head motion was restricted by using foam inserts between the 
head and the head coil. Visual stimuli were projected onto a screen in the magnet bore 
that could be viewed through a mirror attached to the head coil. 
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Heart Rate Data Acquisition and Analysis 
During scanning, the electrocardiogram (ECG) was measured continuously using the 
MRI-compatible Biopac System at a sample frequency of 5000 Hz. The ECG was 
recorded from three AgAg/Cl electrodes, attached directly around the heart. Inter 
Beat Intervals (IBIs) were defined as the length between consecutive R-peaks. The R-
peaks were detected with the program Physiospec (developed by Van Beek, 
Developmental Psychology, UvA). The recorded IBIs were manually screened for 
physiologically impossible readings and artifacts (i.e. R-peaks not detected or other 
peaks seen as R-peaks). These were corrected by adjusting specific parameters in the 
program that extracted the IBIs from the digitized ECGs.  
Five consecutive IBIs were selected around the onset of marble motion; the 
IBI concurrent with the onset of marble motion (IBI 0), two IBIs preceding the onset 
of marble motion (IBI -2 and IBI -1), and two IBIs following the onset of marble 
motion (IBI 1 and IBI 2). In order to obtain an index of phasic heart rate change (IBI 
difference) IBIs were referenced to IBI-2. Thus, we analyzed the differences scores 
relative to IBI -2 for IBI -1, IBI 0, IBI 1 and IBI 2. Analyses of IBI-2 revealed no 
significant differences in IBI length between the different test conditions, confirming 
that there were no a priori differences between these conditions reflected in heart rate. 
Statistical analyses were performed using repeated measures ANOVA. Huynh-Feldt 
corrections for violations of the assumption of sphericity were used when necessary 
(Jennings, 1987; Vasey & Thayer, 1987). 
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
Data were preprocessed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
London). Images were corrected for rigid-body motion. Structural and functional 
volumes were spatially normalized to T1 templates. The normalization algorithm used 
a 12-parameter affine nonlinear transformation involving cosine basis functions, and 
then resampled the volumes to 3-mm cubic voxels. Translational movement 
parameters never exceeded 1 voxel (< 3mm) in any direction for any subject or scan. 
Templates were based on the MNI305 stereotaxic space (Cocosco, et al., 1997), an 
approximation of Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). Functional volumes 
were spatially smoothed with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-maximum isotropic Gaussian 
kernel. Statistical analyses were performed on individual participants’ data using the 
general linear model in SPM8. The fMRI time series data were modeled by a series of 
events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) and the 
temporal derivatives. The onset of marble motion of each trial was modeled as an 
event of interest. Separate regressors were defined for white nogo (intentional 
inhibition), white go (intentional action), green go (stimulus-driven action), and green 
omissions (omission on the green marble trials). The trial functions were used as 
covariates in a general linear model, along with a basic set of cosine functions to high-
pass filter (120 Hz) the data. The least-squares parameter estimates of the height of 
the best-fitting canonical HRF for the different conditions were used in pair-wise 
contrasts.  
 To examine the relationship between heart rate and neural activation, IBI 
differences scores were added as regressors to the whole-brain regression analyses. All 
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reported correlations between heart rate and neural activation consisted of at least 10 
contiguous voxels at an uncorrected threshold of p < .001. The reason for setting this 
threshold was because we had a priori hypotheses on which brain regions (lateral and 
medial PFC) were of interest in this study and to avoid Type II errors, because 
detecting individual correlations requires more power than group analyses (see also 
Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009). Region of interest (ROI) analyses were performed 
to visualize the relationship between heart rate and neural activation and to examine 
the specificity of the relationship between heart rate and neural activation for 
externally guided versus intentional action control. ROI analyses were performed with 






Participants responded in time to the green marble on 65.02 % (SD = 6.79) of the 
trials, and decided to intentionally inhibit responding to the white marble on 44.99 % 
(SD = 8.38) of the trials. 
Participants were substantially slower to respond to the white (M = 359, SD 
= 68) compared to the green (M = 294, SD = 21) marble trials, F (1, 15) = 21.72, p < 
.001, indicating that the decision process on the white marble trials took longer. 
 
Heart Rate 
IBIs were computed separately for the externally guided green go condition and the 
intentional white go and white nogo conditions. To test for differences in heart rate 
responses between the three different conditions, a Condition (3: green go, white go, 
white nogo) x IBI (4: IBI -1 to IBI 2) repeated measures ANOVA was performed. A 
main effect of IBI was observed, F (3, 51) = 7.78, p < .01, indicating that heart rate 
decelerated in anticipation of marble movement (onset during IBI 0), followed by an 
acceleratory recovery (see Figure 1). A Condition x IBI interaction, F (6, 102) = 11.13, 
p < .001, indicated that heart rate responses differed between the different conditions. 
Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs on IBI 1 (during which participants decided 
between acting and inhibiting), showed that heart rate deceleration was less 
pronounced for the externally guided green go condition compared to both the 
intentional white go condition, F (1, 15) = 20.10, p < .001, and the intentional white 
nogo condition, F (1, 15) = 25.98, p < .001. Finally, heart rate deceleration was more 
pronounced for the intentional white nogo compared to the intentional white go 
condition, F (1, 15) = 6.37, p < .05. 
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Figure 1: Stimulus-locked heart rate changes associated with externally guided action (Green 
Go), intentional action (White Go) and intentional inhibition (White NoGo). IBI 0 refers to 
the IBI during which the marble started to roll down the ramp. An increase in IBI difference 
scores indicates heart rate deceleration, and a decrease in IBI difference scores indicates heart 
rate acceleration. 
 
Heart Rate and fMRI correlations 
In order to examine the relation between heart rate deceleration and neural activation 
during action control, whole-brain regression analyses with IBI 1 difference scores as 
regressors were performed on the three conditions (green go, white go and white 
nogo) versus fixation baseline (null). The reason for focusing on the conditions versus 
fixation baseline was because condition versus baseline typically has higher reliability 
and is not contaminated by individual differences in “control condition” 
responsiveness (see Ordaz, Foran, Velanova, & Luna, 2013). 
For externally guided action (the green go condition), average IBI 1 difference 
scores were added as a regressor to the contrast green go > null. This analysis revealed 
activation in right lateral prefrontal cortex (lateral PFC) and right paracentral lobe (see 
Figure 2A and Table 1). A ROI analysis showed that right lateral prefrontal cortex was 
more active for individuals who showed stronger heart rate deceleration during 
externally guided action (see Figure 2D). 
 For intentional action (the white go condition), average IBI 1 difference 
scores were added as a regressor to the contrast white go > null. This analysis revealed 
activation in medial frontal cortex and supplementary motor area (SMA) (Figure 2B, 
see Table 1 for a full list of active areas). A ROI analysis showed that medial frontal 
cortex was more active for individuals who showed stronger heart rate deceleration 
during intentional action (see Figure 2H). 
 Finally, for intentional inhibition (the white nogo condition) average IBI 1 
difference scores were added as a regressor to the contrast white nogo > null. This 
analysis also revealed activation in medial frontal cortex (Figure 2C, see Table 1 for a 
full list of areas). A ROI analysis showed that medial frontal cortex was more active 
for individuals who showed stronger heart rate deceleration during intentional 
inhibition (see Figure 2L). 
  




Figure 2: Whole brain regression analyses showing relation between heart rate deceleration 
and neural activation for: A. externally guided action (Green Go), B. intentional action (White 
Go) and C. intentional inhibition (White NoGo) (uncorrected p < .001, at least 10 contiguous 
voxels). D-L. Associations between heart rate deceleration and neural activation for the 
different task conditions. Trendlines are added for significant correlations.  
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Table 1. Brain regions revealed by whole-brain regression analyses (all p < .001 uncorrected, > 
10 voxels).  
 
Anatomical region L/R K Z MNI coordinates 
 
    
x y z 
Green Go > null, regression IBI  1 
      Paracentral Lobe r 14 3.88 9 -27 63 
Lateral PFC (IFG) r 28 3.83 51 30 21 
       White Go > null, regression IBI  1 
      Supplementary Motor Area l 100 4.80 -3 -18 54 
Superior Frontal Gyrus l 38 4.16 -21 21 39 
Para Hippocampal Area l 22 4.16 -15 -12 -24 
Medial Frontal Cortex (SMG) l 40 4.15 -3 39 36 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex r 29 4.00 9 36 12 
Posterior Cingulate Cortex l 11 3.03 0 -48 27 
Inferior Parietal Lobe l 20 3.83 -48 -33 45 
Amygdala l 17 3.81 -30 3 -18 
Hippocampus l 18 3.73 -18 -24 -12 
Superior Frontal Gyrus l 11 3.73 -18 54 6 
Occipital Lobe l 13 3.66 -48 -72 -9 
Supplementary Motor Area r 15 3.65 9 24 48 
Middle Temporal Gyrus r 10 3.64 45 -36 3 
Precentral Gyrus r 10 3.49 54 3 24 
       White NoGo > null, regression IBI1 
     Amygdala l 41 4.43 -30 3 -21 
Para Hippocampal Area r 42 4.41 18 -30 -12 
Occipital Lobe l 11 4.12 -15 -66 39 
Medial Frontal Cortex (SMG) l 34 4.03 -3 33 39 
Inferior Parietal Lobule l 30 3.95 -51 -36 42 
Superior Temporal Gyrus r 10 3.67 66 -15 12 
  
 
In order to examine the specificity of the relationship between heart rate 
deceleration and neural activation for externally guided versus intentional action 
control in lateral and medial prefrontal cortex, we performed additional ROI analyses. 
For the ROI in right lateral PFC, which was taken from the regression analysis for 
externally guided action, values for intentional action and intentional inhibition were 
extracted. Intentional action related activation in this area correlated with IBI 1 
difference scores for intentional action (r = .637, p < .01) (see Figure 2G), and 
intentional inhibition related activation in this area correlated with IBI difference 
scores for intentional inhibition (r = .670, p < .01) (see Figure 2J). For the ROI in 
medial frontal cortex, which was taken from the regression analysis for intentional 
action, values for externally guided action and intentional inhibition were extracted. 
Externally guided action activation in this area did not correlate with IBI 1 difference 
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scores for externally guided action (p > .2) (see Figure 2E), whereas intentional 
inhibition related activation in this area did correlate with IBI 1 difference scores for 
intentional inhibition (r = .778, p < .001) (see Figure 2K). Finally, for the ROI in 
medial frontal cortex, which was taken from the regression analysis for intentional 
inhibition, values for externally guided action and intentional action were extracted. 
Externally guided action activation in this area did not correlate with IBI 1 difference 
scores for externally guided action (p > .2) (see Figure 2F), whereas intentional action 
related activation in this area did correlate with IBI 1 difference scores for intentional 
action (r = .771, p < .001) (see Figure 2I). Taken together, these results show 
specificity of the relation between heart rate deceleration and neural activation in 
medial frontal cortex for intentional action control (i.e. both intentional action and 
intentional inhibition), but not for the relation between heart rate deceleration and 





The present study was the first to examine the role of a central autonomic network in 
intentional and externally guided action control in a combined neuroimaging and heart 
rate study. In line with our previous heart rate study outside the scanner (Schel, et al., 
2013), the heart rate results showed a pronounced heart rate deceleration during both 
intentional action and inhibition decisions, indicating that heart rate is sensitive to 
intentional decisions. Furthermore, the results showed that heart rate deceleration 
during intentional action control was associated with activation in medial frontal 
cortex, whereas heart rate deceleration during externally guided action control was 
associated with activation in right lateral PFC. Here we will discuss these findings vis-
à-vis recent hypotheses about the functioning of the central autonomic network and 
the relation between heart rate responses and neural activation. 
 In this study both intentional and externally guided action control involved 
activation of a central autonomic network. However, the implementation of this 
central autonomic network differed between intentional and externally guided action 
control. On the autonomic level, the results showed that both intentional and 
externally guided action control are associated with heart rate deceleration. There was 
however a difference in the level of autonomic responsiveness, such that heart rate 
deceleration was more pronounced for intentional compared to externally guided 
action control. On the central level, the results showed that the association between 
heart rate deceleration and neural responsiveness differed between intentional and 
externally guided action control, such that for intentional action control the 
association was observed in medial frontal cortex and for externally guided action 
control the association was observed in right lateral PFC. These results are in line with 
previous research suggesting a medial/lateral distinction for intentional versus 
externally guided action control (Brass & Haggard, 2008; Goldberg, 1985; Krieghoff, 
et al., 2011). However, the ROI analyses suggest that this distinction is only partial. 
That is, for externally guided action control heart rate deceleration is associated with 
activation in right lateral PFC, whereas for intentional action control (both intentional 
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action and intentional inhibition) heart rate deceleration is associated with activation in 
medial frontal cortex, but also in right lateral PFC. These results extent previous 
findings by showing that regions in lateral PFC are also important for intentional 
action control (Karch, et al., 2009; Orr & Banich, 2014). 
 The present study was one of the first to examine the relationship between 
parasympathetic mediated heart rate deceleration and neural activation during a 
cognitive task. Previous studies examining the relation between parasympathetic 
mediated heart rate changes and neural activation have mainly looked at physical tests, 
such as a handgrip exercise (Norton, Luchyshyn, & Kevin Shoemaker, 2013; Wong, 
Masse, Kimmerly, Menon, & Shoemaker, 2007). These studies have shown 
ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) to be important in modulating heart rate (Norton, et al., 
2013; Wong, et al., 2007). This vmPFC region is more ventral compared to the medial 
frontal cortex region, which we have found to be associated with heart rate 
deceleration during intentional action control. Interestingly, this region in medial 
frontal cortex is close to the midcingulate cortex region found to be associated with 
sympathetic regulation in a large meta-analysis on the central processing of autonomic 
function (Beissner, Meissner, Bar, & Napadow, 2013). In contrast, the lateral PFC 
region, which was associated with heart rate deceleration during externally guided 
action control, has not been previously implicated in parasympathetic cardiac control. 
Besides the medial frontal cortex being important in the central autonomic network 
for intentional action control, the left amygdala was also found to be associated with 
heart rate deceleration during intentional action control (both intentional action and 
intentional inhibition). Previous research has found the amygdala to be one of the key 
regions via which the prefrontal cortex influences heart rate (Thayer & Lane, 2009), 
both for sympathetic and parasympathetic regulation (Beissner, et al., 2013). However, 
the left amygdala was not found to be associated with heart rate deceleration during 
externally guided action control.  
Some limitations of the present study deserve mentioning. First, due to 
scanner artifacts on the heart rate date, the final sample size of the current study was 
relatively small. Future studies should replicate these findings in a larger sample. 
Second, our paradigm did not include an externally guided inhibition condition, only 
externally guided action. It will be an interesting question for future research to 
examine the role of the central autonomic network in intentional versus externally 
guided inhibition.  
To conclude, the present study examined the role of the central autonomic 
network in an action control task in a combined heart rate and neuroimaging study. 
The results of this study demonstrate a relation between autonomic responsiveness 
and neural activity in key brain regions for action control, and extent the existing 
literature by showing that heart rate deceleration during action control is an integrated 
part of the central autonomic network, dissociating between intentional and externally 
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Abstract 
Choosing not to act, or the ability to intentionally inhibit your actions lies at the core of self-
control. Even though most research has focused on externally primed inhibition, an important 
question concerns how intentional inhibition develops. Therefore, in the present study children 
(aged 10 to 12) and adults (aged 18 to 26) performed the marble task, in which they had to 
choose between acting on and inhibiting a prepotent response, while fMRI data were collected. 
Intentional inhibition was associated with activation of the fronto-basal ganglia network. 
Activation in the subthalamic nucleus and dorsal fronto-median cortex, regions which have 
previously been associated with intentional inhibition, did not differ between intentional 
inhibition and intentional action. Even though both children and adults intentionally inhibited 
their actions to a similar extent, children showed more activation in the fronto-basal ganglia 
network during intentional inhibition, but not in the subthalamic nucleus and dorsal fronto-
median cortex. Furthermore, a positive relation between self-reported impulsivity and 
intentional inhibition was observed. These findings have important implications for our 
understanding of disorders of impulsivity, such as ADHD, which are associated with poor self-
control abilities. 
 




Self-control abilities are of critical importance for successful functioning across the life 
span. A classical experiment to test self-control is the marshmallow experiment, a 
delay of gratification test for preschool children in which children can choose between 
one marshmallow now or two marshmallows later (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 
1989). Studies with the marshmallow experiment have shown that during the 
preschool ages there are large individual differences in the ability to control the 
immediate impulse to eat the first marshmallow and wait for the second marshmallow 
(Mischel et al., 1989) and experimental variations of this task have shown a 
developmental increase in controlling immediate impulses between childhood and 
adulthood (Christakou, Brammer, & Rubia, 2011; Lee et al., 2013; Scheres et al., 2006). 
These changes are accompanied by neurodevelopmental changes. Recently, it has been 
shown that individuals who were less able to delay gratification when they were 
preschoolers, showed poorer self-control and reduced recruitment of the fronto-basal 
ganglia network during a response inhibition task in adulthood (Casey et al., 2011).  
 An important distinction which has been made in tasks that involve self-
control, is whether the inhibitory process is externally or internally driven. Externally 
driven response inhibition involves the ability to interrupt an action when signaled by 
a cue in the environment, for example, a traffic light which turns red. Neuroscientific 
studies have shown that the fronto-basal ganglia network, with main nodes in right 
inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), striatum, globus pallidus, and subthalamic nucleus 
(STN), is consistently involved during externally driven response inhibition (e.g. Aron, 
Behrens, Smith, Frank, & Poldrack, 2007; Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Forstmann et al., 
2012; Jahfari et al., 2011; King et al., 2012). Developmental studies have also found 
evidence for the involvement of the fronto-basal ganglia network in externally driven 
response inhibition in children (Cohen et al., 2010; Ordaz, Foran, Velanova, & Luna, 
2013). So far, most developmental neuroimaging studies have focused on the frontal 
component of the fronto-basal ganglia network, namely the rIFG (Luna, 
Padmanabhan, & O'Hearn, 2010). These studies have reported both increases (e.g. 
Ordaz et al., 2013; Rubia, Smith, Taylor, & Brammer, 2007) and decreases (e.g. Booth 
et al., 2003; Durston et al., 2002) in inhibition related rIFG activation with age, but an 
age-related increase in rIFG activation and a decrease in activation in task-unspecific 
frontal regions appears to be the most common pattern (Crone & Dahl, 2012; 
Durston et al., 2006; Luna et al., 2010). Overall, these studies show a stabilization of 
response inhibition performance and its underlying neural correlates during 
adolescence (Luna et al., 2010). 
A second, but understudied component of self-control is intentional 
inhibition. In daily life often both external cues and internal processes play a role in 
the decision to inhibit, although sometimes external cues are more important (such as 
when stopping at a traffic light) and other times internal processes are more 
prominent (such as when inhibiting yourself from taking another piece of chocolate). 
However, in contrast to externally driven inhibition, intentional inhibition is not 
triggered by an external cue. Instead, intentional inhibition has been defined as a late 
internally driven veto process, a final opportunity to inhibit before action execution 
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(Brass & Haggard, 2008; Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012; Haggard, 2008). Since 
intentional inhibition is not preceded by any external stimulus, and does not result in 
any overt behavior, intentional inhibition has proven difficult to investigate. Yet, this 
type of inhibition is involved in many of our day to day activities such as inhibiting 
yourself from taking another piece of chocolate, inhibiting pressing the send button 
when being on the verge of sending an angry email, or inhibiting scratching itchy skin 
caused by eczema. Delay of gratification studies have reported developmental 
improvements in the ability to intentionally inhibit the impulse to choose an 
immediate reward (Christakou et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2013; Scheres et al., 2006), but 
these tasks involve many different processes besides intentional inhibition, such as 
reward sensitivity and reward discounting. A neuroscience perspective can provide 
important insights into the development of intentional inhibition, as this provides a 
covert measure of a process, which occurs without a specific stimulus and without any 
behavioral outcomes. An important question concerns whether intentional inhibition 
is guided by the same neural network as externally driven inhibition, or whether 
intentional inhibition is associated with different underlying neural circuitry, which 
may develop during child and adolescent development. 
 In the present study, we used the child-friendly marble paradigm to examine 
the neural correlates of intentional action and inhibition in children. In this paradigm 
participants are instructed to freely decide between responding and inhibiting 
responding to a rolling marble. Children between 10 to 12 years of age were included 
to allow for comparison of the results to the externally driven response inhibition 
literature (Booth et al., 2003; Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002; 
Durston et al., 2002; Rubia et al., 2007). Based on these prior findings, we expect to 
observe activation in the main nodes of the fronto-basal ganglia network (i.e. rIFG, 
striatum, globus pallidus, and STN) during intentional inhibition, comparable to what 
we have observed in adults (Schel et al., 2014). If developmental differences in 
internally driven inhibition share mechanisms with externally driven response 
inhibition (Bunge et al., 2002; Durston et al., 2002; Luna et al., 2010), then we may 
expect inhibition-related activation in the rIFG to be stronger for adults compared to 
children.  
Recently, several studies have suggested that intentional inhibition is 
associated with increased activation in the dorsal fronto-median cortex (dFMC) (Brass 
& Haggard, 2007; Kühn, Haggard, & Brass, 2009), a region which was previously 
found to be more active in early adolescents when inhibiting a selfish impulse in a 
sharing task (van den Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2011). 
Therefore, we examined whether more activity in the dFMC during intentional 
inhibition was observed in children compared to adults based on prior studies 
showing that this region is more active in 10-12-year-olds (Blakemore, 2008; Gunther 
Moor et al., 2012; van den Bos et al., 2011). 
In order to validate our experimental measure of intentional inhibition, participants 
also completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) 
outside of the scanner to obtain an estimate of impulsivity and self-control in daily 
life. We expect daily life impulsivity to be predictive of intentional action control 
performance. 





Nineteen healthy right-handed children between 10-12 years of age (10 females, M = 
11.56, SD = .83) and twenty-four healthy right-handed adults between 18-26 years of 
age (13 females, M = 21.49, SD = 2.36) participated in the experiment. The results 
from the adults have previously been published in a larger report on response 
inhibition (Schel et al., 2014). A chi-square test revealed no significant differences in 
gender distributions between age groups (p = .92). All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, and no neurological or psychiatric impairments according 
to self- or parent-report. Informed consent was obtained for all participants and the 
study was approved by the Internal Review Board at Leiden University Medical 
Center. In accordance with the guidelines of the Leiden University Medical Center, all 
anatomical scans were reviewed by a radiologist. No anomalous findings were 
reported.  
To obtain an estimate of cognitive functioning, children and adults completed 
the subtests similarities and block design of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children (WISC) (Wechsler, 1981b) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) 
(Wechsler, 1981a) respectively. Estimated IQ scores were within the normal range 
(children: M = 111.32, SD = 9.94, adults: M = 111.33, SD = 6.93) and age groups did 
not differ in estimated IQ scores, F (1,42) = .00, p = .99, η2 = 1.04-6. 
 
Task 
The marble task was adapted from Kühn and colleagues (2009). Each trial 
(see Figure 1) started with the presentation of a fixation screen (white cross against a 
black background) with duration jittered between 1400 and 2000 ms. The fixation 
screen was followed by a screen showing a white ramp with a white marble on top 
presented against black background. After a variable duration of 1400 to 2000 ms the 
marble started rolling down the ramp and participants could stop the marble from 
crashing by pressing a button. Finally, a feedback screen, showing trial outcome, was 
presented for 1000 milliseconds. There were two task conditions: a green marble and a 
white marble condition. 
 In the green marble condition, the white marble changed to green as soon as 
it started rolling. The task was programmed in such a way that participants viewed 16 
rapidly presented static pictures showing the marble at successive locations on the 
ramp, which was experienced as a rolling movement. Participants were instructed to 
stop the marble from crashing by pressing a response button with their right index 
finger. When participants were successful at stopping the marble, they were presented 
with a feedback screen showing the location where they had stopped the marble. 
When participants were not successful at stopping the marble, they were presented 
with a feedback screen showing a shattered marble beneath the ramp. The speed of 
the marble was adjusted by a staircase-tracking procedure. At the start of the 
experiment, the static pictures were presented for 30 milliseconds each. When 
participants were successful at stopping the marble the duration was decreased with 10 
milliseconds, making the task more difficult. When participants were not successful at 
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stopping the marble in time the duration was increased with 10 milliseconds, making 
the task easier. The staircase procedure was allowed to fluctuate between 20 and 80 
milliseconds, allowing a response window between 320 and 1280 milliseconds.  
  
 
Figure 1. Trial structure of the marble task. Stimuli were presented at a black background. At 
the beginning of each trial a white marble on top of a ramp was presented. After a variable 
delay (jittered between 1400 and 2000 ms) the marble started to roll down the ramp, and could 
change color to green. 
 
In the white marble condition, the marble did not change color and 
participants were instructed to choose between responding and inhibiting. When 
participants responded, they were presented with a feedback screen showing the 
location where they had stopped the marble. When participants inhibited, they were 
shown a feedback screen showing the white marble at the bottom of the ramp. In 
order to motivate participants to balance the frequency of responding and inhibiting, 
they were told that the stopped and non-stopped marbles would fall in different 
baskets. Participants were instructed to collect an equal amount of marbles in each 
basket, but were not allowed to count or use a sequencing strategy; therefore 
participants were instructed to make an independent decision every time the marble 
stayed white. At the end of each block participants were shown how many marbles 
they had collected in each basket. As will be described in the results section, the 
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participants were successful in following the instruction to stop the marble on 
approximately 50% of the trials.  
In order to give participants sufficient time to decide between responding and 
inhibiting the speed of the white marble rolling down the ramp was set considerably 
slower. The speed of the sequentially presented static white marble pictures was set to 
the speed currently reached in the green marble condition plus 30 milliseconds. 
Consequently the duration of the sequentially presented static white marble pictures 
was allowed to fluctuate between 50 and 110 milliseconds, allowing a response 
window between 800 and 1760 milliseconds.  
The experiment consisted of three blocks of 80 trials, each block consisting of 48 
green and 32 white marble trials. Trials were presented in a pseudo-randomized order 
so that each white marble trial was preceded by 0, 1, 2, or 3 green marble trials. The 
large proportion of green trials served two functions. First, the green trials lead to a 
prepotent tendency for action. Since the green marble trials were rather difficult, 
participants had to remain focused on the goal of responding quickly to the rolling 
marble, thus increasing the prepotency of responding. Also, due to the intermixed 
presentation of green and white trials participants could not predict when a white trial 
would be presented. Therefore participants had to be prepared to quickly respond to a 
green marble during the whole duration of the experiment, leaving the prepotency 
intact. This was desirable, so that intentional inhibition of action would involve a late 
brake on an already-prepared action, rather than a decision not to initiate action 
preparation. Second, the randomized interleaving of intentional (white) and instructed 
(green) trials also discouraged participants from strategically pre-deciding a pattern of 
intentional action, such as act-inhibit-act-inhibit etc. 
 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
Following the scanning session participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
(BIS-11) (Patton et al., 1995). The BIS-11 is a measure of impulsive traits consisting of 
three subscales: motor impulsivity (‘I act without thinking’), non-planning impulsivity 
(‘I’m not interested in the future, but in today’), and attentional impulsivity (‘I have 
difficulties sitting still during lectures’). For the child participants the questions were 
rephrased in an age-appropriate style (e.g. ‘I have difficulties sitting still in the 
classroom’ instead of ‘I have difficulties sitting still during lectures’).  
 
Data Acquisition 
Scanning was performed with a standard whole-head coil on a 3.0 Tesla Philips 
scanner at the Leiden University Medical Center. The marble task consisted of 3 
event-related runs, each lasting approximately 6 minutes. Functional data were 
acquired using T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI). The first 2 volumes of each 
run were discarded in order to allow for equilibration of T1 saturation effects (TR = 
2.2 sec, TE = 30 msec, sequential acquisition, 38 slices of 2.75 mm, field of view 220 
mm, 80 x 80 matrix, in-plane resolution 2.75 mm). After the functional runs a high-
resolution 3D T1-FFE scan for anatomical reference was obtained (TR = 9.760 ms; 
TE = 4.59 ms, flip angle = 8 degrees, 140 slices, 0.875 × 0.875 × 1.2 mm3 voxels, field 
of view = 224 × 168 × 177 mm3). Head motion was restricted by using foam inserts 
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between the head and the head coil. Visual stimuli were projected onto a screen in the 
magnet bore that could be viewed through a mirror attached to the head coil. 
 
Behavioral Data Analysis 
The use of response selection strategies on the marble task was evaluated by 
computing the Random Number Generation 2 (RNG2) index using Towse and Neil’s 
(1998) RgCalc program. The RNG2 index is an adaptation of the RNG index (Evans, 
1978) optimized for two-choice response sequences, which considers the randomness 
of the sequence (Neuringer, 1986). Scores can range from 0 (no predictability) to 1 
(complete predictability). 
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
Data were preprocessed using SPM8 (Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
London). Images were corrected for rigid-body motion. Translational movement did 
not exceed 1 voxel ( < 3 mm) and mean movement did not differ between age groups, 
F (1, 42) = .043, p = .84, η2 = .001. Structural and functional volumes were spatially 
normalized to T1 templates. The normalization algorithm used a 12-parameter affine 
nonlinear transformation involving cosine basis functions, and then resampled the 
volumes to 3-mm cubic voxels. Templates were based on the MNI305 stereotaxic 
space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan, & Evans, 1997), an approximation of Talairach 
space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). Functional volumes were spatially smoothed 
with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. Statistical 
analyses were performed on individual participants’ data using the general linear 
model in SPM8. The fMRI time series data were modeled by a series of events 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) and the temporal 
derivatives. The onset of marble motion of each trial was modeled as an event of 
interest. Separate regressors were defined for white nogo (intentional inhibibition), 
white go (intentional action), green go (externally guided action), and green omissions 
(omission on the green marble trials). The trial functions were used as covariates in a 
general linear model, along with a basic set of cosine functions to high-pass filter (120 
Hz) the data. The least-squares parameter estimates of the height of the best-fitting 
canonical HRF for the different conditions were used in pairwise contrasts. All 
reported effects consisted of at least 10 contiguous voxels that exceeded a false-
discovery-rate (FDR) corrected threshold of p < .05, unless otherwise specified.  
Region of interest (ROI) analyses were performed to further characterize the 
involvement of brain regions in the development of intentional inhibition. ROI 
analyses were performed with the MarsBaR toolbox in SPM8 (Brett, Anton, 
Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net). ROIs that spanned 
several anatomical regions were masked with marsbar-aal ROIs. For rSTN, ROI 
analyses were performed on an anatomical rSTN template derived from a study using 
ultrahigh 7 Tesla scanning (Forstmann et al., 2010). For dFMC, ROI analyses were 
performed on a 6 mm radius sphere centered on -7, 42, 21 (Kühn et al., 2009). 
 
 





The first comparison looked at performance on the instructed green marble trials. The 
staircase-tracking procedure for green marble trials was overall successful, showing 
that participants responded in time on 60.63 % of the trials (SD = 7.06). However, 
despite the tracking, adults (M = 63.22, SD = 7.18) were more successful at 
responding to the green marble in time compared to children (M = 57, 35, SD = 
5.49), F (1,42) = 8.68, p < .01, η2 = .17 (see Figure 2A). Second, we examined the 
choice behavior on the intentional white marble trials. As instructed, participants 
decided to inhibit responding to the white marble on approximately 50 % of the trials 
(children: M = 40.73, SD = 10.03; adults: M = 46.83, SD = 8.00). However, as can be 
seen in Figure 2A children more often responded to the white marble compared to 
adults, F (1,42) = 4.92, p < .05, η2 = .11.  
 
 
Figure 2. A. Percentage of go responses in the green and white marble conditions for children 
and adults separately. B. Reaction times in the green and white marble conditions for children 
and adults separately.  
  
To examine the use of response selection strategies the RNG2 index was computed. A 
mean RNG2 index of .81 (SD = .01) was observed. To examine the randomness of 
the participants’ choice behavior, the participants’ RNG2 index was compared with a 
RNG2 index computed over a set of randomly generated sequences of go- and nogo-
responses. For the randomly generated set of go- and nogo-response sequences a 
mean RNG2 index of .801 (SD = .002) was observed. Although the RNG2 index for 
the randomly generated sequences was marginally but significantly smaller compared 
to the participants’ RNG2 index, F (1, 66) = 18.90, p < .001, η2 = .22, these results 
indicate that the participants’ behavior was close to being random and not driven by 
simple alternation strategies. Children and adults did not differ in RNG2 index, F 
(1,42) = 1.20, p = .28, η2 = .03, indicating that children and adults did not differ in use 
of strategies for deciding between responding and inhibiting. 
5. Development of intentional inhibition 
 74 
 Next, we examined whether there were differences in response times to the 
instructed green and intentional white marble trials. As expected, reaction times on the 
green trials were shorter compared to the white trials, F (1,41) = 60.79, p < .001, η2 = 
.60 (see Figure 2B), indicating that the decision process on the white trials took more 
time. No main, F (1, 41) = .84, p = .37, η2 = .02, or interaction, F (1,41) = 1.47, p = 
.23, η2 = .04, effects of age group were observed. 
 No developmental differences in self-reported impulsivity on the BIS-11 were 
observed (all p’s > .1) (see Table 1). However, correlation patterns between self-
reported impulsivity and performance on the marble task differed between age 
groups. First, adults who reported more motor impulsivity, more often chose to 
inhibit, r = .409, p < .05, but for children this correlation was not significant, r = -.084,  
p = .73 (see Figure 3A). However, a comparison between the correlations showed that 
the correlations for adults and children did not differ significantly from each other, z 
= 1.06, p = .28. Second, adults who reported more non-planning impulsivity, more 
often chose to inhibit, r = .508, p < .05, but for children this correlation was not 
significant, r = -.331, p = .17 (see Figure 3B). A comparison between the correlations 
showed that the correlations for adults and children differed significantly from each 
other, z = 2.72, p < .01, showing that the correlation was present in adults but not in 
children. No correlations between self-reported attentional impulsivity and task 
performance were observed (all p’s > .05). 
 
Table 1. Average BIS-11 scores per age group 
 
 BIS-11 Motor BIS-11 Non-planning BIS-11 Attentional 
Children 2.01 (.28) 2.14 (.43) 2.19 (.47) 





Figure 3. A. Correlation between intentional inhibition and self-reported motor impulsivity 
for children and adults separately. B. Correlation between intentional inhibition and self-
reported non-planning impulsivity for children and adults separately. 
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fMRI 
To identify the brain regions involved in intentional inhibition, the contrast intentional 
inhibition > intentional action (White NoGo > White Go) was computed for the 
whole group (N=43). This analysis revealed activation in a fronto-basal ganglia 
network, including bilateral IFG, bilateral striatum, and occipital lobe, but not in the 
STN and the dFMC (see Figure 4, and Supplementary Table 1 for the MNI 
coordinates of peak values). A two-sample t-test on the whole brain level revealed no 
developmental differences on the contrast intentional inhibition > intentional action 
(White NoGo > White Go). To further examine the involvement of the fronto-basal 
ganglia network in intentional inhibition across development, ROI analyses were 
performed for the rIFG, right putamen, right caudate, and right globus pallidus2. ROI 
analyses average across a set of voxels and therefore have more power to detect 
changes in a priori selected areas.  
 
 
Figure 4. Whole brain contrast showing activation related to intentional inhibition (White 
NoGo > White Go) for the whole group (N =43) (FDR-corrected p < .05, at least 10 
contiguous voxels). 
 
 For rIFG no main effect of age group was observed F (1, 41) = .29, p = .59, 
η2 = .01. However, there was a trend for an age group x condition interaction, F (1,41) 
= 3.71, p = .061, η2 = .08, indicating that children showed significantly more rIFG 
activation for intentional inhibition compared to intentional action, F (1,18) = 25.21,  
p < .001, η2 =  .0=58, whereas adults did not, F (1,23) = 2.05, p = .17, η2 = .08 (see 
Figure 5).  
 In the right putamen no main effect of age group was observed,  F (1,41) = 
.91, p = .35, η2 = .02. However, an age group x condition interaction, F (1,41) = 6.92, 
p < .05, η2 = .14, indicated that the activation difference between intentional 
inhibition and intentional action in right putamen was larger for children, F (1,18) = 
29.93, p < .001, η2 = .62, than for adults, F (1,23) = 4.03, p = .057, η2 = .15 (see 
Figure 5). 
For right caudate there was a main effect of age group, showing that children 
had more stimulus related deactivation compared to adults, F (1,41) = 18.09, p < .05, 
η2 = .10 (see Figure 5). However, no age group x condition interaction was observed, 
F (1,41) = 2.25, p = .14, η2 = .05. 
                                                        
2 Here we only report right hemisphere ROIs in line with previous response inhibition 
literature. However, for the left hemisphere ROIs similar results were found.  
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 For right globus pullidus no main effect of age group was observed, F (1,41) 
= .38, p = .54, η2 = .01. However, an age group x condition interaction, F (1,41) 
=7.28, p < .05, η2 = .15, indicated that children showed relatively more right globus 
pallidus activation during intentional inhibition compared to intentional action, F 





Figure 5. ROI analyses of right IFG, right putamen, right caudate, and right globus pallidus 
showing activation levels during intentional action (White Go) and intentional inhibition 
(White NoGo) for children and adults separately. 
 
Role of STN. No STN activation during intentional inhibition was observed in 
the contrast intentional inhibition > intentional action (White NoGo > White Go). 
However, when looking at the intentional inhibition decision process (White NoGo > 
Green Go) and the intentional action decision process (White Go > Green Go) 
separately, clear bilateral STN activation was observed for both intentional inhibition 
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and intentional action (see Figure 6, and Supplementary Table 2 for the MNI 
coordinates of peak values). To further examine the role of the STN in the intentional 
inhibition and action processes across development a ROI analysis was performed for 
right STN. STN activation did not differ between intentional inhibition (White NoGo 
> Green Go) and intentional action (White Go > Green Go), F (1,41) = 2.96, p = .09, 
η2 = .07. No main, F (1,41) = .86, p = .36, η2 = .02, or interaction effects, F (1, 41) = 
.18, p = .68, η2 = .004, of age group were observed (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. A. Whole brain contrast showing activation related to intentional action decision 
process (White Go > Green Go) for the whole group (N =43) (FDR-corrected p < .05, at least 
10 contiguous voxels). B. Whole brain contrast showing activation related to intentional 
inhibition decision process (White NoGo > Green Go) for the whole group (N =43) (FDR-
corrected p < .05, at least 10 contiguous voxels). C. ROI analysis of right STN showing 
activation levels during intentional action decision process (White Go > Green Go) and 
intentional inhibition decision process (White NoGo > Green Go) for children and adults 
separately. 
 
Role of dFMC. No dFMC activation during intentional inhibition was observed 
in the contrast intentional inhibition > intentional action (White NoGo > White Go). 
To make sure that there indeed were no differences in dFMC activation, a ROI 
analysis was performed for dFMC. This analysis showed that dFMC activation did not 
differ between intentional inhibition (White NoGo) and intentional action (White 
Go), F (1,41) = .43, p = .52, η2 = .01. Also, no main, F (1,41) = .12, p = .76, η2 = .003, 
or interaction effects, F (1, 41) = .01, p = .94, η2 = .00, of age group were observed. 
 
Brain-behavior correlations. To examine the relation between self-reported 
impulsivity and intentional inhibition related brain activation, whole brain regression 
analyses on the contrast White NoGo > White Go with the BIS-11 subscales as 
regressors were performed on the whole sample (N=43). No effects were observed at 
the FDR corrected threshold. However, for non-planning impulsivity a significant 
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relationship with intentional inhibition related brain activation in the left putamen was 
observed at an uncorrected threshold (p < .001, at least 10 contiguous voxels), such 
that participants who reported more impulsivity showed more activation in left 
putamen during intentional inhibition (see Figure 7). A ROI analysis of this left 
putamen region showed a significant positive correlation in adults, r = .600, p < .005, 
but for children this correlation was not significant, r = .368, p = .12. However, the 
correlations for adults and children did not differ significantly from each other, z = 
.93, p = .35. No relationships between motor and attentional impulsivity and 
intentional inhibition related brain activation were found. 
 
 
Figure 7. Whole brain regression analysis showing relation between intentional inhibition 
related neural activation in left putamen and self-reported non-planning impulsivity 
(uncorrected p < .001, at least 10 contiguous voxels). Follow-up ROI analysis showed that this 





The present study examined the neural correlates of an important component of self-
control; namely intentional inhibition, in children and adults. We used the marble task 
previously developed by Kühn et al. (2009) to test the neural correlates associated with 
responding to a rolling marble versus withholding responding to a rolling marble, 
where the latter process requires intentional inhibition of a prepotent response. As 
predicted, children and adults showed different recruitment of the fronto-basal ganglia 
network during intentional inhibition. However, no effects were observed in the 
dFMC, suggesting that differences are attributable to a similar process as what 
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previously has been observed for externally guided inhibition (see Luna et al., 2010 for 
a review). 
 Prior studies have reported that there is a developmental change in inhibitory 
performance when the task involves external cues (Luna et al., 2010), but much less is 
known about developmental differences when inhibition is internally driven. The first 
question we addressed was therefore whether children were able to withhold 
responding when they had to freely decide to do so. On a behavioral level we show an 
early development of intentional inhibition performance. That is to say, children 
intentionally inhibited responding to the rolling marble on approximately 50 % of the 
trials. Also, our RNG2 results indicate that children as well as adults did not use 
strategies to choose between inhibiting and acting. These findings are in line with our 
previous studies in which we have shown mature performance levels on intentional 
inhibition tasks in late childhood / early adolescence on similar tasks (Schel & Crone, 
2013; Schel, Windhorst, van der Molen, & Crone, 2013).  
Even though both children and adults inhibited responding to the marble on 
approximately 50 % of the trials, it is possible that developmental differences occur in 
neural responses to intentional inhibition demands, which is potentially a more 
sensitive index than deciding whether to press the button or not. Therefore, we 
examined the involvement of the fronto-basal ganglia network in intentional 
inhibition in children and adults. We show that the fronto-basal ganglia network, 
which is well known for its involvement in externally driven response inhibition (Aron 
et al., 2007; Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Jahfari et al., 2011) is activated during both 
intentional inhibition and intentional action. Although the fronto-basal ganglia 
network was activated for both intentional inhibition and intentional action, activation 
in most nodes of the network (i.e. rIFG, right putamen and right globus pallidus) was 
larger for intentional inhibition. Thus the fronto-basal ganlia network appears to be 
important for inhibition, irrespective of how inhibition was triggered (externally or 
internally driven) (see also Schel et al., 2014). 
Although there were no developmental differences on the behavioral level, 
we observed differential recruitment of the fronto-basal ganglia network such that 
children showed more activation for intentional inhibition compared to intentional 
action, whereas for adults activation did not differ between intentional inhibition and 
intentional action. Thus, it appears that children show increased recruitment of the 
fronto-basal ganglia network during intentional inhibition to reach adult performance 
levels. The pattern of trend-level increased activation in rIFG and increased activation 
in putamen during intentional inhibition in children compared to adults is consistent 
with some studies on externally driven response inhibition (Casey, Thomas, Davidson, 
Kunz, & Franzen, 2002), but not with others which have reported less recruitment of 
rIFG and instead compensatory recruitment in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Bunge 
et al., 2002; Durston et al., 2002; Luna et al., 2010). In this study, we do not find 
compensatory recruitment for children outside the fronto-basal ganglia network. 
Thus, children already activate the same network as adults, but to a different extent. 
One explanation for this pattern of results might be that for adults acting and 
inhibiting are two equal response options, whereas for children acting is the default 
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response. Therefore, overruling this default response in order to intentionally inhibit, 
might require increased recruitment of the fronto-basal ganglia network.  
One notable finding was that the STN was not more active for intentional 
inhibition, even though it has been consistently reported as an important region for 
externally driven inhibition. However, additional analyses showed that the STN, which 
is conceptualized as a main inhibitory node in the fronto-basal ganglia network for 
inhibition, was equally activated for intentional inhibition and intentional action. 
These findings corroborate the conceptualization of response inhibition and response 
selection as “two sides of the same coin” of Mostofsky and Simmonds (2008). 
Inhibition and action can be seen as two equal response options, which are supported 
by a similar neural network (Karch et al., 2009; Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008).  
 Finally, we show that individual differences in self-reported impulsivity are 
predictive of intentional inhibition performance and the underlying neural correlates. 
Interestingly, the results of our exploratory analyses into the relation between self-
reported impulsivity and intentional inhibition show that people who are more 
impulsive more often chose to inhibit. Also, they showed more activation in the left 
putamen during intentional inhibition (note that these results are based on an 
uncorrected threshold of .001, > 10 contiguous voxels). This is opposite to the 
relation observed between impulsivity and externally driven response inhibition; there 
more impulsivity is predictive of worse inhibitory performance (Casey et al., 2011). 
The positive relation between self-reported impulsivity and intentional inhibition 
could suggest that impulsivity is not always a negative trait. When provided with a 
choice, impulsive people are well able to choose to inhibit. Thus, acting does not 
always appear to be the default choice. However, it should be noted that in the current 
study, the choice between inhibition and action was made in a relatively neutral 
context (i.e. there were no consequences depending on either choice). In daily life, this 
is often not the case. There the choice between inhibition and action is almost always 
influenced by motivational factors like loss, reward or punishment (Leotti & Wager, 
2010). How impulsivity influences intentional inhibition in those circumstances 
remains an important question for future research. 
 A continuing debate in research on intentional inhibition is the role of the 
dFMC. Some studies, including the study by Kühn and colleagues (2009), which also 
used the marble paradigm, have shown that the late veto of a response is associated 
with more activity in the dFMC. This has been interpreted as a role of this area in the 
voluntary control of an action (i.e., the “whether” decision in action control) (Brass & 
Haggard, 2008; Haggard, 2008). Several other studies have confirmed that this region 
is more active in other paradigms on intentional inhibition, such as choosing not to 
gamble (Campbell-Meiklejohn, Woolrich, Passingham, & Rogers, 2008) or inhibition 
of cigarette cravings (Brody et al., 2007). However, not all studies can replicate this 
effect, for example, in a prior study in adults we observed dFMC activation only under 
specific preceding context conditions (Schel et al., 2014). In the current study, we 
found no evidence for dFMC activation in children, suggesting that neural differences 
are only observed in the network which is also engaged by externally triggered 
inhibition.  
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 Some limitations of the present study deserve mentioning. First, we only 
included a selected age-range (10-12 year-olds and 18-26 year-olds) in the present 
study. Future studies should include participants across the whole age range from early 
childhood to adulthood, to examine whether there are specific developmental periods 
during which intentional inhibition is most sensitive to developmental change (see 
also: Schel & Crone, 2013). Second, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that 
participants might have pre-decided not to initiate an action, instead of canceling a 
prepared action at the last moment on the intentional inhibition trials. However, the 
fast paced and unpredictable nature of the task, made it very difficult to pre-decide. In 
future research electromyography measures might be included, to make sure that 
initial action preparation is also present on intentional inhibition trials. Third, since the 
present study did not have an externally guided inhibition condition, we could not 
directly compare the development of intentional versus externally driven inhibition. 
Follow-up studies should include an externally driven inhibition condition to be able 
to directly compare intentional and externally driven inhibition. Fourth, the present 
study used the relatively neutral marble task, in which there are no strong internal 
motivations for action. An interesting avenue for future research might be to include a 
strong affective or motivational component, such as is the case in the marshmallow 
paradigm (Mischel et al., 1989). This might be especially interesting for research in 
adolescence, when there is a sensitivity towards rewards (Somerville, Hare, & Casey, 
2011). Fifth, although the role of the rIFG is typically interpreted in terms of response 
inhibition (for a review, see Ridderinkhof, Forstmann, Wylie, Burle, & van den 
Wildenberg, 2011), alternative conceptualizations in terms of action selection have 
also been proposed (Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010). While the 
present study does not allow to distinguish the role of rIFG with respect to those 
alternatives, they may be reconciled by pointing to the role of rIFG in overriding one 
response alternative (here, to act) in favor of another (here, to inhibit).  
To conclude, the present study was the first to examine the neural correlates of 
intentional inhibition in children and adults. Although children performed at adult 
level, children showed increased recruitment of the fronto-basal ganglia network 
during intentional inhibition. Individual differences in impulsivity were predictive of 
intentional inhibition, more impulsive people were more likely to choose to inhibit. 
This research has implications for research into disorders of impulsivity, such as 
ADHD, which are currently associated with poor self-control abilities (Scheres et al., 
2006; Scheres, Sumiya, & Thoeny, 2010). Many types of impulsive behaviors, which 
are typical for children and adults with disorders of impulsivity, require an intentional 
decision to inhibit, given that external cues are not always available. 
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5.5 Supplementary material 
 
Table S1. Brain regions revealed by the whole brain contrast intentional inhibition > 
intentional action (all FDR corrected, p < .05, > 10 voxels) for the whole group (N = 43). 
 
Anatomical region L/R K Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
Intentional inhibition > Intentional action (White NoGo > White Go) 
Occipital lobe L/R 11247 7.12 24 -78 21 
     Putamen R  5.17 18 6 -9 
     Putamen L  4.69 -21 12 -9 
Superior Temporal Gyrus R 104 4.86 60 -9 -6 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 148 3.98 54 33 9 
Supramarginal Gyrus L 47 3.51 -63 -24 36 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 25 3.08 -45 -9 -6 




Table S2. Brain regions revealed by whole brain contrast, focused on decision processes (all 
FDR corrected, p < .05, > 10 voxels) for the whole group (N = 43). 
 
Anatomical region L/R K Z MNI coordinates 
    x y z 
Intentional inhibition > Externally driven action (White NoGo > Green Go) 
Occipital Lobe L/R 17071 7.65 12 -66 3 
Middle Cingulate Cortex L 320 4.97 -6 -27 -33 
Caudate Nucleus L 79 4.35 -6 9 12 
Thalamus (including STN) R 77 3.56 9 -12 0 
Thalamus (including STN) L 24 3.33 -18 -30 3 
Postcentral gyrus L 15 3.16 -60 -6 24 
       
Intentional action > Externally driven action (White Go > Green Go) 
Middle Cingulate Cortex L/R 6165 7.58 6 27 33 
Supramarginal Gyrus R 849 5.98 51 -42 42 
Precuneus R 946 5.48 9 -66 42 
Inferior Parietal Lobe L 427 5.32 -54 -42 51 
Thalamus (including STN) L/R 446 4.90 -9 -12 3 
Middle Temporal Gyrus R 119 4.26 54 -27 -3 
Cerebellum L 22 3.58 -30 -66 -27 
Insula R 14 3.39 36 -12 15 
Superior Temporal Gyrus L 36 3.20 -39 -30 12 
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This chapter is published as: 
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Abstract 
The present study examined the influence of relevant and irrelevant emotions on response 
inhibition from childhood to early adulthood. Ninety-four participants between 6 and 25 years 
of age performed two go/nogo tasks with emotional faces (neutral, happy, and fearful) as 
stimuli. In one go/nogo task emotion formed a relevant dimension of the task and in the other 
go/nogo task emotion was irrelevant and participants had to respond to the color of the faces 
instead. A special feature of the latter task, in which emotion was irrelevant, was the inclusion 
of free choice trials, in which participants could freely decide between acting and inhibiting. 
Results showed a linear increase in response inhibition performance with increasing age both 
in relevant and irrelevant affective contexts. Relevant emotions had a pronounced influence on 
performance across age, whereas irrelevant emotions did not. Overall, participants made more 
false alarms on trials with fearful faces than happy faces, and happy faces were associated with 
better performance on go trials (higher percentage correct and faster RTs) than fearful faces. 
The latter effect was stronger for young children in terms of accuracy. Finally, during the free 
choice trials participants did not base their decisions on affective context, confirming that 
irrelevant emotions do not have a strong impact on inhibition. Together, these findings suggest 
that across development relevant affective context has a larger influence on response inhibition 
than irrelevant affective context. When emotions are relevant, a context of positive emotions is 
associated with better performance compared to a context with negative emotions, especially 
in young children.  




The ability to cognitively control our actions is of critical importance for successful 
functioning. A well-studied component of cognitive control is response inhibition, 
which refers to the ability to refrain from a prepotent response (Luna, et al., 2010). 
Response inhibition has been shown to have a protracted developmental trajectory 
(Bunge, Dudukovic, et al., 2002; Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 2002; van der Molen, 
2000), with mature performance levels being reached in mid to late adolescence (Luna, 
et al., 2010).  
In daily life, cognitive control processes seldom stand-alone; one is often 
required to exercise cognitive control in a social or affective context. Sometimes the 
context can be relevant, for example when you want to approach friendly people but 
inhibit from approaching unfriendly people, and sometimes context is irrelevant, for 
example when you want to approach people belonging to a certain group and inhibit 
from approaching people belonging to another group, independent of whether they 
are friendly or unfriendly. To examine the role of affective context on response 
inhibition, prior studies made use of an emotional go/nogo task (e.g. Tottenham, et 
al., 2011). In this task, participants are instructed to respond to a certain emotional 
stimulus and inhibit responding to another emotional stimulus (such as emotional 
words or emotional facial expressions), thereby making the affective context task-
relevant (Reynolds & Jeeves, 1978). Performance on the emotional go/nogo task 
correlates with performance on the traditional go/nogo task (in which no affective 
information is presented) thereby validating the emotional go/nogo task as a measure 
of response inhibition within an affective context (Schulz et al., 2007).  
In adults, response inhibition appears to be better for negative compared to 
positive stimuli (Chiu, Holmes, & Pizzagalli, 2008; Schulz, et al., 2007). This effect 
goes together with better emotion recognition for negative compared to positive 
stimuli (Chiu, et al., 2008; Schulz, et al., 2007). Within a large developmental sample 
(5- to 28-year-olds) worse overall response inhibition performance for negative stimuli 
was found, and this pattern did not differ with age (Tottenham, et al., 2011). In this 
study different negative emotions were included, namely sadness, anger, and fear. 
Importantly, response inhibition performance appeared to be worst for the emotions 
for which emotion recognition was most difficult (sadness and anger). For fear, 
emotion recognition was best and response inhibition performance for fearful faces 
did not differ from response inhibition for positive (i.e. happy) stimuli, consistent with 
the notion that fearful faces are relatively easy to recognize (Tottenham, et al., 2011).  
Recently, studies have examined the influence of irrelevant emotions on 
response inhibition. In these studies, emotional stimuli were presented in the 
background and participants were instructed to respond to another dimension of the 
emotional stimulus (for example, the color or the direction of a stimulus). 
Importantly, all these tasks share the feature that participants do not have to focus on 
the emotional aspects of the stimuli for successful task performance. Within adult 
studies results are mixed, some studies show an effect of irrelevant emotions on 
response inhibition performance (Albert, Lopez-Martin, & Carretie, 2010; Sagaspe, 
Schwartz, & Vuilleumier, 2011), and other studies do not show an effect of irrelevant 
6. Intentional inhibition in context 
 86 
emotions on performance (Brown et al., 2012).In children and adolescents again 
mixed results were found, with two studies showing an effect of irrelevant emotions 
on response inhibition (Cohen-Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Lamm, White, McDermott, 
& Fox, 2012), and another study not showing this effect (Todd, Lee, Evans, Lewis, & 
Taylor, 2012).  
Knowing how affective contexts influence response inhibition is of critical 
importance, since response inhibition is seldom required in a cold situation. Most 
often response inhibition is needed in hot affective situations, in which emotions play 
a role. Importantly, these emotions are not always relevant for the task at hand. 
Currently, it remains unknown whether relevant and irrelevant affective contexts have 
a similar or different influence on response inhibition.  The goal of this study was 
therefore to examine the influence of relevant and irrelevant affective context on 
response inhibition in children, adolescents and adults. 
The present study is the first to directly compare the influence of both 
relevant and irrelevant emotions on response inhibition within the same participants 
of a developmental sample (covering mid-childhood to early adulthood). Participants 
performed two emotional response inhibition tasks, one in which emotion formed a 
relevant dimension of the task, and one in which emotion was irrelevant. In the first 
emotional go/nogo task emotion was a relevant dimension and participants had to 
respond when a given emotional facial expression was presented and inhibit 
responding when another emotional facial expression was presented (see Tottenham, 
et al., 2011). In the second emotional go/nogo task emotion was an irrelevant 
dimension. In this task the same emotional faces were presented, but now faces were 
colored and participants had to respond to the color of the faces. A special feature of 
the latter task was the inclusion of intentional go/nogo trials (Brass & Haggard, 2007, 
2008). The task therefore involved three types of trials: go-trials, nogo-trials, and 
choice-trials (in which participants could freely decide between responding and 
inhibiting). These choice trials were added to the task to further examine the influence 
of irrelevant emotions on response inhibition in a free choice situation. Previous 
research in the field of free choice inhibition has been conducted in a neutral context 
(e.g. Brass & Haggard, 2007; Kühn, et al., 2009). This research has indicated that free 
choice inhibition can be distinguished from externally driven inhibition on the basis of 
underlying neural mechanisms (Filevich, et al., 2012). Here we aimed to examine the 
influence of affective context on free choice inhibition. In both tasks happy, fearful, 
and neutral faces were presented, since previous research has shown that within a 
developmental sample emotion recognition for these emotions is comparable 
(Tottenham, et al., 2011). 
We expected to observe a stronger effect of relevant compared to irrelevant 
emotions on response inhibition (Brown, et al., 2012; Schulz, et al., 2007; Todd, et al., 
2012; Tottenham, et al., 2011). We expected this effect to be present across all age 
groups. Furthermore, we expected to find a developmental increase in inhibitory 
performance, and we aimed to examine whether this pattern was different depending 
on affective context (Tottenham, et al., 2011). Finally, we aimed to test whether we 
would find a dip in response inhibition performance for happy stimuli in adolescents 
(Somerville, et al., 2011) when emotion was a relevant or an irrelevant dimension. 





Ninety-four participants took part in the study. Participants were divided over 5 age 
groups; 18 6-7-year olds (M = 7.11, SD = .46, 8 females), 19 8-9-year-olds (M = 9.36, 
SD = .85, 8 females), 19 10-12-year-olds (M = 11.68, SD = .83, 10 females), 20 13-15-
year-olds (M = 14.67, SD = .46, 9 females), and 18 18-25-year-olds (M = 21.04, SD = 
2.16, 15 females). A chi-square test revealed no significant differences in gender 
distributions between age groups (p = .07). Children and adolescents were recruited 
from a primary and a secondary school in the Netherlands and informed consent was 
obtained from a primary caregiver. Adult participants were recruited from Leiden 
University and signed informed consent before participation in the experiment. 
Participants completed the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven 
SPM) to obtain an estimate of their cognitive functioning (Raven, et al., 1998). For 
one 6-7-year-old the Raven SPM was not completed. All estimated IQ scores were 
within the normal range. However, age groups differed in estimated IQ scores, F (4, 
92) = 6.00, p < .001. 13-15-year-olds had a significantly lower estimated IQ (M = 
107.05, SD = 7.68) compared to the 6-7-year-olds (M = 124.35, SD = 14.77), the 8-9-
year-olds (M = 120.84, SD = 11.16), and the 18-25-year-olds (M = 119.17, SD = 9.33) 
(all p’s < .02). 13-15-year-olds’ estimated IQ did not differ significantly from the 10-
12-year-olds (M = 116.53, SD = 14.17) (p = .09). Therefore, all analyses were 
performed twice, once without estimated IQ score and once with estimated IQ score 
added as a covariate. Since all results remained the same with estimated IQ score 
added as a covariate we here report only the results of the analyses without estimated 
IQ score as a covariate.  
 
Stimuli 
Face stimuli were selected from the Radboud Faces Database (Langner et al., 2010). 
The selected set consisted of four adult males, four adult females, four child males, 
and four child females, all posing three different expressions (happy, fearful, and 
neutral), resulting in 48 stimuli in total. For the standard emotional go/nogo task face 
stimuli were transformed to grayscale images. For the colored emotional go/nogo task 
blue, purple, and orange color filters were placed over the grayscale images, resulting 
in blue, purple, and orange colored face images.  
 
Tasks 
Participants performed two tasks; a standard emotional go/nogo task, in which 
emotion was a relevant dimension of the task, and a colored emotional go/nogo task 
in which emotion was an irrelevant dimension of the task.  
  
Standard emotional go/nogo task. The standard emotional go/nogo task was 
adapted from Tottenham et al. (2011). In this task participants had to respond by 
pressing a button when a given facial expression (e.g. happy) was presented and inhibit 
responding when another facial expression (e.g. neutral) was presented (see Figure 
1A). In each task block emotional facial expressions (happy or fearful) were coupled 
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with neutral facial expression, resulting in four different go/nogo blocks 
(happy/neutral, neutral/happy, fearful/neutral, and neutral/fearful, with the first 
emotion as the go-, and the second emotion as the nogo-stimulus). Participants were 
not instructed about the valence of the nogo-stimulus, but instead were instructed to 
inhibit responding when another facial expression than the go-stimulus was presented. 
Face stimuli were presented for a maximum duration of 1000 ms, and participants had 
to respond within that time window. When participants responded within the time 
window, the face stimulus disappeared from the screen and the remaining time was 
added to the presentation time of the fixation cross as a filler to keep the task duration 
equal across participants. The subsequent jitter (fixation cross) was presented for 750 
ms.  
Face stimuli were presented on a black background. Each task block 
consisted of 60 trials; 42 go-trials (to create a prepotency for responding) and 18 
nogo-trials. Trials were presented in a pseudo-randomized order, such that there were 
never more than two consecutive nogo-trials. Task blocks were presented in a random 
order and before each task block participants were instructed which facial expression 
formed the go-stimulus. 
 
 
Figure 1. A. Outline of the standard emotional go/nogo task. B. Outline of the colored 
emotional go/nogo task. See text for details about the tasks. 
 
Colored emotional go/nogo task. In the colored emotional go/nogo task emotion 
was an irrelevant dimension and participants were instructed to respond to the color 
of the faces (see Figure 1B). In this task there were three types of trials: go-trials, 
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nogo-trials, and choice-trials. In the choice trial condition, participants could freely 
decide between responding and inhibiting. The task was explained to the participants 
as a catching game, in which they had to catch and inhibit catching members of 
colored teams. Participants were instructed that they had to catch the members of the 
blue team by pressing a button and had to inhibit catching members of the purple 
team. Participants were explained that people in the orange team were in disguise. 
50% of the orange team members actually belonged to the blue team and therefore 
had to be caught, and the other 50% of the orange team members actually belonged to 
the purple team and therefore should not be caught. Participants were instructed to 
freely decide and not use a strategy to decide when to respond or inhibit in the choice 
condition. The meaning (i.e. go, nogo, choice) of the colors was counterbalanced 
across participants, to control for possible a priori color preferences. 
The temporal properties of the task were similar to the standard emotional 
go/nogo task; face stimuli were presented for a maximum duration of 1000 ms, and 
participants had to respond within that time window. When participants responded 
within the time window, the face stimulus disappeared from the screen and the 
remaining time was added to the presentation time of the fixation cross as a filler to 
keep the task duration equal across participants. The subsequent jitter (fixation cross) 
was presented for 750 ms. 
Face stimuli were presented on a black background. In total there were 270 
trials; 180 go-trials (to create a prepotency for responding), 30 nogo-trials, and 60 
choice trials. Emotions (happy, fearful, and neutral) were equally distributed across 
conditions. Trials were presented in a pseudo-randomized order, such that there were 
never more than two consecutive nogo-trials or more than two consecutive choice-
trials. The task was divided in two task blocks of 135 trials each.  
 
Procedure 
All participants were tested in a laboratory or an empty classroom. Tasks were 
performed in a fixed order. First the colored emotional go/nogo task was performed, 
to ensure that emotion would be an irrelevant dimension in that task. Before each task 
participants were given instructions and performed a short practice block (18 trials for 
the colored task and 15 trials for the standard task). It was stressed that participants 
were not supposed to use a specific strategy to decide whether to act or inhibit in the 
choice condition of the colored task. Care was taken that all participants understood 
the instructions and were able to perform the tasks. Including instructions, the tasks 
took approximately 25 minutes to complete. After completion of the tasks participants 
were asked whether they had used a specific strategy in the choice condition of the 
colored task. Finally, participants completed the Raven SPM. 
 
Data analysis plan 
For both the standard and the colored emotional go/nogo task, the main variable of 
interest was the percentage of false alarms (i.e. failed inhibitions). Furthermore we 
were interested in the percentage of correct responses on the go-trials and the reaction 
times for the correct go-trials to examine overall task performance. For the colored 
emotional go/nogo task an additional variable of interest was the percentage of nogo 
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choices. These variables were added to repeated measures ANOVAs with Age group 
as a between subjects factor, and Emotion as within subjects factor, to examine task 
performance in the context of happy and fearful faces across development. For the 
standard emotional go/nogo task, Type (i.e. emotion as the go-stimulus vs. emotion as 
the nogo-stimulus) was added as an additional factor to the repeated measures 
ANOVAs to examine whether performance in the context of happy and fearful faces 





Standard emotional go/nogo task 
Four participants (one 6-7-year-old, two 8-9-year-olds, and one 13-15-year-old) were 
excluded from all analysis of this task because of misunderstanding of task 
instructions (i.e. reversal of go and nogo stimuli). Therefore the final sample for this 
task consisted of 17 6-7-year olds (M = 7.09, SD = .46, 8 females), 17 8-9-year-olds 
(M = 9.37, SD = .88, 7 females), 19 10-12-year-olds (M = 11.68, SD = .83, 10 
females), 19 13-15-year-olds (M = 14.71, SD = .41, 9 females), and 18 18-25-year-olds 
(M = 21.04, SD = 2.16, 15 females).  
  
 False alarms. To examine differences in the percentage of false alarms (i.e. 
failed inhibitions), an Age group (5) x Emotion (2: happy and fearful) x Type (2: 
emotion as go- or nogo-stimulus) repeated measures ANOVA was performed. A main 
effect of Emotion, F (1, 85) = 50.89, p < .001, indicated that overall participants made 
more false alarms in blocks with fearful faces compared to blocks with happy faces 
(see Figure 2A). No main or interaction effects of Type were observed (all p’s > .08), 








































































Figure 2. Overall results of the standard emotional go/nogo task: A. Percentage of false 
alarms for the blocks with happy and fearful faces. B. Percentage of correct responses for the 
blocks with happy and fearful faces C. RTs in milliseconds for the blocks with happy and 
fearful faces. Note that happy and fearful faces were presented in separate blocks, paired with 
neutral faces (see text for explanation).  
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A main effect of Age group, F (4, 85) = 14.72, p < .001, indicated that overall 
the percentage of false alarms decreased with age (see Figure 3A). Post-hoc Tukey 
tests showed that the 6-7-year-olds (M = 34.72, SD = 16.01) did not differ from the 8-
9-year-olds (M = 28.35, SD = 16.76) (p = .58), but made significantly more false 
alarms compared to the other age groups (all p’s < .005). 8-9-year-olds did not differ 
from the 10-12-year-olds (M = 18.71, SD = 14.59) (p = .16), but made significantly 
more false alarms compared to the two oldest age groups (both p’s < .005). 10-12-
year-olds, 13-15-year-olds (M = 10.60, SD = 5.28), and 18-25-year-olds (M = 7.64, SD 
= 5.54) did not differ significantly from each other (all  p’s > .05). No interactions 
between Age group and Emotion or Type were observed (all p’s > .1) 
   
Percentage correct go-trials. To test for differences in the percentage of correct 
responses on the go-trials, an Age group (5) x Emotion (2: happy and fearful) x Type 
(2: emotion as go- or nogo-stimulus) repeated measures ANOVA was performed. A 
main effect of Emotion, F (1, 85) = 23.22, p < .001, indicated that percentage correct 
go-trials was higher in blocks with happy faces compared to blocks with fearful faces. 
A main effect of Type, F (1, 85) = 9.03, p < .005, indicated that percentage correct go-
trials was higher in blocks in which the emotional face was the go-stimulus compared 
to blocks in which the neutral face was the go-stimulus. Finally as can be seen in 
Figure 2B, an Emotion x Type interaction, F (1, 85) = 8.60, p < .005, indicated that 
better performance for blocks where the emotional face was the go-stimulus to 
relative to the nogo-stimulus, was driven by the blocks with happy faces. For the 
blocks with fearful faces it did not matter whether the emotional face was a go- or a 
nogo-stimulus (p = .84). 
Overall, the percentage correct on the go-stimulus increased with age, F (4, 
85) = 18.91, p < .001 (see Figure 3B). Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the 6-7-year-
olds (M = 87.43, SD = 6.45) made fewer correct responses compared to all other age 
groups (all p’s < .03). 8-9-year-olds (M = 91.84, SD = 4.40) did not differ significantly 
from the 10-12-year-olds (M = 95.68, SD = 2.91) (p = .058), but made significantly 
fewer correct responses compared to the two oldest age groups (both p’s < .01). 10-
12-year-olds, 13-15-year-olds (M = 96.68, SD = 4.28), and 18-25-year-olds (M = 
98.35, SD = 1.70) did not differ significantly from each other (all p’s > .3). An 
Emotion x Age group interaction, F (4, 85) = 3.90, p < .01, showed that the difference 
between percentage correct for the blocks with happy faces compared to the blocks 
with fearful faces (independent of whether these were go- or nogo-stimuli) was larger 
for the youngest age groups (see Figure 3B).  
 
Reaction times. Differences in reaction times to the go-stimuli were examined 
by performing an Age group (5) x Emotion (2: happy and fearful) x Type (2: emotion 
as go- or nogo-stimulus) repeated measures ANOVA. A main effect of Emotion, F (1, 
85) = 51.02, p < .001, showed that reaction times were faster for the blocks with 
happy faces compared to the blocks with fearful faces. A main effect of Type, F (1, 
85) = 12.30, p < .005, showed that reaction times were faster for the blocks in which 
the emotional face was the go-stimulus compared to block in which the neutral face 
was the go-stimulus. As can be seen in Figure 2C an Emotion x Type interaction, F (1, 
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85) = 11.86, p < .005, indicated that the effect of faster reaction times when the 
emotional face was the go-stimulus was driven by the block with happy faces, for the 



















































































































































Figure 3. Developmental differences on the standard emotional go/nogo task: A. 
Developmental decrease in the percentage false alarms for happy and fearful faces plotted 
separately for the blocks in which the emotional face was the go- versus the nogo-stimulus. B. 
Developmental increase in the percentage correct responses for happy and fearful faces plotted 
separately for the blocks in which the emotional face was the go- versus the nogo-stimulus. C. 
Developmental decrease in RTs to happy and fearful faces plotted separately for the blocks in 
which the emotional face was the go- versus the nogo-stimulus. Note that happy and fearful 
faces were presented in separate blocks, paired with neutral faces (see text for explanation). 
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Overall, reaction times to the go-stimuli decreased with age, F (4, 85) = 29.28, 
p < .001 (see Figure 3C). Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the 6-7-year-olds (M = 
647, SD = 56) did not differ from the 8-9-year-olds (M = 605, SD = 70) (p = .28), but 
were significantly slower compared to the other age groups (all p’s < .001). 8-9-year-
olds did not differ from the 10-12-year-olds (M = 559, SD = 52) (p = .17), but were 
significantly slower compared to the two oldest age groups (both p’s < .001). 10-12-
year-olds were slower compared to both the 13-15-year-olds (M = 504, SD = 65) (p < 
.05) and the 18-25-year-olds (M = 447, SD = 63) (p < .001). The 13-15-year-olds were 
also significantly slower compared to the 18-25-year-olds (p < .05). An Emotion x Age 
group interaction, F (4, 85) = 4.40, p < .005, indicated that the emotion effect of faster 
response times for blocks with happy faces than for blocks with fearful faces was 
driven by the four oldest age groups, whereas the youngest age groups did not differ 
in reaction times to emotions (see Figure 3C). A Type x Age group interaction, F (4, 
85) = 2.88, p < .05, indicated that the type effect of faster reaction times for the 
blocks in which the emotional face was the go-stimulus was reversed for the 8-9-year-
olds (see Figure 3C).  
Together, these results indicate that task relevant emotions influence task 
performance such that participants are more accurate and faster for happy faces than 
for fearful faces, and that this effect is strongest for the younger age groups. Overall, 
the results suggest that the blocks with fearful faces were more difficult compared to 
the blocks with happy faces.  
 
Colored emotional go/nogo task 
False alarms. In order to examine the influence of irrelevant emotions on false 
alarms, an Age group (5) x Emotion (3: neutral, happy, and fearful) repeated measures 
ANOVA was performed for the nogo-trials. No main effect of Emotion was 
observed (p > .4). Overall, the percentage of false alarms decreased with age, F (4, 89) 
= 7.26, p < .001 (see Figure 4). Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the 6-7-year-olds (M 
= 25.56, SD = 12.68) did not differ from the 8-9-year-olds (M = 28.25, SD = 20.07) (p 
= .96) and both groups made more false alarms compared to the two oldest groups 
(13-15-year-olds: M = 12.83, SD = 9.44, 18-25-year-olds: M = 9.44, SD = 9.85) (all p’s 
< .05). The 10-12-year-olds (M = 21.05, SD = 10.89) did not differ significantly from 
any group (all p’s > .06). 
 
Percentage correct go-trials. To examine whether the irrelevant emotion of the go-
stimulus influenced correct responding, an Age group (5) x Emotion (3: neutral, 
happy, and fearful) repeated measures ANOVA was performed. No main effect of 
Emotion was observed (p > .7). Overall, correct responding to the go-trials increased 
with age, F (4, 89) = 7.58, p < .001 (see Figure 5). Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that 
the 6-7-year-olds (M = 95.74, SD = 3.59) made fewer correct responses to the go-
stimuli compared to all other age groups (8-9-year-olds: M = 98.10, SD = 2.79, 10-12-
year-olds: M = 98.51, SD = 1.57, 13-15-year-olds: M = 99.06, SD = 1.33, 18-25-year-
olds: M = 99.41, SD = .75) (all p’s < .05). The other age groups did not differ 
significantly from each other (all p’s > .3).  
 































Figure 4. Percentage false alarms on the colored emotional go/nogo task. Participants were 
























Figure 5. Percentage correct on the colored emotional go/nogo task. Participants were 
instructed to respond to colors and emotion was an irrelevant dimension. 
 
Nogo choices. To further examine the influence of irrelevant emotions on action 
and inhibition, an Age group (5) x Emotion (3: neutral, happy, and fearful) repeated 
measures ANOVA for the choice trials was performed. No main effect of Emotion 
was observed (p > .2). Overall, the percentage of nogo-choices for choice trials 
increased with age, F (4, 84) = 4.64, p < .005 (see Figure 6). Post-hoc Tukey tests 
showed that the 6-7-year-olds (M = 32.31, SD = 20.10) did not differ significantly 
from the 8-9-year-olds (M = 43.07, SD = 19.70) (p = .16), but made significantly 
fewer nogo-choices compared to the oldest three age groups (10-12-year-olds: M = 
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48.86, SD = 14.84, 13-15-year-olds: M = 49.75, SD = 7.24, 18-25-year-olds: M = 
49.44, SD = 8.71) (all p’s < .01). The oldest four age groups did not significantly differ 






























Figure 6. Percentage nogo choices on the colored emotional go/nogo task. Participants were 
instructed to respond to colors and emotion was an irrelevant dimension. 
 
Reaction times. To examine whether irrelevant emotions influenced reaction 
times differently depending on condition (go versus choice), an Age group (5) x 
Condition (2: go and choice) x Emotion (3: neutral, happy, and fearful) repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed. A main effect of Condition, F (1, 89) = 220.41, p 
< .001, indicated that making an intentional decision to act took more time compared 
to acting in response to an external go-stimulus.  
Overall, reaction times decreased with age, F (4, 89) = 5.04, p < .005 (see 
Figure 7). Post-hoc Tukey tests showed that the 6-7-year-olds were significantly 
slower compared to the two oldest age groups (both p’s < .05). The other age-groups 
did not differ significantly from each other (all p’s > .08).  
As indicated by a Condition x Age group interaction, F (4, 89) = 4.25, p < 
.005, developmental differences in reaction times were more pronounced in the choice 
compared to go condition (see Figure 7).  
 Together, these results show an increase in performance with age. Irrelevant 
emotions had no effect on performance. Also in the choice condition, decisions to act 
or inhibit were not influenced by irrelevant emotions.  
 























Figure 7. Developmental differences in RTs for the go- and choice-conditions. Participants 





The present study examined the influence of relevant and irrelevant emotions on 
response inhibition across child and adolescent development. For this means 
participants performed two emotional go/nogo tasks, one in which emotion formed a 
relevant dimension and one in which emotion was an irrelevant dimension. The latter 
task also involved a condition in which participants could make free choices between 
responding and inhibiting. Here we will discuss the findings of the present study 
related to (1) the main effects of emotion on response inhibition, (2) the linear age-
related increase in response inhibition performance within an affective context, and 
(3) the influence of irrelevant affective context in a free-choice situation.  
 
Emotion effects 
In the standard emotional go/nogo task relevant emotions influenced response 
inhibition. Overall, the blocks with fearful faces were more difficult compared to the 
blocks with happy faces. This finding could indicate that emotion recognition was 
easier in blocks with happy compared to fearful faces. Previous studies with the 
emotional go/nogo task have shown better performance (i.e. fewer false alarms) for 
negative compared to positive emotions (Chiu, et al., 2008; Schulz, et al., 2007). It 
should be noted that this reversed effect of better performance for negative emotions 
was found in the context of sad or anger facial expressions (Schulz, et al., 2007) and in 
the context of generally negative words (Chiu, et al., 2008). The one study also 
including fearful faces did not show a difference in performance between fearful and 
happy faces (Tottenham, et al., 2011). Thus, we reasoned based on prior studies that 
fearful faces and happy faces should not differ in demands on emotional recognition. 
Yet, the finding that performance was worse for fearful faces than for happy faces 
contrasts with these earlier studies.  
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Our observation of decreased performance in the blocks with fearful faces 
could be explained by literature showing negative effects of threatening stimuli on 
cognitive control in general (Lindstrom & Bohlin, 2012) and response inhibition in 
particular (Hartikainen, Siiskonen, & Ogawa, 2012; Lindstrom & Bohlin, 2012). 
Fearful faces are an indicator of possible threat and therefore might have a similar 
negative effect on response inhibition as threatening stimuli. Future studies should 
examine this effect of emotion valence vis a vis demands on emotion recognition in 
more detail.  
One of the specific questions we aimed to study was whether the effect of 
emotions on inhibition was different for relevant and irrelevant affective contexts. In 
line with our expectations we found strong effects of relevant emotions on response 
inhibition, but no effects of irrelevant emotions on response inhibition. This is in 
agreement with prior studies showing small or no effects of irrelevant emotions on 
response inhibition (Albert, et al., 2010; Brown, et al., 2012; Lamm, et al., 2012; 
Sagaspe, et al., 2011; Todd, et al., 2012). This strengthens the hypothesis that 
differences in demands on emotion recognition may be a stronger indicator of 
inhibition performance than the presence of an emotion per se. Future studies should 
unravel whether it is truly the effect of an emotion that influences inhibition, or if 




Previous research has reported two interesting effects with respect to the development 
of response inhibition. First, several studies have reported a developmental increase in 
inhibitory control (Cohen-Gilbert & Thomas, 2013; Durston, Thomas, Yang, et al., 
2002; Tottenham, et al., 2011; van der Molen, 2000), a finding which was supported in 
this study. Second, a prior study showed a dip in response inhibition performance for 
happy faces during mid-adolescence (Somerville, et al., 2011). This dip has been 
interpreted as an increased tendency to approach appetitive stimuli within 
adolescence, which is supported by the observation of increased activation in striatal 
reward areas when seeing those positive stimuli (Somerville, et al., 2011). We aimed to 
test this hypothesis in more detail in a large sample, but we could not replicate this 
finding, neither when emotion was a relevant dimension, nor when emotion was an 
irrelevant dimension of the task. Instead, we observed a linear increase in task 
performance independent of the influence of relevant and irrelevant emotions. This is 
in line with the findings of Tottenham et al. (2011) who also did not find an 
adolescent dip in performance on the standard emotional go/nogo task and findings 
of Cohen-Gilbert and Thomas (2013) who did not find an adolescent dip in 
performance on an emotional go/nogo task with irrelevant emotions. One possibility 
is that this effect is dependent on specific faces which were used or task instructions. 
The nonlinear development of sensitivity to emotions should be studied in more detail 
in future experiments.  
In agreement with Tottenham et al. (2011) we showed a stable effect of 
emotions on response inhibition across development, such that inhibition was more 
difficult for fearful faces than for happy faces, especially when emotions were relevant 
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for the task. When emotions were irrelevant, we showed a small enhancement of 
happy faces on response inhibition, but response inhibition for fearful faces was 
comparable to response inhibition for neutral faces. In contrast, Cohen-Gilbert and 
Thomas (2013) showed decreased performance in the context of negative compared 
to neutral and positive irrelevant emotions across development. However, in this 
study pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, 
& Cuthbert, 2008) were used as irrelevant background stimuli. Negative pictures from 
the IAPS might be more salient in capturing attention compared to the fearful faces 
used in the present study, which could explain why we did not find a negative effect of 
irrelevant fearful faces in the present study (see also Hartikainen, et al., 2012; 
Lindstrom & Bohlin, 2012). Previous research has suggested that seeing emotional 
faces involves more emotion recognition, whereas seeing IAPS stimuli involves more 
emotion evocation (Britton, Taylor, Sudheimer, & Liberzon, 2006), resulting in more 
arousal. Therefore, arousal instead of valence per se might be the driving factor 
through which affective stimuli influence response inhibition.   
 
Free choice  
In the colored emotional go/nogo task free choice-trials were added to further 
examine the effect of irrelevant emotions on response inhibition. One could expect to 
observe a stronger effect of irrelevant emotions in a free choice situation, given that 
participants can use the affective context to base their decisions on (M Brass, Lynn, 
Demanet, & Rigoni, 2013). However, decisions to act or inhibit were not made on the 
basis of affective context. Brass et al. (2013) argued that in free choice situation social 
context can be an important motivator for behavior. Moreover, free choice 
experiments with an affective, social, or motivational context are more ecologically 
valid compared to the standard free choice experiments in which participants can 
choose between arbitrary response options (M Brass, et al., 2013). Here, however, we 
did not show an effect of irrelevant affective context on choice behavior. Future 
studies should address whether a more salient affective, social, or motivational context 
has a stronger effect on behavior.  
There were also developmental differences in deciding between acting and 
inhibiting on the choice-trials. Young children in general chose to inhibit on a fewer 
percentage of trials than adults, which can reflect the same underlying mechanism as 
standard stimulus-driven inhibition (Bunge, Dudukovic, et al., 2002; Durston, 
Thomas, Yang, et al., 2002; Luna, et al., 2010; van der Molen, 2000). Thus, even in a 
choice context it was more difficult for them to choose to inhibit. Second, all 
participants were slower on choice trials than on go trials, consistent with prior studies 
on free choice (Kühn, et al., 2009). However, there was no developmental difference 
in reaction times on free choice trials, whereas there was a steep developmental 
decrease in reaction time to standard go trials. The latter finding is consistently 
reported in the developmental literature (Tamnes, et al., 2012), but the absence of age 
differences in choice trials suggests that the deliberation time of choice versus no 
choice puts additional demands on reaction time in adolescents and adults. But most 
importantly, this deliberation time was not dependent on irrelevant affective context. 
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An interesting question for future research will be to add a free choice condition to 
the task where affective context is relevant.   
 
Limitations 
The present study has a number of limitations. First, the standard and the colored 
emotional go/nogo tasks were explained in a slightly different manner. The colored 
emotional go/nogo task was explained in a game-framework, whereas the standard 
emotional go/nogo task was explained with standard instructions. This might have 
influenced how participants have experienced the tasks. If the colored emotional 
go/nogo task was experienced more as a game, this might have been more engaging 
for the younger participants. However, it is not very likely that this difference in 
framing had an effect on how emotion influenced task performance.  
Second, the free choice condition was only presented in the emotional 
go/nogo task with irrelevant emotions. Therefore, we could not examine whether 
relevant affective contexts, in contrast to irrelevant affective contexts, would have an 
effect on choices to act or inhibit. A fruitful direction for future research would be to 
add such a free choice condition to an emotional go/nogo task with relevant 
emotions, to further unravel the effects of relevant affective context on response 
inhibition.  
 Third, the color of the emotional faces differed between tasks. In the standard 
emotional go/nogo task emotional faces were presented in grayscale, whereas in the 
colored emotional go/nogo task emotional faces were presented in color. Therefore, 
the relevance of emotion is confounded with the absence or presence of color. Future 
studies should examine whether the different influence of relevant versus irrelevant 
emotion remains present, when color remains constant.  
Fourth, the present study was a behavioral study. Therefore, we could not 
examine the underlying mechanisms of the influence of relevant and irrelevant 
emotions on response inhibition. Future studies comparing the influence of relevant 
and irrelevant emotions on response inhibition should include psychophysiological 
measures to examine these mechanisms. Previous studies focusing on the effect of 
irrelevant emotions on response inhibition did not all observe effects on the 
behavioral level (e.g. Brown, et al., 2012). However, all studies showed an effect of 
irrelevant emotions on the neural level, indicative of increased effort when applying 
response inhibition within an affective context (Albert, et al., 2010; Brown, et al., 
2012). One open question is whether this effect is equally strong for relevant and 
irrelevant emotions.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
Affective or social contexts can interact with cognitive control, especially during 
childhood and adolescence (Blakemore & Robbins, 2012). The present study set out 
to directly compare the influence of relevant and irrelevant emotions on response 
inhibition across development. We show that with increasing age there is a linear 
increase in response inhibition performance within affective contexts. In this large 
cross-sectional sample we have found no evidence of a previously observed mid-
pubertal dip in affective response inhibition (Somerville, et al., 2011). 
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Furthermore, our results indicate that across development relevant emotions 
have a stronger effect on response inhibition compared to irrelevant emotions, and 
this effect was stronger in young children. In a free choice situation people did not 
base their decisions on irrelevant affective context. An interesting question for future 
research would be to incorporate a free choice condition in a response inhibition task 
with relevant affective context to further elucidate the influence of affective context 
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The primary goal of this thesis was to gain insight in the development of intentional 
inhibition. In the first four empirical chapters the marble task was employed in 
combination with heart rate and/or neuroimaging measures to gain insight in the 
covert processes underlying intentional inhibition. The marble paradigm is a valuable 
paradigm for studying the dynamics of intentional inhibition, in which participants are 
instructed to freely choose between acting and inhibiting to a rolling marble. Since the 
free choice trials are presented intermixed with instructed action trials, responding to 
the rolling marble is the prepotent response in the marble paradigm. Given that 
responding is prepotent, intentional inhibition in the marble paradigm taxes the late 
veto-mechanism.  
 In chapter 2 the marble paradigm was combined with the study of phasic 
heart rate changes in a cross-sectional experiment comparing 3 age groups (8-10, 11-
12, and 18-26). In this chapter it was shown that heart rate deceleration was a sensitive 
index of intentional action control. Both intentional inhibition and intentional action 
were associated with pronounced heart rate deceleration compared to externally 
guided action. Heart rate deceleration was most pronounced during intentional 
inhibition, indicative of the involvement of a central autonomic network in intentional 
inhibition. With regard to development, this study showed that children as young as 8-
years-old are well able to intentional inhibit a prepotent response. Both on the 
behavioral and on the heart rate level, there were no differences between age groups 
in intentional inhibition. 
 Chapter 3 examined the differences and similarities between intentionally and 
externally guided inhibition at the neural level in a group of young adults (18-26). So 
far, dissociations between intentional and externally guided inhibition were mainly 
based on conceptual ideas regarding both forms of inhibition, but the differences and 
similarities were never directly tested. The study described in chapter 3 aimed to test 
this in an experiment in which participants performed two experimental tasks: the 
marble task as a measure of intentional inhibition and the stop-signal task as a 
measure of externally guided inhibition. The results of this study showed that 
intentional and externally guided inhibition were supported by a common neural 
network. However, dFMC was found to be specifically activated for intentional 
inhibition, not for externally guided inhibition. Importantly, results showed that 
dFMC activation was context specific, such that dFMC activation during intentional 
inhibition was reduced when there was a strong prepotency for acting (i.e. when the 
intentional inhibition trial was preceded by a larger number of green action trials).  
 The study described in chapter 4 examined the role of the central autonomic 
network involved in intentional action control in a combined fMRI and heart rate 
study. For this study heart rate was measured continuously, while participants lay 
inside the scanner. The heart rate results showed a replication of the heart rate results 
presented in chapter 2, with pronounced heart rate deceleration for intentional 
compared to externally guided action control. Furthermore, the results showed that 
for intentional action control heart rate deceleration was related to activation in medial 
frontal cortex (in a region posterior to the dFMC region found in chapter 3) and for 
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externally guided action control heart rate deceleration was related to activation in 
lateral PFC. These results are consistent with an often suggested medial/lateral 
distinction for intentionally versus externally guided action control, and indicate that 
heart rate deceleration is an integrated part of the central autonomic network involved 
in intentional action control. 
 The development of intentional inhibition was further examined in the study 
presented in chapter 5. This study examined the neural correlates of intentional 
inhibition in a group of children (10-12) and a group of young adults (18-26). Even 
though both age groups were well able to intentionally inhibit a prepotent response on 
about 50% of the choice trials, the results showed that children recruited the fronto-
basal ganglia network to a different extent during intentional inhibition compared to 
adults. That is, compared to adults, children showed more activation during 
intentional inhibition relative to intentional action in the core regions of the fronto-
basal ganglia network. Correlations between intentional inhibition and self-reported 
impulsivity also differed with age. Adults who reported more impulsivity, more often 
choose to intentionally inhibit and showed more activation in the left putamen during 
intentional inhibition, but for children these correlations were not significant.  
 The final empirical chapter described in this thesis (chapter 6), examined the 
development of inhibition within an affective context. In this study, participants 
performed two tasks: an externally guided inhibition task in which emotion formed a 
relevant dimension, and a combined externally and intentionally guide inhibition task 
in which emotion formed an irrelevant dimension. The results showed that across 
development emotion only influenced inhibition performance when it formed a 
relevant dimension of the task. With regard to the development of intentional 
inhibition this study showed that also children younger than 8-years-old (the youngest 
age tested with the marble task) are able to intentionally inhibit. The youngest 
participants in this study were 6-years-old and although they intentionally inhibited 
less frequently than the participants who were 8 years of age and older (until 26), they 
were able to intentionally inhibit a prepotent response.  
 In the following section the main results of the empirical chapters described 
in this thesis will be discussed and directions for future research will be presented.  
 
 
7.2 General conclusions and future directions 
 
At a conceptual level there are clear reasons to dissociate intentional and externally 
guided inhibition (Filevich, et al., 2012). However, most studies have looked at either 
intentional or externally guided inhibition and no studies have yet directly compared 
both forms of inhibition. Based on previous studies examining either intentional or 
externally guided inhibition, a different underlying neural architecture was proposed, 
with intentional inhibition being associated with dFMC activation and externally 
guided inhibition being associated with activation in the fronto-basal ganglia network. 
The studies described in this thesis were the first to examine both forms of inhibition 
within the same participants. Below, the general conclusions based on these studies 
for the development of intentional inhibition will be given. 
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Development of intentional inhibition 
On the behavioral level, the developmental studies presented in this thesis have 
indicated that, in contrast to stimulus-driven inhibition, intentional inhibition as 
measured with the marble paradigm appears to have a relatively early developmental 
trajectory (chapters 2 and 5). This idea was reinforced by the absence of covert heart 
rate differences in response to intentional inhibition demands (chapter 2). However, 
the underlying neural correlates differed between children and adults, such that 
children compared to adults showed relatively more activation in the main nodes of 
the fronto-basal ganglia network during intentional inhibition compared to intentional 
action (chapter 5).  
 Thus, although in a neutral context, intentional inhibition performance 
appears to be mature in childhood, the underlying neural network is differently 
activated for children compared to adults, indicating that the network is still immature. 
Therefore, the neural network in children may be more vulnerable in motivationally 
and/or affectively relevant contexts. It remains an interesting question for future 
research to examine whether the developmental pathway of intentional inhibition is 
the same when faced with motivationally and/or affectively attractive options (see also 
the section: Self-control in context). 
 
Neural networks for intentional inhibition 
An important step in gaining insight in the development of intentional inhibition is 
gaining a better understanding of the neural network involved in intentional 
inhibition. The study presented in chapter 4 aimed to acquire this by examining the 
associations between heart rate deceleration and neural activation during intentional 
and externally guided action control. In this study it was shown that for intentional 
action control heart rate deceleration was related to activation in medial frontal cortex 
and for externally guided action control heart rate deceleration was related to 
activation in lateral PFC, consistent with an often-suggested medial/lateral distinction 
for intentional versus externally guided action control.  
 This study however, could not give insight in the dynamics of the neural 
network involved in intentional inhibition. That is, it does not help to understand how 
the different regions in the fronto-basal ganglia network and the dFMC interact to 
produce intentional inhibition. This will be an important question for future research, 
which could be examined with functional connectivity analyses, such as psycho-
physiological interactions (PPI) or dynamic causal modeling (DCM). The studies 
employing the marble task, which are presented in this thesis, were not very well 
suited for these kinds of functional connectivity analyses, given the fast-paced version 
of the marble task that was employed in this study. Therefore, future studies 
examining the dynamics of the neural network involved in intentional inhibition 
would benefit from a slower-paced intentional inhibition task. 
 Another approach to gain a better understanding of the neural network 
involved in intentional inhibition is by examining the relationship between intentional 
inhibition and structural connectivity. Diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) can be used to 
examine fractional anisotropy (FA), a measure of white matter integrity, of the tracts 
connecting different brain regions in a neural network. Preliminary results based on 
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additional data collected as part of the studies presented in this thesis show that there 
are developmental differences in the relation between FA in the white matter tract 
connecting right IFG and right SMA/preSMA and measures of self-control between 
children and adults (see Figure 1) (Schel, Peper, & Crone, in prep). That is, for self-
reported impulsivity both children and adults show a negative relationship with white-
matter integrity, indicating that individuals who are more impulsive have lower white 
matter connectivity between regions important for self-control. However, for 
intentional inhibition related activation in the right IFG the relation with white matter 
integrity changes with age. For children there is no relation between neural activation 
and structural connectivity, but for adults, individuals who have better structural 
connectivity also show more activation during intentional inhibition in right IFG (one 
of the key inhibitory regions). Taken together, these preliminary results suggest that 
the fronto-basal ganglia network continues to mature from childhood to adulthood. 
Whereas the network may appear mature for some components of self-control (i.e. 
self-reported impulsivity), there appears to be continued development related to 
intentional inhibition. Thus, even though behaviorally children are able to perform 
well on the task, the underlying neural architecture remains immature, both on the 
functional (see chapter 5) and on the structural level. 
 
 
Figure 1. Associations between white matter integrity in the rIFG-rSMA/preSMA tract and 
self-control across development (Schel, et al., in prep).  
 
 
Self-control in context 
As mentioned before, intentional inhibition rarely happens in an affectively neutral 
situation. When this affective information is irrelevant, intentional inhibition 
performance appears not to be influenced by the affective context (chapter 6). 
However, when faced with motivationally and/or affectively attractive options 
intentional inhibition might be influenced, especially during adolescence, a time during 
which appetitive cues might be experienced more strongly (Somerville, et al., 2010). 
An important motivator for self-control concerns determining the balance 
between preferring small immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards, a process 
also referred to as delay of gratification (Mischel, et al., 1989), or delay discounting 
(Ainslie, 2005; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994). Paradigms tapping into these processes 
are highly applicable to understanding intentional components of self-control, because 
in such paradigms, participants have control over whether to act and receive the 
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immediate reward, or to control the tendency to act by inhibiting and waiting for the 
delayed reward. A classic developmental paradigm in which these motivational forces 
are clearly present is the delay of gratification paradigm, also referred to as the 
marshmallow test. This delay of gratification paradigm for preschoolers presents 
children with one pair of two options: one marshmallow now, or two marshmallows 
after an unspecified delay (Mischel, et al., 1989). Studies using this paradigm have 
shown that there are individual differences in the ability to inhibit the impulse to 
choose the immediately gratifying option of one marshmallow during the preschool 
ages (Mischel, et al., 1989), which appear to be predictive for self-control abilities later 
in life (Casey, et al., 2011; Eigsti et al., 2006). In addition, Casey and colleagues found 
that individuals who were less able to delay gratification when they were preschoolers, 
showed poorer self-control and differential recruitment of the fronto-basal ganglia 
network during an emotional go/nogo paradigm 40 years later (Casey, et al., 2011), 
suggesting that these early individual differences reflect temperament characteristics 
with long term effects. 
In addition to these individual differences, several studies have reported that 
preferences for small immediate rewards tend to decrease as a function of age, 
suggesting that self-control increases with age (Christakou, et al., 2011; de Water, 
Cillessen, & Scheres, in press; Lee, et al., 2013; Olson, Hooper, Collins, & Luciana, 
2007; Prencipe et al., 2011; Scheres, et al., 2006; Steinberg et al., 2009). This has been 
observed both in real-time delay discounting task, in which participants really have to 
wait during the delay, and in hypothetical delay discounting tasks, in which 
participants not have to experience the delay. When hypothetical delay tasks are 
combined with brain imaging, it was found that in adults a network of brain regions, 
including medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), ventral striatum, and posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC), regions involved in the valuation of immediate rewards, and posterior 
parietal cortex (PPC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), and ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) regions involved in the valuation of immediate and delayed 
rewards, is associated with hypothetical delay discounting (for a review, see Scheres, 
de Water, & Mies, 2013).  
To date, no study has yet examined the neural correlates of actual waiting for 
delayed rewards during real delay discounting tasks across development, which entails 
the intentional inhibition of an (tempting) action. The prediction would be that 
waiting for the delayed reward will be associated with increased activity in the dFMC, 
a region which partly overlaps with the mPFC region associated with hypothetical 
discounting. Currently, only a few studies have focused on the inhibition of tempting 
actions and these studies were all based on adults. These studies have shown that in 
adults, inhibiting the temptation to continue gambling (Campbell-Meiklejohn, et al., 
2008), and inhibiting a craving for cigarettes (Brody, et al., 2007) both activate the 
dFMC, the same region implicated in intentional inhibition of motoric actions (Brass 
& Haggard, 2007; Kühn, et al., 2009; Schel, et al., 2014). Given that developmental 
differences seem present mostly when there is a strong motivation to act, an 
important model for future research will be to test the interplay between activity in 
brain regions which drive emotions and brain regions which ‘veto’ our motives to act, 
which will allow us to understand self-control from a broader perspective, integrating 
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knowledge from externally-guided response control, motivation, and internal self-
control. 
 
Implications for developmental disorders 
There are several childhood/adolescence disorders, which are associated with 
problems with self-control, such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) 
(Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & Pennington, 2005), oppositional defiant 
disorder/conduct disorder (ODD/CD) (Nigg, 2003), and substance abuse (Wills & 
Stoolmiller, 2002). Traditionally, these disorders have been examined from a self-
control perspective using externally driven inhibition tasks, with mixed results. For 
example, meta-analyses of studies using externally driven inhibition tasks have shown 
that there are clear inhibition problems in children and adults with ADHD (Lijffijt, 
Kenemans, Verbaten, & van Engeland, 2005; Willcutt, et al., 2005). However, effect 
sizes are small to moderate, and not all children with ADHD have problems with 
externally driven inhibition (Nigg, Willcutt, Doyle, & Sonuga-Barke, 2005). In terms 
of neurobiological correlates, the results of prior studies have shown that children and 
adults with ADHD show decreased recruitment of the fronto-basal ganglia network 
(including rIFG) during externally driven response inhibition compared to healthy 
controls (for meta-analyses, see: Cortese et al., 2012; Hart, Radua, Nakao, Mataix-Cols, 
& Rubia, 2013). 
One interesting direction for future research on self-control in ADHD, will 
be to examine the role of intentional inhibition, given that in many daily life situations, 
children need to control impulses such as wanting to get up of their chair and walk 
around in the classroom. These types of behavior, which are typical or children with 
ADHD or conduct disorder, often require an internal decision to inhibit, or veto, 
actions. The behavioral paradigms and neurobiological model proposed in this thesis 
provide a promising starting point for examining intentional inhibition in these 
disorders. Additionally, as children grow up, adults expect an increasing ability to 
intentionally inhibit actions. Specifically, when still in their childhood, individuals with 
ADHD will more often than not have adults in their proximity who serve as external 
drivers of self-controlled behaviors.  However, as individuals with ADHD get older, 
the demands on internally driven inhibition will only increase. For example, in high 
school and beyond, it is expected that students demonstrate self-controlled behaviors 
with less and less assistance from others. Therefore, an intriguing hypothesis, which 
could be addressed in future research, is that the development of intentional inhibition 
may play a role in the remission versus persistence of ADHD symptoms over time.  
A promising start for studying intentional inhibition in motivationally relevant 
contexts in individuals with ADHD has been made in research employing delay 
discounting tasks (Barkley, Edwards, Laneri, Fletcher, & Metevia, 2001; Demurie, 
Roeyers, Baeyens, & Sonuga-Barke, 2012; Hurst, Kepley, McCalla, & Livermore, 2011; 
Paloyelis, Asherson, Mehta, Faraone, & Kuntsi, 2010; Plichta et al., 2009; Scheres, et 
al., 2006; Scheres, Tontsch, Thoeny, & Kaczkurkin, 2010; Wilson, Mitchell, Musser, 
Schmitt, & Nigg, 2011) or choice delay tasks (Solanto et al., 2001; Sonuga-Barke, 
Taylor, Sembi, & Smith, 1992; for a review, see: Luman, Oosterlaan, & Sergeant, 
2005). These tasks are relevant here, because participants have control over whether 
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or not to control the tendency to act by inhibiting and waiting for the delayed reward. 
If these tasks are viewed as measures of intentional inhibition, a preliminary 
conclusion would be that those with ADHD have relatively weak intentional 
inhibition, since the majority of studies has demonstrated that individuals with ADHD 
chose not to control the tendency to act and prefer the immediate reward. However, it 
should be noted that additional processes are involved in delay discounting tasks such 
as delay aversion and sensitivity to reward magnitude and reward immediacy (Marco et 
al., 2009; Scheres, Tontsch, et al., 2010). Additionally, a substantial portion of these 
studies made use of hypothetical tasks, reducing the demand on intentional inhibition 
to resist a temptation. Therefore, other paradigms may be more suitable for measuring 
intentional inhibition in individuals with ADHD, both in cool contexts, such as the 
marble paradigm (Kühn, et al., 2009), and in hot contexts, such as the marshmallow 
paradigm (Mischel, et al., 1989). 
A better understanding of the typical development of the underlying 
mechanisms of the ability to intentionally inhibit tempting actions, might help to 
better understand developmental disorders of impulsivity such as ADHD. Currently, 
many children with ADHD receive cognitive behavioral therapy focused on the use of 
external reinforcers in order to stimulate positive behavior (Serrano-Troncoso, Guidi, 
& Alda-Diez, 2013). However, an important direction for future research will be to 
examine whether shifting the focus to motivations and drives from within (internal 
processes) may help children, adolescents, and adults with ADHD to better regulate 





To conclude, examining self-control development from the perspective of intentional 
inhibition is a valid and important road for future research. The studies presented in 
this thesis have shown that intentional inhibition can at least be partially dissociated 
from externally guided inhibition based on underlying neural networks. Furthermore, 
on the behavioral level intentional inhibition appears to have a relatively early 
development compared to externally guided inhibition. However, the underlying 
neural network is still immature in childhood, leaving the network potentially 
vulnerable under motivationally and/or affectively taxing circumstances. Therefore, it 
remains an important avenue for future research to examine whether this early 


















Zelfcontrole is de vaardigheid om zelf de controle te hebben over je eigen acties, 
gedachten en emoties (Casey & Caudle, 2013). Deze zelfcontrole vaardigheden zijn 
zeer belangrijk voor succesvol functioneren in het dagelijks leven (bijvoorbeeld in 
sociale situaties en in school- en werk-omgevingen). De ontwikkeling van zelfcontrole 
is daarom een belangrijk aspect van de cognitieve ontwikkeling van kinderen en 
adolescenten (Diamond, 2013).  
 De vaardigheid om zelf je acties te stoppen (intentionele inhibitie) vormt de 
kern van zelfcontrole. Intentionele inhibitie is gedefinieerd als een laat ‘veto’ 
mechanisme (Filevich et al., 2012) waarmee men er zelf voor kan kiezen om een 
alreeds geïnitieerde actie op het allerlaatste moment te stoppen (Filevich et al., 2012; 
Haggard, 2008). Dit proces verschilt van stimulus- of extern gedreven inhibitie, 
waarbij het niet iemands eigen gedachtenproces, maar een extern signaal is, dat 
aangeeft dat je met je actie moet stoppen.  
 Zover, heeft het meeste onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van zelfcontrole 
gebruik gemaakt extern gedreven inhibitie taken. Echter, intentionele inhibitie is zeer 
belangrijk tijdens de ontwikkeling en problemen met intentionele inhibitie vormen 
ook een belangrijke component in psychologische stoornissen zoals Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (Moffit et al., 2011). Daarom is het doel van de 
studies beschreven in dit proefschrift om meer inzicht te krijgen in de ontwikkeling 
van intentionele inhibitie.  
 
 
8.2 Intentionele inhibitie 
 
In het dagelijks leven moeten we vaak zelf beslissen om onze acties te stoppen, 
aangezien er niet altijd expliciete signalen zijn die aangeven dat je moet stoppen. 
Ondanks dat intentionele inhibitie zo belangrijk is in het dagelijks leven, heeft 
voorgaand onderzoek zich voornamelijk gericht op de ontwikkeling van extern 
gedreven inhibitie. Uit dit onderzoek hebben we geleerd dat extern gedreven inhibitie 
een langzame ontwikkeling heeft. Jonge kinderen kunnen wel inhiberen, maar zij doen 
dit nog niet zo efficiënt als volwassenen (Luna et al., 2010). Ook laten kinderen een 
ander patroon van hersenactiviteit zien tijdens extern gedreven inhibitie dan 
volwassenen (e.g. Durston et al., 2002). 
 Een belangrijke reden waarom onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van inhibitie 
voornamelijk naar extern gedreven inhibitie heeft gekeken, is dat intentionele inhibitie 
moeilijk te onderzoeken is. Bij het onderzoeken van de ontwikkeling van intentionele 
inhibitie hebben we te maken met drie belangrijke struikelblokken. Allereest resulteert 
intentionele inhibitie in geen gedragsoutput. Dit betekent dat wanneer we enkel naar 
gedrag kijken, we enkel kunnen zeggen of iemand heeft geïnhibeerd of niet. Echter, 
op basis van enkel geen gedrag is het moeilijk om te concluderen dat men 
daadwerkelijk een actie heeft geïnhibeerd (zie ook het derde struikelblok). Daarom zijn 
psychofysiologische en neuroimaging maten erg belangrijk in het onderzoek naar 
intentionele inhibitie, aangezien ze kunnen helpen om inzicht te krijgen in de aan 
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intentionele inhibitie ten grondslag liggende processen.  Ten tweede, is intentionele 
inhibitie een intern proces, wat niet vooraf wordt gegaan door een extern signaal. Dit 
maakt dat intentionele inhibitie lastig is te manipuleren in een experimentele taak. Ten 
derde, om te kunnen spreken van intentionele inhibitie moet er ook daadwerkelijk een 
actie worden geïnhibeerd. Echter, op gedragsniveau kunnen we geen onderscheid 
maken tussen een actie die op het allerlaatste moment is geïnhibeerd en een actie die 
nooit was geïnitieerd. De vroege keuze om een actie niet te initiëren komt vaker voor 
in experimentele taken waarin er geen sterkte motivatie om een actie uit te voeren is 
(Filevich et al, 2012). Daarom is het belangrijk dat taken om intentionele inhibitie te 
onderzoeken een sterke motivatie of prepotentie voor actie bevatten.   
 In de experimenten beschreven in dit proefschrift is gebruik gemaakt van het 
knikkerspel om intentionele inhibitie te meten. In dit spel rolt er steeds een witte 
knikker van een helling naar beneden. Zodra de knikker begint te rollen, verandert de 
knikker van kleur en wordt hij groen. Deelnemers is gevraagd om zo snel mogelijk op 
een knop te drukken om de knikker te stoppen en er zo voor te zorgen dat de knikker 
niet van de helling afrolt en breekt. Deze groene knikker conditie creëert een 
prepotentie voor actie. Dat wil zeggen, zodra deelnemers een knikker bovenaan de 
helling zien liggen, zitten ze klaar om op de knop te druk zodra de knikker begint te 
rollen.  Tijdens een gedeelte van de trials verandert de rollende knikker niet van kleur 
(hij blijft wit) en mogen de deelnemers zelf kiezen of ze willen reageren of inhiberen. 
Aangezien reageren de prepotente actie is in dit spel, heeft men het late ‘veto’ 
mechanisme voor intentionele inhibitie nodig in dit spel. De eerste 4 empirische 
hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2 t/m 5) maken gebruik van het 
knikkerspel in combinatie met hartslag en neuroimaging maten om meer inzicht te 
krijgen in processen betrokken bij intentionele inhibitie. 
 
Hartslag 
Een belangrijke maat om de aan intentionele inhibitie ten grondslag liggende 
processen te bestuderen is de studie van fasische hartslag veranderingen. 
Veranderingen van hartslag naar hartslag staan onder de controle van zowel het 
sympathisch als het parasympathisch zenuwstelsel (Berntson et al., 2007). Het 
sympathisch systeem heeft relatieve lange termijn effecten, het kost het sympathisch 
systeem  enkele seconden om de hartslag te beïnvloeden. Het parasympathisch 
systeem daarentegen, heeft een meer direct effect op het hart en kan de hartslag snel 
vertragen. Deze snelle parasympathische hartslag vertraging wordt geïnterpreteerd als 
een oriëntatie reflex (Bradley, 2009).  
 Parasympathische hartslag veranderingen zijn een gevoelige index van 
cognitieve controle processen in het algemeen (Crone et al., 2003, 2004; Jennings et 
al., 2003) en van actie en inhibitie in het bijzonder (Jennings & Van der Molen, 2002; 
Van der Veen et al., 2000).  Gedurende de voorbereiding voor een snelle reactie, 
treedt er gewoonlijke een voorbereidende hartslag vertraging op (Jennings & Van der 
Molen, 2002, 2005). Wanneer er een reactie wordt gegeven of een actie wordt 
uitgevoerd, wordt deze voorbereidende hartslag vertraging gevolgd door een hartslag 
versnelling, waardoor de hartslag weer herstelt naar zijn basissnelheid (Jennings & Van 
der Molen, 2005).  Echter, wanneer men een actie inhibeerd, wordt deze hartslag 
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versnelling uitgesteld en vertraagd de hartslag verder (Jennings & Van der Molen, 
2005, Van der Veen et al., 2000).  
In dit proefschrift worden fasische hartslag veranderingen bestudeerd om 
meer inzicht te krijgen in de ontwikkeling van intentionele inhibitie (hoofstuk 2). In 
hoofdstuk 4 wordt deze maat gebruikt in combinatie met neuroimaging om meer 
inzicht the krijgen in het aan intentionele inhibitie ten grondslag liggende netwerk. 
 
fMRI 
Functionele MRI (fMRI) is een neuroimaging techniek die inzicht geeft in welke 
hersengebieden betrokken zijn bij cognitieve processen. Hierbij wordt gebruik 
gemaakt van de zogenaamde Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) response.  
 Deze techniek is veel gebruikt om de neurale correlaten van extern gedreven 
inhibitie te onderzoeken. Deze studies hebben laten zien dat er tijdens extern 
gedreven inhibitie een specifiek netwerk van hersengebieden actief is, waaronder de 
rechter inferior frontal gyrus, de pre-supplementary motor area en de subthalamic 
nucleus (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008).  Recent, zijn er ook 
enkele fMRI studies naar intentionele inhibitie gedaan. Deze studies hebben laten zien 
dat voor volwassenen intentionele inhibitie, in tegenstelling tot extern gedreven 
inhibitie, is geassocieerd met activatie in een specifiek gebied in de frontale cortex, 
namelijk in de dorsal fronto-median cortex (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Kühn et al., 
2009). 
 In dit proefschrift is fMRI gebruikt om te onderzoeken of intentionele 
inhibitie en extern gedreven inhibitie inderdaad op basis van het onderliggende neurale 
netwerk van elkaar onderscheiden kunnen worden (hoofdstuk 3). In hoofdstuk 5 is 
fMRI daarnaast gebruikt om de ontwikkeling van het aan intentionele inhibitie ten 
grondslag liggende neurale netwerk te onderzoeken. 
 
 
8.3 Samenvatting van de studies 
 
In de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 2 speelden deelnemers het knikkerspel terwijl 
hun hartslag continue werd gemeten. In deze cross-sectionele studie werden 3 
leeftijdsgroepen (8-10, 11-12, en 18-26) met elkaar vergeleken. De resultaten van deze 
studie laten zien dat fasische hartslag veranderingen een goede index zijn voor 
intentionele actie controle. Zowel intentionele inhibitie als intentionele actie waren 
geassocieerd met een sterkere hartslagvertraging dan extern gedreven actie. Tijdens 
intentionele inhibitie was de hartslagvertraging bovendien het sterkst. Daarnaast laten 
de resultaten zien dat jonge kinderen (8-jarigen) al zeer goed in staat zijn om 
intentioneel te inhiberen. Zij deden dit op hetzelfde niveau als de volwassenen in deze 
studie en ook op het gebied van fasische hartslag veranderingen waren er geen 
verschillen tussen de leeftijdsgroepen.  
 In hoofdstuk 3 zijn de verschillen en overeenkomsten tussen intentionele en 
extern gedreven inhibitie onderzocht in een groep jong-volwassenen (18-26 jaar). Tot 
nog toe, werden intentionele en extern gedreven inhibitie vooral van elkaar 
onderscheiden op basis van conceptuele ideeën ten aanzien van beide vormen van 
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inhibitie. Voorgaand fMRI onderzoek heeft weliswaar gesuggereerd dat intentionele 
en extern gedreven inhibitie zijn geassocieerd met verschillende neurale netwerken, 
maar dit is nog nooit direct getest is dezelfde proefpersonen. De studie beschreven in 
hoofdstuk 3 was de eerste om beide vormen van inhibitie direct te vergelijken. 
Hiervoor hebben de deelnemers twee taken uitgevoerd terwijl ze in de scanner lagen: 
het knikkerspel als een maat van intentionele inhibitie en een stop-signaal taak als maat 
van extern gedreven inhibitie. In de stop-signaal taak moesten de deelnemers zo snel 
mogelijk aangeven in welke richting een pijl wees. Echter, als de pijl onverwacht rood 
werd, was dit een extern signaal dat ze hun reactie moesten inhiberen. De resultaten 
van deze studie hebben laten zien dat intentionele en extern gedreven inhibitie in 
dezelfde proefpersonen worden ondersteund door eenzelfde neuraal netwerk. Echter, 
daarnaast was er ook activatie specifiek voor intentionele inhibitie in de dorsal fronto-
median cortex, het hersengebied dat eerder met intentionele inhibitie was 
geassocieerd.  De resultaten van deze studie laten echter zien dat de activatie van dit 
hersengebied context specifiek is. Dat wil zeggen, dit gebied was minder actief 
wanneer er een sterke prepotentie voor actie was. 
 Het netwerk geassocieerd met intentionele actie controle is verder onderzocht 
in hoofdstuk 4. Voor deze studie werd de hartslag continue gemeten terwijl de 
deelnemers in de MRI scanner het knikkerspel speelden. De hartslag resultaten waren 
een replicatie van de studie beschreven in hoofdstuk 2: hartslag vertraagde meer 
tijdens intentionele dan extern gedreven actie controle. Bovendien was 
hartslagvertraging geassocieerd met hersenactiviteit tijdens het knikkerspel. Tijdens 
intentionele actie controle was hartslagvertraging geassocieerd met activatie in de 
mediale frontale cortex (in een gebied iets achter het dorsal fronto-median cortex 
gebied uit hoofdstuk 3). Hartslagvertraging tijdens extern gedreven actie controle was 
geassocieerd met activatie in laterale frontale cortex. Deze resultaten zijn consistent 
met een vaak gesuggereerde mediaal/lateraal distinctie voor intentioneel versus extern 
gedreven actie controle. Ook laten ze zien dat hartslag vertraging een integraal 
onderdeel is van het centraal autonoom netwerk voor intentionele actie controle. 
 De ontwikkeling van intentionele inhibitie is verder bekeken in de studie 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 5. Deze studie focuste op de neurale netwerken die ten 
grondslag liggen aan intentionele inhibitie in een groep kinderen (10-12) en een groep 
jong-volwassenen (18-26). Zowel de kinderen als de jong-volwassenen waren in staat 
om hun prepotente reactie in ongeveer 50% van de tijd intentioneel te inhiberen. 
Ondanks hetzelfde gedragspatroon, verschilden de groepen in onderliggende neurale 
activiteit. Beiden groepen activeerden hetzelfde frontal-basal ganglia hersennetwerk, 
maar kinderen activeerden dit netwerk sterker tijdens intentionele inhibitie dan 
intentionele actie in vergelijking met volwassenen. Daarnaast waren er ook verschillen 
in correlaties tussen zelf-gerapporteerde impulsiviteit en intentionele inhibitie tussen 
de leeftijdsgroepen. Dat is, volwassenen die meer impulsiviteit rapporteerden, kozen 
er vaker voor om intentioneel te inhiberen en zij lieten ook meer activiteit in het 
putamen zien tijdens intentionele inhibitie. Voor kinderen waren deze correlaties niet 
significant. Dus ondanks het feit dat kinderen en volwassenen hetzelfde gedrag laten 
zien, blijkt het onderliggende netwerk voor intentionele inhibitie in kinderen nog niet 
volledig ontwikkeld. 
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 In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 6) is de 
ontwikkeling van intentionele inhibitie in een affectieve context onderzocht. Tot zover 
hebben alle studies gebruik gemaakt van het knikkerspel, waarmee de ontwikkeling 
van intentionele inhibitie in een neutrale context onderzocht kan worden. Echter in 
het dagelijks leven moet de beslissing om intentioneel te inhiberen vaak in een 
affectieve context gemaakt worden. Daarom zijn in deze studie twee inhibitie taken 
met een affectieve context gebruikt. De eerste taak was een extern gedreven inhibitie 
taak waarin emotie een relevante dimensie vormde. In deze taak moesten de 
deelnemers zo snel mogelijk reageren als ze een bepaald emotioneel gezicht zagen 
(bijvoorbeeld blij) en inhiberen als ze een ander emotioneel gezicht zagen 
(bijvoorbeeld neutraal). De tweede taak was een gecombineerde intentioneel en extern 
gedreven inhibitie taak waarin emotie een aanwezige, maar irrelevante dimensie 
vormde. In deze taak werden verschillende emotionele gezichten in verschillende 
kleuren getoond en de kleuren gaven aan of de deelnemer moest reageren, inhiberen 
of dat hij zelf mocht kiezen om te reageren of inhiberen (de intentionele inhibitie 
conditie).  De resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat gedurende de ontwikkeling 
emotie alleen een effect heeft op inhibitie gedrag wanneer het een relevante dimensie 
van de taak vormt. Ten aanzien van de ontwikkeling van intentionele inhibitie, laten 
de resultaten zien dat ook kinderen jonger dan 8 jaar (de jongste deelnemers aan deze 
studie waren 6 jaar) in staat zijn om intentioneel te inhiberen. De 6-jarigen deden dit 
echter wel minder frequent dan de deelnemers van 8 jaar en ouder.  
 
 
8.4 Algemene conclusies en richtingen voor vervolgonderzoek 
 
De studies beschreven in dit proefschrift hebben laten zien dat intentionele inhibitie 
een relatief vroeg ontwikkelingstraject heeft in vergelijking met extern gedreven 
inhibitie. Dit werd onder andere ondersteund door het feit dat kinderen dezelfde 
hartslag responsen lieten zien als volwassenen tijdens intentionele inhibitie. Echter, het 
onderliggende neurale netwerk werd door kinderen sterker geactiveerd om tot 
hetzelfde gedrag als volwassenen te komen. Dit wijst erop dat het onderliggende 
netwerk voor kinderen nog niet volledig ontwikkeld is. Hierdoor kan het netwerk 
kwetsbaarder zijn in motivationele en affectieve contexten.  
 Om de mogelijke kwetsbaarheid van het onderliggende neurale netwerk in 
kinderen beter te begrijpen is het belangrijk om een beter inzicht in de dynamiek van 
dit netwerk te krijgen. De studies beschreven in dit proefschrift hebben laten zien 
welke hersengebieden bij dit netwerk betrokken zijn. De volgende stap is om te 
onderzoeken hoe deze hersengebieden met elkaar samenwerken om intentionele 
inhibitie te ondersteunen. Een veelbelovende aanpak hiervoor is om te kijken naar de 
connecties tussen de betrokken hersengebieden. Dit kan met behulp van diffusion 
tensor imaging, waarmee men de witte stof connecties tussen hersengebieden in kaart 
kan brengen.  Voorlopige resultaten, verkregen uit additionele date verzameld als 
onderdeel van de studies in dit proefschrift, laten zien dat er ontwikkelingsverschillen 
zijn in de relatie tussen witte stof connecties en gedrag (Schel et al., in prep). Voor de 
ene component van zelfcontrole (impulsiviteit) is de relatie tussen witte stof 
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connecties en gedrag al vroeg op een volwassen niveau, terwijl voor de andere 
component van zelfcontrole (intentionele inhibitie) de relatie verschilt tussen kinderen 
en volwassenen. 
 Dit onvolwassen netwerk maakt intentionele inhibitie in kinderen kwetsbaar 
voor de mogelijke invloed van motivationele of affectieve contexten. De studie 
gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 6 heeft laten zien dat affectieve context geen invloed heeft 
op intentionele inhibitie gedurende de ontwikkeling, wanneer deze affectieve context 
irrelevant is. Echter in het dagelijks leven is een motivationele of affectieve context 
vaak zeer relevant en kan dus een effect hebben op intentionele inhibitie. Dit effect 
zou bovendien extra sterk kunnen zijn gedurende de adolescentie, wanneer affectieve 
cues sterker worden ervaren (Somerville et al., 2010).  Een belangrijke richting voor 
vervolgonderzoek is daarom om de ontwikkeling van intentionele inhibitie in een sterk 
relevante motivationele of affectieve context te onderzoeken. 
 Uiteindelijk kan een beter begrip van de aan intentionele inhibitie ten 
grondslag liggende mechanismen ook helpen om een beter begrip te krijgen van 
ontwikkelingsstoornissen waarin zelfcontrole een belangrijke rol speelt, zoals ADHD. 
Een belangrijke richting voor vervolgonderzoek is om te onderzoeken of een focus op 
intentionele inhibitie bij kinderen met ADHD kan helpen om hen te leren om hun 





Samenvattend kan men concluderen dat het belangrijk is om zelfcontrole vanuit het 
perspectief van intentionele inhibitie te onderzoeken. Intentionele inhibitie kan op 
basis van zijn onderliggende neurale netwerk deels van extern gedreven inhibitie 
worden onderscheiden. Daarnaast heeft intentionele inhibitie een relatief vroeg 
ontwikkelingstraject in vergelijking met extern gedreven inhibitie. Echter het 
onderliggende neurale netwerk is nog niet volgroeid, waardoor het kwetsbaarder is in 
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